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Hierarchy is a defining feature of groups (Berger et al., 1972; Fiske, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). In this thesis I examined what it takes to climb up this hierarchy in face-to-face 
groups. I did so from three angles: what people need to do in order to attain status, what kind 
of person people need to be in order to attain status, and what people may need to sacrifice in 
order to attain status. Moreover, I assessed the moderating effect on these relations of two 
fundamental processes underlying group hierarchies: dominance (i.e., assertively claiming 
status) and prestige (i.e., willingly being granted status).  
  Before addressing the main questions of this thesis, I examined the impact of dominance 
and prestige processes on perceptions of group hierarchy types (Chapter 2). A vignette study 
found that assertively claiming status for oneself and willingly being granted status both 
emerged as viable ways of enhancing perceived status, above and beyond formal status. It 
also found that, at the group level, each type of process worked against the other: perceptions 
of each were undermined by mixing it with the other. This finding implies that groups can be 
classed along a hierarchy type continuum, ranging from highly dominance-based to highly 
prestige-based. 
  Having empirically established how dominance and prestige processes jointly shape the 
types of hierarchies that exist in groups, I addressed the main questions of this thesis in a 
series of experimental and naturalistic studies.  
  In Chapter 3, I examined the interpersonal behaviours that promote status in different types 
of group hierarchies. I found that agentic behaviour promoted status both in dominance-
based and in prestige-based hierarchies. In contrast, communal behaviour augmented status 
in prestige-based hierarchies, but diminished status in dominance-based hierarchies. Thus, I 
found that status attainment is associated with diametrically different interpersonal 
behaviours in different hierarchy types. 
  In Chapter 4, I assessed how the self-appraisals of people who engage in different status-
promoting behaviours differ. I found that self-esteem was associated with behaviour that was 
high in agency and high in communion, whereas narcissism was associated with behaviour 
that was high in agency and low in communion. Thus, self-esteem related to behaviours that 
promote status in prestige-based groups, whereas narcissism related to behaviours that 
promote status in dominance-based groups.  
  In Chapter 5, an experimental study found that the interpersonal warmth towards 
individuals increased with status in relatively prestige-based hierarchies and decreased with 
status in relatively dominance-based hierarchies. In other words, in prestige-based groups, 
being liked and being included were liable to go hand-in-hand, whereas in dominance-based 
groups, there was a trade-off between them: to attain status one might need to sacrifice 
inclusion. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution as I failed to replicate it 
in a subsequent naturalistic study. 
  Together, these findings presented in this thesis convincingly demonstrate that hierarchy 
type is a diversifying feature of groups. As such, they powerfully illustrate the importance of 
distinguishing between dominance-based and prestige-based groups.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Hierarchy, Status, and Status Processes in Face-to-Face Groups  
One of the most important challenges that people face in navigating their 
social world is attaining status (Fiske, 2010). People with high status are more 
influential (Berger, Cohen & Zelditch, 1972), have larger and stronger social 
networks (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993), enjoy a wider choice in romantic partners 
(Betzig, 1986), and lead longer and healthier lives (Ellis, 1994). To have status is to 
succeed, to lack it is to fail.  
In this thesis I examine what it takes to attain status. I do so in several ways. 
First, I assess what people need to do in order to attain status. To achieve this, I 
assess what types of interpersonal behaviours promote status and what types of 
behaviours diminish it. Second, I assess what kind of person people need to be in 
order to attain status, focusing in particular on how people who engage in status-
promoting behaviours feel about themselves. Finally, I assess what people may need 
to sacrifice in order to attain status. In particular, I focus on a possible interpersonal 
ramification of status: whether a high rank in a status hierarchy comes at the expense 
of the interpersonal warmth one receives from others.   
As human psychology is adapted for the intimate hunter-gatherer bands in 
which we spent much of evolutionary history (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Van Vugt, 
Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), this investigation is focused on status in face-to-face 
groups. Hierarchies in such groups can be based on two profoundly different 
processes: dominance and prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). I argue that what it 
takes to attain status in a group will depend strongly on the extent to which each of 
these processes underlies the group hierarchy.  2 
 
Hierarchy and status in face-to-face groups 
A group hierarchy is defined here as the informal ranking of group members 
along one or more social dimensions (e.g., Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Informal status differences emerge in interactions between group 
members. Formal status differences, on the other hand, may be established by forces 
within (e.g., explicitly agreed rules) or outside of a group (e.g., the formal hierarchy 
of the organization in which a group exists). Formal and informal hierarchies may 
often overlap but need not overlap: informal leaders of a group may be held in high 
standing, whereas formally appointed bosses may not be taken seriously. In this 
thesis I focus on informal rather than formal hierarchies because, when the two 
diverge, it is the informal hierarchy that truly reflects the relative ranking of group 
members in the eyes of others.  
I focus on status in face-to-face groups, defined as groups where status is 
mediated by proximate rather than formalized interactions (Anderson, John, Keltner, 
& Kring, 2001). To qualify as face-to-face groups, groups must not be too large or 
too geographically dispersed, as this hinders face-to-face interactions among all 
members. Face-to-face groups are ubiquitous. Many task or project teams in the 
work environment engage in face-to-face interactions, as do sports teams, groups of 
friends and relatives. Moreover, across evolution, humans were generally organized 
in face-to-face groups, making this the natural habitat to which our psychology is 
adapted (Caporael, 1996). 
The term status is used here to refer to a person’s position in an informal 
group hierarchy. I use the term status rather than the term rank or position, because 
the latter are often associated with more formally established hierarchies. As group 
hierarchies need not reflect the formal order at the level of groups, organizations or 3 
 
society, they are subjectively perceived rather than objectively verifiable from typical 
indicators of formal status like education level, position, or income. Conceptually, 
this differentiates status in such a hierarchy from a number of related concepts. For 
example, Social Economic Status (SES) is based on objectively verifiable indicators 
of a person’s achievements and possessions. Moreover, a hierarchy of power 
differentiates individuals in terms of their control (or potential control) over valued 
resources (e.g., Fiske, 2010). This implies that power often goes beyond mere 
psychological influence and in such cases has an objective, rather than subjective 
base.  
Although face-to-face status is essentially subjective, the presence of status 
differences in a group affects how people interact. Firstly, high status group members 
are more prominent than low status group members: they speak more, their opinion 
is sought more often, and their contributions receive more attention from others 
(Berger et al., 1972; Chance, 1967). Secondly, high status group members are more 
influential than low status group members: they are better able to get what they want 
from other group members, and their opinions carry more weight in group decisions 
(Berger et al., 1972; Hawley, 1999; Mazur, 1985). Prominence and influence are so 
strongly intertwined with status that many definitions list them as defining features 
of status (Anderson et al., 2001).  
In this thesis, prominence and influence are both taken to be necessary 
components of status. In other words, neither alone suffices to constitute the informal 
ranking that exists in a group: prominence without influence does not constitute 
status, nor does influence without prominence. Moreover, jointly prominence and 
influence are taken to be sufficient indicators of status. Thus status can be defined 4 
 
and measured in terms of prominence and influence: in order to know whether status 
is high, it is sufficient to determine whether prominence and influence are high. 
 The definition above bucks the recent trend in social psychology to define 
status solely in terms of prestige (e.g. Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). 
However, it echoes perspectives in anthropology (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) 
and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng, Tracy, 
& Henrich, 2010) that define status in terms of both dominance and prestige, because 
prominence and influence may reflect a ranking based on prestige, on dominance, or 
on both. As such, the recurrent definition also incorporates the so-called “conflict” 
perspective that defines status in terms of the aggressive dominance of one party over 
another (e.g., Mazur, 1985; Mills, 1956). More importantly, it fittingly reflects the 
informal hierarchy that exists in the eyes of group members. This type of hierarchy 
need not always be based on prestige. As victims of high-school bullies, or 
subordinates of autocratic bosses realize, dominant or aggressive individuals enjoy a 
certain status in the eyes of others, enjoying both prominence and influence, but not 
necessarily prestige. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 2, my definition also accords 
with lay perceptions of status as potentially resulting from dominance-processes, 
prestige-processes, or both.  
Defining status in terms of prominence and influence allows me to further 
distinguish it from power. Distinguishing status from power conceptually is 
important. Although status and power are empirically distinct constructs and have 
distinct effects on for example social judgments (Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011), 
resource allocation strategies (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991), and intergroup perception 
(Boldry & Gaertner, 2006), the two constructs are conceptually confounded. For 
example, both are important sources of influence (Boldry & Gaertner, 2006; Fragale 5 
 
et al., 2011). Moreover, both are context-dependent, and may often reflect a person’s 
competence in a given context (e.g., compare a recruiter of a prestigious company 
dealing with job applicants or being fined by a police officer for speeding on the way 
home; Berger et al, 1972; Fragale et al, 2011). However, where status necessarily 
involves both prominence and influence, power need not involve prominence, as in 
the case of a disregarded leader mentioned earlier. Status, on the other hand, need not 
imply control. In prestige-based hierarchies, crude attempts to assert control can 
decrease status (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). In dominance-based hierarchies where 
status is maintained through threat, status may more often entail control. However, as 
status exists purely in the eyes of others, high-status group members need not 
actually control resources, but may be merely be perceived as controlling them (see 
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991 for such an attribution process at the group level). 
According to the current definition of status, both street gang leaders and 
eminent psychologists qualify as examples of people with high status. However, it 
seems likely that the nature of their relations and interactions with fellow group 
members differ considerably. One important variable that may capture such 
differences is the hierarchy type of the group.  
Hierarchy Types 
There are many ways to distinguish between hierarchies. But one 
fundamental distinction seems to stand out across different literatures. I will refer to 
this distinction here as that obtaining between hierarchies based in dominance (i.e., 
where status is aggressively grabbed by a few group members) and those based in 
prestige (i.e., where status is freely granted by many group members), a terminology 
that is commonly used by both anthropologists (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Von Rueden, Gurven & Kaplan, 2008, 2010) and evolutionary psychologists (e.g., 6 
 
Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010a). It is important to 
note that it is not admiration for an individual’s forcefulness that is the basis of status 
in a dominance-based hierarchy, but rather other members’ fear that this force will be 
directed at them (cf. Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). This is highlighted by 
characterizations of dominance-striving as force (rather than persuasion: Kracke, 
1975) or intimidation (rather than attraction: Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995).  
Over the course of evolution human social hierarchies likely went through 
stages of being more dominance-based or more prestige-based (Van Vugt, Hogan, et 
al., 2008), leading to the persistence of both routes to status as evolutionary stable 
alternatives. In support of this view, hierarchies generally fitting either of these 
descriptions have been observed among small-scale pre-literate societies (e.g., 
Kracke, 1978). For example, Chagnon (1992/1968) describes how an ambitious 
member of the violent Amazonian Yąnomamӧ  tribe attempts to “grab” status in his 
group by engaging in a power-struggle with the headman (see Appendix 1.1). On the 
other hand, Dentan (1979) describes how the Semai of Malaysia decide freely whom 
they confer respect to, and how attempts to enforce one’s will are met with avoidance 
rather than acquiescence (see Appendix 1.2 for a description of this process).  
Among social psychologists and sociologists, a debate concerning the nature 
and purpose of human hierarchies reflects a similar distinction. The conflict view 
states that hierarchies result from conflict between people with differing interests and 
resources (Mills, 1956). According to this view status is something that is claimed: 
those who are able to realize their will against the resistance of others attain status 
(Kemper, 1994; Mazur, 1985). In contrast, the functional view states that hierarchies 
result from the need to effectively divide roles in order to achieve common goals 
(Davis & Moore, 1945). According to this view, status is granted by group members 7 
 
to individuals who fulfil roles that they value (Berger et al., 1972). In this case, status 
differentiation is functional in that it facilitates the effective division of labour.  
It is important to note that dominance and prestige are qualitatively different 
processes evoked by distinctly different stimuli (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
Moreover, given that some of the prototypical verbal and non-verbal behaviours 
associated with dominance and prestige processes are exact opposites (e.g., 
dominance is associated with avoiding a high-status individual whereas prestige is 
associated with seeking proximity to a high-status individual:  Cheng et al., 2010a; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) these two processes are unlikely to coincide. Thus, there 
is reason to believe that dominance and prestige processes are negatively correlated. 
In contrast, at the level of the individual, dominance and prestige represent largely 
orthogonal dimensions (Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng et al, 2010a). In 
other words, individuals may be both admired by others (i.e., have prestige) and 
feared by others (i.e., have dominance) to varying degrees. In groups, finally, 
dominance and prestige processes often partly co-occur (cf. Anderson et al., 2001). 
For example, in groups that value assertive behaviour (e.g., a relatively aggressive 
sales team), people who aggressively claim status may also earn respect for such 
behaviour. On the other hand, people demonstrating their value to a strongly 
competence-oriented group (e.g., a group of academics) may need to aggressively 
defend their position against that of group members (i.e., academics with diverging 
views). Thus, rather than groups being either completely dominance-based or 
completely prestige-based, they may be based on both processes to varying degrees. 
As such, the hierarchy type
1 of some groups may be primarily dominance-based, 
whereas the hierarchy type of others may be primarily prestige-based. As this thesis 8 
 
will argue, what it takes to attain status may differ importantly across such different 
groups.  
Overview 
Central to this thesis is the contention that status in face-to-face groups results 
from and is maintained by both dominance and prestige processes in varying degrees. 
Moreover, the relative importance of each of these processes will differ across 
groups, resulting in different hierarchy types. These hierarchy types are defining 
features of groups that affect the nature of the relations and interactions in groups, 
and the psychological processes that co-occur with them.  
Conditions prompting the emergence of relatively dominance-based or 
relatively prestige-based hierarchies have been studied across a range of disciplines 
(Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; Kracke, 1978; Schlessinger, 1986; Van 
Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008). Moreover, anthropologists have described dominance and 
prestige processes in some detail (see e.g. Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), and 
psychologists have studied individual differences in engaging in these processes 
(e.g., Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010a). However, to my 
knowledge I am the first to study the consequences for individual group members of 
differences in dominance and prestige at the group level. My aim in doing so is to 
understand how such differences impact what it takes to attain status: what people 
need to do to attain status, what kind of people it takes to attain status, and what 
people may need to sacrifice to attain status. I argue that the hierarchy type of a 
group will moderate each of these aspects of status attainment.  
Before addressing the main questions of this thesis, I assessed the impact of 
dominance and prestige processes on perceptions of group hierarchy types (see 
Chapter 2). In their seminal paper, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) argued that 9 
 
dominance and prestige processes are alternative routes to status. Although there is 
both qualitative (e.g., Chagnon, 1992/1968; Dentan, 1979; Kracke, 1978) and 
quantitative (e.g., Cheng et al., 2010a, 2010b) research supporting this view, this 
research is sparse and raises interpretational issues. For example, people who are 
rated as either highly dominant or highly prestigious are also rated highly on 
leadership, suggesting that both represent a means of obtaining and exerting 
influence (Cheng et al., 2010a, 2010b). However, it remains unclear whether highly 
dominant individuals attain status because others admire or fear their assertive 
behaviour (cf. Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; see also Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b). 
Similarly, as prestigious individuals tend to dominate interactions (Shelly & Troyer, 
2001), it remains unclear whether others grant them status or whether they claim it 
for themselves. My first aim was therefore to illustrate unambiguously that 
dominance and prestige are both viable routes to status.  
My second aim was to assess the joint effect of dominance and prestige 
processes on perceptions of individual status and of group hierarchy type. As 
noted earlier, even in groups in which dominance processes prevail, prestige 
processes may also take place to some degree, and vice versa. How might the joint 
presence of these processes affect people’s perception of a group hierarchy? As the 
verbal and non-verbal behaviours associated with dominance and prestige processes 
are sometimes exact opposites (see Cheng et al., 2010a; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), 
there is reason to believe that their effects on perceptions of a group will be mutually 
antagonistic: the presence of dominance processes will make people perceive a group 
hierarchy as less prestige-based and vice-versa. In other words, it seems likely that 
people perceive hierarchy types as forming a continuum ranging from strongly 
dominance-based to strongly prestige-based. Moreover, different relative levels of 10 
 
dominance-striving and prestige-striving will offer a viable route to high status, 
depending on a group’s position on that continuum, but engaging in neither 
dominance-based nor prestige-based status-striving will not. 
I found support for these predictions in an experimental vignette study. When 
a student was allegedly elected president of a student association without having 
engaged in either dominance or prestige processes this student was seen as having 
lower status than when they had allegedly engaged in dominance processes, in 
prestige processes, or in both. Moreover, their perceived level of status did not differ 
in the latter three conditions. The two processes also had a mutually antagonistic 
effect on perceptions of the group hierarchy: when either process was combined with 
the other, its impact on the perceived hierarchy type of the group dwindled. In other 
words, the student association was seen as less dominance-based when dominance 
processes allegedly co-occurred with prestige processes, and vice versa.  
Having empirically established how dominance and prestige processes jointly 
shape the types of hierarchies that exist in groups, I turned to main topic of this 
thesis: what it takes to attain status. In Chapter 3, I focused on the interpersonal 
behaviours that promote status in different types of group hierarchies. 
Conceiving of these behaviours along the main axes of a circumplex model (e.g., 
Wiggins, 1979) allowed me to obtain a complete picture of those behaviours that 
have meaningful interpersonal consequences (Wiggins, 1979). This chapter provides 
a crucial synthesis of two important, competing, theoretical views of status (the 
conflict view and the functional view) as well as a single framework for interpreting 
findings traditionally associated with one or the other view. Moreover, it paints a 
more complete picture of the hierarchy type construct that lies at the heart of this 
thesis. 11 
 
As agentic (i.e., assured, dominant) behaviour signals both forcefulness and 
competence (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b), it may instil both fear and admiration in 
others. Therefore, I predicted that agentic behaviour would promote status both in 
dominance-based and in prestige-based hierarchies. In contrast, communal behaviour 
may signify consideration for others as well as potential for exploitation (by 
signalling a lack of readiness for engaging in competition), and so should augment 
status in prestige-based hierarchies, but diminish status in dominance-based 
hierarchies. 
After pre-tests confirmed people’s diverging perception of the abilities and 
skills signalled by agentic behaviours (i.e., being both more persuasive and more 
intimidating) and communal behaviours (i.e., being both more respectful and more 
accommodating), I tested the effect of these behaviours on status attainment in two 
further studies. In the first study, college students provided peer ratings of their 
classmates’ status, as well as of the agency and communion of the behaviours each of 
these classmates typically performed. I concurrently assessed the hierarchy type of 
each class. This sociometric design maximized ecological validity, by capitalizing on 
observations made in a genuine, face-to-face group. In the second study, I 
orthogonally manipulated hierarchy type (dominance-based; prestige-based) and the 
behaviour of the target (high or low in agency; high or low in communion) in 
hypothetical groups. Participants then estimated target status. The experimental 
design here maximized internal validity, enabling key constructs to be studied in the 
absence of confounds. Both studies found support for the hypotheses. Moreover, 
with their combination of field-study relevance and laboratory rigor, they did so after 
subjecting the hypotheses to broad and thorough testing.  12 
 
Having established which behaviours promote status in groups with different 
hierarchy types, I now wanted to predict which people were likely to engage in such 
behaviours. One important individual difference that has been linked to people’s 
level of status is their own appraisal of themselves (Cheng et al., 2010a; Kirkpatrick 
& Ellis, 2001; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). However, research has not yet established 
whether different self-appraisals are related to different status-promoting behaviours. 
Therefore, I assessed how the self-appraisals of people who engage in different 
status-promoting behaviours differ (see Chapter 4). Performing a bottom-up 
analysis of the scales most commonly used to measure self-esteem (i.e., the 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale: Rosenberg, 1965) and narcissism (i.e., the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory: Raskin & Terry, 1988) I derived characteristic features of 
these two constructs (see Kwan & Mandisodza, 2007, for a similar approach) that 
emphasize their distinctions. Empirical data confirmed that self-esteem can be 
characterized primarily as a judgment of the self as meeting standards of worthiness, 
a judgment that, extrapolated externally, recalls a judgment of one’s own capacity for 
prestige-based status. Narcissism, in contrast, can be characterized primarily as a 
judgment of the self as exceeding a standard, a judgment that, extrapolated 
externally, recalls a judgment of one’s own capacity for dominance-based status. 
Given that people may be more likely to strive for status when they feel confident 
that they can attain it (Gilbert et al., 1995), I thus predicted that narcissism would be 
positively related to the behaviours that promote status in dominance-based 
hierarchies (i.e., behaviours high in agency and low in communion), whereas self-
esteem would be positively related to the behaviours that promote status in prestige-
based hierarchies (i.e., behaviours high in both agency and communion). I tested 
these hypotheses in a series of three studies. Using different measures of the main 13 
 
constructs across studies, and measuring them at the trait as well as the state level, 
provided a clear and consistent pattern that supported the hypotheses.  
Having established what behaviours promote status in different hierarchy 
types, and which people are likely to engage in such behaviours and thus attain 
status, the question arises as to what costs people incur when they engage in such 
behaviours. Such costs may be seen as sacrifices that need to be made in order to 
attain status and thus provide important further insight into what it takes to attain 
status, the main theme of this thesis. To answer this question, Chapter 5 assessed the 
interpersonal consequences of status in different types of hierarchies. Prior 
research already suggests that people with high status are perceived to be more 
competent than those with low status (Berger et al., 1985; Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009b). However, it also paints a highly inconsistent picture of the interpersonal 
warmth group members feel towards people with high status (cf. Lee & Tiedens, 
2001). Thus the effect of status on interpersonal perceptions of warmth, the other 
important dimension of social cognition (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), remains 
poorly understood. It stands to reason that such mixed findings may result from 
status being attained in contrasting ways. Thus, I predicted that status in relatively 
prestige-based hierarchies, being rooted in popularity, would elicit greater 
interpersonal warmth, whereas status in more dominance-based hierarchies, being 
rooted in coercion, would elicit less interpersonal warmth.  
As in the earlier pair of studies, I tested this hypothesis in two studies that 
used different methods with complementary strengths. In the first study I 
manipulated the hierarchy type of hypothetical groups. In line with the hypothesis, 
the interpersonal warmth shown towards a hypothetical person of high status was 
greater when the hypothetical group the person belonged to was described as having 14 
 
a prestige-based hierarchy than when it was described as having a dominance-based 
hierarchy. In the second study I measured the hierarchy type of classes of college 
students in the UK. All classes were rated by students as having a relatively prestige-
based hierarchy. In line with this, the interpersonal warmth shown to students by 
their peers correlated positively with their level of peer-rated status in their class. 
However, when controlling for the nesting of students in college classes, the relation 
between status and interpersonal warmth did not differ across classes with different 
hierarchy types. In other words, the predicted interaction between status and 
hierarchy type did not emerge as significant in this study. Given that the hypothesis 
was supported in the first study, the failure to replicate this finding in the second 
study may have resulted from the natural limitations of the included sample. Future 
work assessing larger and more diverse samples might be able to replicate the 
interaction between status and hierarchy type in a natural setting and thus provide 
ecologically valid support for the hypothesis.  
The following chapters provide a more detailed description of each of these 
studies and their findings. Together these chapters investigate different perspectives 
on what it takes to attain status: what people need to do to attain status, what kind of 
people it takes to attain status, and what people may need to sacrifice to attain status. 
As a whole, they reveal that status attainment is fundamentally moderated by the 
hierarchy type of a group. As such, they convincingly argue that in order to 
understand what it takes to attain status in groups, it is vital to distinguish between 
dominance and prestige hierarchies.  15 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Status Processes and their Effect on Face-to-Face Groups: The Nature of 
Dominance and Prestige hierarchies 
Before investigating what it takes to attain status in groups – the focal 
concern of this thesis – I first need to establish whether hierarchies differ across 
groups, and if so, how they differ. To do so, I take a closer look at two important 
processes. Dominance processes involve group members submitting to an individual 
who aggressively claims high status, whereas prestige processes involve group 
members granting status to people who demonstrates traits, skills, or behaviour that 
they value (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Each of these two processes offered a 
viable route to status in face-to-face groups at some point in our evolutionary history 
(Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008). In this chapter I first illustrate unambiguously that 
they both continue to do so. Having established that, I go on to investigate the more 
interesting implications of these processes for group hierarchies. In particular, I 
assess how the joint presence of these two processes affects how people perceive the 
hierarchy type of a group.  
Dominance and Prestige Processes 
In evolutionary terms, the ability of social animals to form a rank order is 
very old. Rudimentary status hierarchies are still ubiquitous in many lower animals, 
who commonly engage in a series of actions called “ritual agonistic behaviour” 
(Gilbert et al., 1995). Here, the less powerful party in a dispute ritually surrenders to 
another party to avoid injury or death, after which the more powerful party stops 
fighting, and claims victory by ritually displaying its dominance. Why does such a 
process exist? The reason is that, although the more powerful party can, by 
augmenting its status, increase its access to resources and improve its mating 16 
 
prospects (Buss, 1999; Gilbert et al., 1995), it still runs at least some risk of injury or 
death, increasing the longer the dispute for status lasts (Gilbert et al., 1995). Ritual 
agonistic behaviour, which permits dangerous and protracted disputes to be 
substituted by safer and shorter ones, reduces the risk of physical harm to both 
weaker and stronger parties. The reciprocal signalling system thus increases the 
reproductive potential of both parties. 
In humans, dominance striving need not entail the use of physically 
aggressive displays. Rather, it may take the form of criticizing or condescending 
behaviour, which is a social act that either inflicts, or threatens to inflict, 
psychological injury (Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2002). Regardless the type of 
display, if “intimidation” (Gilbert et al., 1995) is responded to with obedient 
submission, then the result is the propagation of status differences via a dominance 
process.  
Prestige, more recently rooted in our evolutionary history, is another potential 
source of status (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Hierarchies based on prestige emerge 
when gifted group members convince other members to join their “clientele” of 
followers (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), while less gifted ones critically evaluate the 
potential of alternative leaders to provide what they want (Price, 2000). Thus, status 
can here be achieved, not by imposing oneself on others, but by advertising attributes 
that others value. The presence of such a dynamic enables groups to benefit from the 
specialist skills (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) or competent leadership (Van Vugt, 
2006) of talented members. At all events, if the offer of valued attributes by the few 
is willingly accepted by the many, then the result is the propagation of status 
differences via a prestige process.  17 
 
Given the strong evolutionary basis of both processes, my first hypothesis is 
that dominance and prestige are both viable routes to status in face-to-face groups 
(Hypothesis 2.1). Although some existing research already suggests that both 
dominance and prestige processes can promote status, findings are sparse and often 
raise interpretational issues. For example, violating social norms (Van Kleef, Homan, 
Finkenauer, Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011), asserting force (Cheng et al., 2010a, 
2010b; Kracke, 1978), or behaving angrily (Tiedens, 2001) can increase status, 
arguably as a type of dominance process. However, it is possible that such status 
increases result from other members’ admiration for such forthright behaviours (i.e., 
a prestige process), rather than from their fear of the person displaying them (i.e., a 
dominance process; cf. Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; see also Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009b). Conversely, being perceived as more competent (e.g., more highly educated: 
Moore, 1968; more knowledgeable: Shelly & Troyer, 2001; see also Berger et al., 
1972), as more persuasive (Cheng et al., 2010a, 2010b; Kracke, 1978), or as more 
generous and willing to help others (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006, 
Study 3) can promote status and influence, arguably as a type of prestige process. 
However, as such people also tend to dominate in interactions (Shelly & Troyer, 
2001) it remains unclear to what extent participants in these studies are granted status 
or claim it for themselves.  
From Status Processes to Group Hierarchy Types 
Although the two status-attainment processes are distinct, a trade-off between 
them is liable to exist. (Compare the trade-off between high-elaboration processes 
and low-elaboration processes in the ELM model of persuasion, which consist of 
distinct but mutually competing processes; Petty & Wegener, 1998)
1. Hence, I 
advance the hypothesis that dominance-based and prestige-based processes operate 18 
 
antagonistically in face-to-face groups. Accordingly, my second hypothesis is that, to 
the extent that a group’s hierarchy is characterized as dominance-based, it will be 
perceived as less prestige-based, and to the extent that a group’s hierarchy is 
characterized as prestige-based, it will be perceived as less dominance-based. 
(Hypothesis 2.2)  
To my knowledge, no research has yet directly investigated this hypothesis. 
However, ethological descriptions of prototypical groups (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001) offer indications that it might be true. Striking in such descriptions is that some 
of the interpersonal behaviours observed in relatively dominance-based hierarchies 
are the exact opposites of those observed in prestige-based hierarchies, suggesting 
they might be mutually antagonistic. For example, in dominance-based hierarchies, 
low-ranking individuals seek to avoid those with high rank, whereas in prestige 
hierarchies low-ranking individuals seek proximity to those with high rank. 
Moreover, in dominance-based hierarchies, high-ranking individuals emphasize their 
importance through aggressive displays (i.e., “grandstanding”) and expressions of 
superiority, whereas in prestige hierarchies high-ranking individuals underplay their 
importance through self-deprecation and expressions of gratitude (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001).  
Study 2.1: Perceptions of Status 
Given the ambiguity created in earlier studies by dominance and prestige 
processes being confounded, my first aim was to replicate the earlier findings using a 
sounder methodology. To clearly lay out the process underlying status attainment, 
the study used detailed and specific vignette descriptions of dominance and prestige 
processes taking place in a hypothetical group. Moreover, a manipulation check, that 19 
 
was included at the end of the study, explicitly assessed the type of process leading 
to status in the described group. Thus, not only did I describe the two processes 
unambiguously, I also made sure they were interpreted as such.  
To test both the independent and joint effects of both processes, I had 
participants read vignettes describing someone being elected president of a student 
association either as a result of a dominance process, a prestige process, both, or 
neither. Importantly, formal status (i.e., being elected) was equated across conditions. 
Thus, how status was achieved, via face-to-face interpersonal processes implying a 
type of group hierarchy was the key variable. Moreover, the design of the study 
permitted me to examine, by a comparative analysis of conditions, whether 
dominance and prestige processes had independent or antagonistic effects on the 
hierarchy types of the groups.  
It is important to note that, rather than engaging directly with the student they 
were rating, participants rated their perception of the status of a student whose 
interactions with others were merely described to them in a vignette. Therefore, 
participants needed to imagine what it would be like to be a member of the group, in 
order to rate the student’s status. To facilitate this process the context in which the 
vignette was situated (a student association) was chosen to be highly familiar to 
participants in the study (University students), so that the situation would seem real 
and meaningful for them and they could relate to it well.  
Participants and Procedure 
Undergraduate students (N = 171) from Tilburg University participated in a 2 
(level of dominance-based processes: low, high) x 2 (level of prestige-based 
processes: low, high) x 2 (male, female) between-subject vignette study. The 20 
 
participants ranged in age from 18 to 60 (M = 21.18, SD = 4.82) and were mostly 
female (70.8%).  
Participants read one of eight vignettes
2 (adapted from Snyder, Kirkpatrick, 
& Barrett, 2008; see Appendix A) describing the election of a new president in a 
student association, either Tom (male condition) or Lisa (female condition, to 
additionally counterbalance by gender). The outcome (i.e., being successfully 
elected) was kept constant across conditions, but the underlying process was varied. 
In the high-dominance condition, the student was described as behaving in a 
domineering way, and the group as reacting with avoidant obedience. For example, 
the student “expressed a subtle threat to any competitors” and group members 
“would avoid eye contact and slouch in their seats”. In the high-prestige condition, 
by contrast, the student was described as being self-assured without being 
overbearing, and the group as reacting with keen interest. For example, the student 
spoke “in a relaxed and confident manner” and the group “made good eye contact 
and listened intently until (s)he was finished speaking”. Furthermore, in the high-
dominance and high-prestige condition, the student sometimes spoke “forcefully”, 
but at other times spoke “in a relaxed and confident manner”, while the group would 
sometimes “avoid eye contact and slouch in their seats” but at other times would 
make “good eye contact and listen intently until (s)he was finished speaking”. 
Finally, in the low-dominance low-prestige condition, the student “spoke without 
much emotion or confidence” and the group reacted in a mixed fashion, such that 
“some of his/her peers remained attentive and others appeared uninterested”. 
After reading the vignette, participants completed the measures below.  21 
 
Measures 
Participants rated the student’s perceived status on two items (How prominent 
[visible, attracts attention] is Tom/Lisa in his/her student association?; How 
influential is Tom/Lisa in his/her student association?). Participants answered the 
questions (M = 5.33, SD = 1.49, r(169) = .63) on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at All, 7 = 
Very Much). 
The perceived hierarchy type of the student association was measured with 
four items. Of these, two, M = 4.53, SD = 1.51, r(169) = .57, assessed how much 
status in the student association was based on dominance (In Tom/Lisa’s student 
association, status is assertively taken by people who have the ability or means to do 
so; In Tom/Lisa’s student association, people with lower status go along with those 
with high status because they fear repercussions). Another two, M = 4.30, SD = 1.41, 
r(169) = .55, assessed how much status in the student association was based on 
prestige (In Tom/Lisa’s student association, status is willingly given to people by 
others who value them ; In Tom/Lisa’s student association, people with lower status 
go along with those with high status out of genuine respect). Again, participants rated 
each item on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at All, 7 = Very Much). 
Results 
No main or interactive effects of gender emerged (all ps   .27). Hence, I 
omitted gender from all further analyses.  
Perceptions of status. To assess whether the perceived status of the student 
depended on the process whereby they were elected president, I ran a 2 (level of 
dominance processes: low, high) x 2 (level of prestige processes: low, high) ANOVA 
on the students’ perceived status. This analysis revealed main effect, such that both 
dominance processes, F(1, 167) = 116.50, p < .001, η = .41, and prestige processes, 22 
 
F(1, 167) = 119.91, p < .001, η = .42, increased perceived status. Moreover, both 
processes interacted to determine status perceptions, F(1, 167) = 78.98, p < .001, η = 
.32. Simple effects analysis revealed, first, that dominance processes increased 
perceived status when the level of prestige processes was low, F(1, 167) = 201.91, p 
< .001, but not when it was high, F(1, 167) = 1.75, p = .19, and second, that prestige 
processes increased perceived status when the level of dominance processes was low, 
F(1, 167) = 197.82, p < .001, but not when it was high, F(1, 167) = 2.12, p = .15. 
Otherwise put, the student was perceived to possess equally high status when elected 
president as a result of dominance processes (M = 5.95, SD = .71), prestige processes 
(M = 5.98, SD = .84), or both (M = 6.23, SD = .75); however, when elected president 
as a result of neither dominance nor prestige processes, the perceived status of the 
student was significantly lower (M = 3.31, SD = 1.13).  
These results suggest three things: (a) that perceived status varies 
independently of formal status; (b) that dominance and prestige processes are 
alternative ways of enhancing perceived status; and (c) that dominance and prestige 
processes do not necessarily combine to enhance status further. Result (a) thus 
underlines the importance of face-to-face interactions, rooted in the group hierarchy, 
for the achievement of status. Moreover, result (b) underlines the viability of either 
dominance or prestige processes for enhancing perceived status, and thus supports 
my first hypothesis. Furthermore, result (c) also reveals how these processes do not 
necessarily supplement each other, which is broadly consistent with, but not yet 
strongly supportive of, my second hypothesis. 
Effect of processes on hierarchy type. Omitting the low-dominance low-
prestige condition from further consideration (because perceived status was arguably 
not achieved therein), I proceeded to test the effect of dominance and prestige 23 
 
processes on the perception of hierarchy type within the student association. 
Accordingly, I ran one-way ANOVAs with three-levels, with perceptions of each 
hierarchy type in turn serving as the DV (Table 2.1). Significant results emerged: 
perceptions that the status hierarchy of the student association was dominance-based 
varied by condition, F(2, 123) = 24.04, p < .001, η = .28, as did perceptions that it 
was prestige-based, F(2, 123) = 83.15, p < .001, η = .58.  
To further characterize the dominance-based differences, I conducted a 
Games-Howell post-hoc analysis, given the significant heteroscedacity across 
conditions (Levene’s test: p = .007). This analysis revealed that the student 
association was perceived as most dominance-based when dominance processes were 
high and prestige processes low; intermediately dominance-based when both types of 
processes were high; and least dominance-based when dominance processes were 
low and prestige processes high (all pairwise ps   .018). The reverse pattern emerged 
for prestige-based differences (using Fisher’s LSD test; Levene’s test: p = .109). 
Here, the student association was perceived as most prestige-based when prestige 
processes were high and dominance processes low; intermediately prestige-based 
when both processes were high; and least prestige-based when prestige processes 
were low and dominance processes high (all pairwise ps   .024).  
Thus, in addition to providing a simple manipulation check—to the effect that 
dominance and prestige processes were appropriately manipulated—these findings 
also imply that those processes tend to antagonize one another: when either process 
was mixed with the other, its impact dwindled. This is consistent with my second 
hypothesis. 24 
 
Discussion 
Study 2.1 revealed that, when the student was elected president without 
having engaged in either dominance or prestige processes, their status was perceived 
to be lower than if their election followed their engaging in either or both of these 
processes. This result confirms that face-to-face status is perceived to be inherently 
different than formal status (cf. Anderson et al, 2001). Moreover, assertively 
claiming status for oneself (i.e., via dominance processes) and willingly being 
granted status (i.e., via prestige processes) both emerged as viable ways of enhancing 
perceived status, above and beyond formal status. 
I used a vignette-based experimental design in Study 2.1, in order to compare 
across carefully described conditions in a controlled setting. This allowed me to 
avoid the ambiguity created in earlier studies by dominance and prestige processes 
being confounded, but also resulted in my measuring perceived status rather than 
actual status. However, given that face-to-face status reflects group-members view of 
a person’s status (Anderson et al., 2001), and the vignettes were designed such that 
participants could readily take this view, perceived status and actual status should 
converge in this study. Consequently, the results I obtained for perceived status 
should be equally true for actual status.  
I did not find any relevant gender differences. This is different from some 
earlier studies that found gender differences in status attainment (Eagly & Karau, 
1991), even despite congruent behaviour patterns (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman, 
1998), but in line with other studies suggesting that female status hierarchies are not 
inherently different in nature than those of males (Anderson et al., 2001).  
I also found that, while both dominance processes and prestige processes can 
enhance perceived status, there is no advantage in engaging in both. Rather, engaging 25 
 
in dominance processes, in prestige processes, or in both may lead to equally high 
perceptions of one’s status in a given group. Moreover, at the group level I found that 
each type of status works against the other: perceptions of each are undermined by 
mixing it with the other. This finding implies that groups can be classed along a 
hierarchy type continuum, ranging from highly dominance-based to highly prestige-
based. Moreover, a group’s position along this continuum may determine the mix of 
dominance processes and prestige processes that will promote status in that group. 
Although the still limited support for this claim requires me to interpret it with 
caution (additional support will be provided by Study 3.2 in the next chapter), it 
promises to be helpful for interpreting otherwise seemingly contradicting findings. 
For example, it makes clear why attaining status sometimes requires people 
to engage in dominance processes, other times to in prestige processes, and other 
times in both. For instance, threats to groups favour leaders with controlling and 
coercive leadership styles (Kracke, 1978; Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; 
Schlesinger, 1986), possibly because they are equipped to take decisive action, 
whereas seeking prestige in such circumstances with for example self-deprecating 
behaviour or expressing gratitude (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) may make people 
seem indecisive and therefore have a detrimental effect on their status. Relatively 
stable conditions, on the other hand, when people seek to satisfy group outcomes as 
well as being treated fairly in the process (Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart, & de Cremer, 
2004), favour leaders with more democratic styles (Schlessinger, 1986). As 
assertively claiming status suggests having selfish motives rather than having the 
best interest of group members at heart, it then may undermine rather than promote 
status. Given that group hierarchies range from being highly dominance-based to 
highly prestige-based, groups that feel highly threatened and groups that perceive no 26 
 
threat, will fall at the two ends of this continuum. In the middle of continuum, then, 
we will find groups in which both types of processes are required to attain status. 
Examples of such groups include those in which people with valuable traits or skills 
go unnoticed if they fail to make some sort of claim to status. For example, an 
academic with valuable ideas may need to defend them against competing ideas in 
order to stake out their turf and earn credit for their work. Or stated conversely, a 
certain level of valuable traits or skills may be required to successfully engage in 
dominance-striving, because it makes such behaviour appear more legitimate (Burke, 
2003). Such between-group differences in hierarchy type will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3, where I also assess the behaviours that help people attain status 
in the different types of hierarchies in detail.  27 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Behavioural Strategies for Getting Ahead in Dominance and Prestige 
Hierarchies 
Having demonstrated clearly in Chapter 2 that status hierarchies range from 
being highly dominance-based to highly prestige-based, I now move on to the main 
research goal of this thesis: to understand what it takes to attain status. In this 
chapter I investigate what behaviours promote status in face-to-face groups.  
Despite the importance of status as a social variable, psychological research 
has not yet unequivocally established what behaviours promote it within groups. 
Some studies find that agentic (i.e., assured, dominant) behaviour promotes status 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b; Driskell, Olmstead, & Salas, 1993). Yet others find that 
agentic behaviour undermines status (Ridgeway, 1987) and that group members 
resist domination (Boehm, 1999; Van Vugt et al., 2004). Furthermore, some studies 
find that communal (i.e., warm, agreeable) behaviour increases status (e.g., helping 
others: Flynn et al., 2006; behaving altruistically: Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). Yet 
others find that friendly behaviour does not affect status (Anderson et al., 2001), or 
even decreases status by conveying submission (Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1997).  
Thus, the findings to date are very mixed. Nonetheless, across the literature, 
two contrasting views regarding how status is attained can be distilled. First, the 
conflict view states that hierarchies arise based on conflicts between individuals with 
competing interests and varying resources (Mills, 1956). Accordingly, status results 
from the ability of some individuals to forcibly impose their will on others (Mazur, 
1985). Second, the functional view states that hierarchies arise based on the 
differential value of individuals’ roles in the pursuit of common goals (Davis & 28 
 
Moore, 1945). Accordingly, status results from the collective judgment by group 
members that an individual contributes more to the group (Berger et al., 1972).  
Here I attempt to synthesize these two views. I propose that the type of 
behaviour leading to status depends crucially on the type of hierarchy present in a 
group.
 Group hierarchies can range from being more dominance-based—where 
status is aggressively grabbed by few group members—to being more prestige-
based—where status is freely granted by many group-members (see Chapter 2).
1 
Thus, in line with the conflict view, group hierarchies may reflect the outcome of 
power-struggles between members; but also, in line with the functional view, group 
hierarchies may reflect the collective recognition of social value. For example, sales 
teams led by imperious bosses, or of street gangs riven by violence, are more 
dominance-based. Here, a more aggressive individual may well rise to the top. But 
work teams who elect their own leader, and academic pay grades based on peer-
reviewed publications are more prestige-based. Here leaders emerge because the 
group recognizes their contribution to the collective. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the distinction between these two types of 
hierarchies is derived from theorizing in human ethology and evolutionary 
psychology, which holds that the survival challenges faced by a group shape the type 
of hierarchy that emerges (Kracke, 1978; Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008). For 
example, early hunter-gatherers generally lived in prestige-based hierarchies. 
However, with the invention of agriculture, more dominance-based hierarchies 
emerged, arguably because accumulating resources and growing communities 
aggravated intergroup conflicts, and the need for leaders to aggressively deal with 
such threats (Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008). Industrialization partially reinstated the 
prevalence of prestige-based hierarchies, perhaps because people had more freedom 29 
 
to switch groups when treated unkindly (Van Vugt et al., 2004; Van Vugt, Hogan, et 
al., 2008). Still, dominance-based hierarchies still thrive in times of crisis and 
intergroup conflict (Kracke, 1978; Schlessinger, 1986). 
Behavioural Strategies in Dominance and Prestige Hierarchies 
To characterize interpersonal behaviour in groups, I employed the 
interpersonal circumplex model (e.g., Wiggins, 1979), which arranges behaviours 
circularly around two orthogonal axes. Behaviours along the vertical agentic axis run 
from compliant-submissive at the bottom to assured-dominant at the top. Behaviours 
along the horizontal communal axis run from cold-quarrelsome on the left to warm-
agreeable on the right. I chose this model because any behaviour with meaningful 
interpersonal consequences can be conveniently located in the two dimensional space 
defined by these two main axes (Wiggins, 1979). 
Applying the circumplex model to my framework, I first hypothesize that 
agentic behaviour will promote status unconditionally. First, agentic behaviour is 
liable to signal forcefulness, and so deter members of dominance-based groups from 
confronting a competitor. Second, agentic behaviour conveys the impression that an 
individual is competent (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b), and so helps to persuade 
members they are worthy of support in prestige-based groups. A pre-test (see Box 1) 
confirmed that targets described in terms of high agency behaviour are seen as both 
more persuasive and more intimidating than targets described in terms of low agency 
behaviour. Hence, agentic behaviour should promote status both in dominance-based 
and in prestige-based hierarchies (Hypothesis 3.1).  
Second, I hypothesize that the effect of communal behaviour on status will be 
conditional upon a group’s hierarchy type. On the one hand, communal behaviour is 
liable to rally general support, and thus advance social rank in prestige-based groups. 30 
 
Just as voters in a democracy tend to support someone who has their best interests at 
heart, lower-ranked members of prestige-based groups should grant status to 
members who treat them respectfully. On the other hand, exhibiting communal 
behaviour may signify a lack of readiness to engage in competition. In the dog-eat-
dog environment of dominance-based groups this is liable to signify weakness and to 
invite exploitation. A second pre-test (see Box 2) confirmed that targets described in 
terms of high communal behaviour are seen as both more respectful and more 
accommodating than targets described in terms of low communal behaviour. Hence, 
hierarchy type should moderate the effect of communal behaviour, such that 
communal behaviour will augment status in prestige-based hierarchies, but will 
diminish status in dominance-based hierarchies (Hypothesis 3.2). 
Study 3.1  
In Study 3.1 I assessed whether natural graduations in hierarchy type across 
groups moderate the behaviour-status link in real-life settings. As status is very 
important among adolescents (Coleman, 1961), I tested the hypotheses in classes of 
UK college students of around 17 years of age. I relied on peer ratings of 
interpersonal behaviour and status as students that age keep a close eye on each 
other’s behaviour and can make detailed estimations of each other’s status (Coleman, 
1961). More generally, face-to-face status reflects the perspective of group members 
and is thus best rated by them (Anderson et al., 2001). I employed an information-
maximizing round-robin design within each class, such that, in assessing both 
interpersonal behaviour and status, each rater evaluated different targets, and each 
target was evaluated by different raters. This ensured reliable and objective measures 
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Participants and Procedure 
College students (N = 182: 10 classes of 8-25 students) participated during 
two sessions with repeated measures. I removed participants who rated fewer than 
80% of their peers, were rated by fewer than 80% of their peers, or who both rated 
fewer than 90% of their peers and were rated by fewer than 90% of their peers.
2 I 
also removed five participants after an outlier analysis revealed their scores were 
minimally reliable over time. However, I retained all other students present at only 
one session, as t-tests confirmed that those present only at Session 1 (n = 27) or only 
at Session 2 (n = 13) did not differ from those of students present at both sessions (all 
ps < .05). This left 170 participants. 
 
Demographic data were obtained in Session 1 in which 157 students (118 
females, 39 males; Mage = 16.96, SD = 1.23) participated. Participants subsequently 
rated the interpersonal behaviour and the status of each student in their class, and 
their class’ hierarchy type. All key measures were repeated two weeks later in 
Session 2.  
Measures 
As varying the scales administered reduces common method bias (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), participants rated status on a 7-point scale, 
hierarchy type on a 6-point scale, and interpersonal behaviour on an 11-point grid-
type measure.  
To measure status, participants rated each student in their class from not at all 
(1) to very much (7) on a single item: “Thinking about each person in your class in 
turn, indicate how prominent (i.e. visible, attracts attention) and influential you feel 
they are in your class”. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, this item was chosen because 
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speak more and receive more attention; Berger et al., 1972; Chance, 1967) and 
influence (the opinions of high status people carry more weight and they get what 
they want more frequently; Berger et al, 1972; Mazur, 1985). 
The class hierarchy type was measured with two items running from a 
prestige pole (1) to a dominance pole (6). The first item ran from “status is willingly 
given to people by others who value them” to “; the second from “people with lower 
status go along with those with high status out of genuine respect” to “people with 
lower status go along with those with high status because they fear repercussions”.  
Interpersonal behaviour was measured with the Interpersonal Grid (IG; 
Moskowitz & Zuroff, 2005). This circumplex-like measure features a square grid 
with two main axes. The vertical, agentic axis runs from compliant-submissive at the 
bottom to assured-dominant behaviour at the top. The horizontal, communal axis 
runs from cold-quarrelsome on the left to warm-agreeable on the right. The ends of 
these axes, as well as the corners of the grid, contain anchor labels. Participants 
placed a single “X” in the grid to simultaneously rate agentic and communal 
behaviour for each student in their class. I chose this item because it has been shown 
to be particularly well suited for research in which many ratings must be made 
briskly (Moskowitz & Zuroff, 2005). To expedite the familiarization process, 
participants were given a full explanation of the grid, illustrated by examples.  
Results   
My analysis of the data was designed to take into account both the 
sociometric nature of the round-robin data as well as the hierarchical nesting of the 
participants in classes. To do so, I first calculated composite peer ratings from the 
sociometric data using Kenny and La Voie’s (1984) social relations model and the 
associated SOREMO software (Kenny, 1994). To take into account the nesting of 33 
 
data within classes, I tested the hypotheses with the mixed models option in SPSS 
and included class as a random effect in the model. Given the complexity of these 
analyses, I maximized the data available to perform them by merging participant 
scores across the two data collection sessions, including all participants who had 
taken part in at least one of the two.  
Assessing temporal stability. Before merging the data across the two data 
collection sessions, I assessed their stability across these two sessions. For the 
hierarchy type measure, I first created hierarchy type composites by averaging 
participant scores on the two items for the first, r1(168) = .30, as well as the second 
session, r2(152) = .47, and assessed the correlation between these two composites. 
This correlation emerged as substantial, r(140) = .70, p <.001.  
For the round-robin measures (agentic behaviour, communal behaviour, and 
status) I used a slightly different method. First, for each of these measures I 
calculated the correlation between each participant’s ratings of the targets in the first 
session and that same participant’s ratings of the targets in the second session. So, for 
example, I calculated the correlation between a given student’s ratings of their class 
members in terms of dominant behaviour in the first session and that same student’s 
ratings of their class members in terms of dominant behaviour in the second session. 
Thus, for a given student I calculated three between-session correlations: one for 
their ratings of their class members’ agentic behaviour, another for communal 
behaviour, and a third for status. Next, for each measure, I normalized the resulting 
correlations using a Fisher r to z' transformation, averaged the resulting values across 
participants, and finally back-transformed that average. Having followed this 
procedure, agentic behaviour (r = .76), communal behaviour (r = .65), and status (r = 
.79) all emerged as substantially correlated across sessions.  34 
 
Merging the data. Having found adequate test-retest reliability, I merged the 
data across the two data collection sessions for agentic behaviour (M = 7.13, SD = 
.93), communal behaviour (M = 7.86, SD = 1.12), status (M = 4.29, SD = .57), and 
hierarchy type (M = 2.74, SD = .93). To maximize the number of participants, as well 
as the reliability of the scores, I did so using single scores for participants who had 
only taken part in one of the sessions, and averaging scores across sessions for 
participants who had taken part in both.
 
SOREMO analysis. I used SOREMO (Kenny, 1994) to compute composite 
peer ratings from the round-robin measures. SOREMO separates target scores (i.e., 
how a student is typically perceived by other students) from perceiver scores (i.e., 
how each student typical views other students) and relationship effects (i.e., how 
people in each dyadic relationship idiosyncratically perceive each other), making 
them suitable for analyses that assume independence. SOREMO prohibits missing 
data. Therefore, for each datum I inserted the average peer-ratings for that participant 
and measure, before computing composite peer ratings of agentic behaviour (M = 
7.08, SD = 1.79), communal behaviour (M = 7.69, SD = 1.28), and status (M = 4.29, 
SD = .82). Having done this, relative target variances confirmed above-chance 
agreement (all ps < .05) between students on each other’s agentic behaviour (relative 
variance = .44), communal behaviour (relative variance = .21), and status (relative 
variance = .36), suggesting adequate quality of the round-robin data. 
Multilevel analysis. I first calculated class-level hierarchy type scores by 
averaging ratings per class (M = 2.68, SD = .38), after a one-way ANOVA revealed 
that the hierarchy type varied significantly across classes, F(9, 160) = 2.43, p = .013. 
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into account the nesting of the data in classes, I used the SPSS mixed models 
function to test the hypotheses in a series of models (Table 3.1).  
In Model 1A, I included composite peer ratings of agentic behaviour and 
communal behaviour, as well as individual ratings (control variable) and class-level 
averages of group hierarchy type, as predictors of students’ status in their class. As 
predicted, I found that agentic behaviour predicted status, F (1, 170) = 103.60, p < 
.001: the more agentic a participant’s behaviour, the higher was their status. Also as 
predicted, I found that communal behaviour did not predict status, F (1, 170) = .67, p 
= .415. Individual ratings of hierarchy type also did not predict status, F (1, 170) = 
.70, p = .792. However, there was a marginal effect such that hierarchy type 
(marginally) negatively predicted status, F (1, 170) = 3.85, p = .051: the more 
prestige-based (less dominance-based) a class hierarchy was the (marginally) higher 
(on average) the status was of students in the class.  
Rerunning this analysis while including class as a random effect (in Model 
1B), did not substantially change the results. Moreover, a limited decrease in the -2* 
log likelihood of the model indicated that taking into account the nesting of the data 
in classes did not significantly improve the model, χ
2
Change= -2.05, p >.05.  
In Model 2A, I again re-did the original analysis, including the interaction 
between communal behaviour and class-level hierarchy type as independent variable. 
Including the interaction effect significantly improved the model, χ
2
Change= -5.55, p 
<.05. Moreover, as predicted, the interaction was significant, F (1, 170) = 5.64, p = 
.019. Rerunning this analysis while including class as a random effect (Model 2B), 
again did not substantially change the results. Moreover, again a limited increase in 
the -2* log likelihood of the model indicated that taking into account the nesting of 
the data in classes did not significantly improve the model, χ
2
Change= -.77, p >.05.  36 
 
To plot the interaction between communal behaviour and class hierarchy type 
for interpretative purposes, I used the beta values from a hierarchical regression to 
calculate slopes one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken & West, 
1991). The overall pattern supported Hypothesis 3.2: whereas communal behaviour 
predicted higher status in more prestige-based hierarchies, it predicted lower status in 
more dominance-based hierarchies (Figure 3.1). However, t-tests on the simple 
slopes revealed that only the latter effect was significant, t(63) = -2.17, p = .02, not 
the former,  t(63) = 0.81, p = .21. 
Discussion 
Study 3.1 confirmed the importance of group hierarchy type as a moderator 
of the behaviour-status link. Agentic behaviour predicted status across hierarchy 
types, supporting Hypothesis 3.1. Communal behaviour predicted status only 
depending on hierarchy type, supporting Hypothesis 3.2. Moreover, it negatively 
predicted status in relatively dominance-based hierarchies. However, it was unrelated 
to status in relatively prestige-based hierarchies. 
Study 3.2 
Study 3.1 generally supported the hypotheses in an ecologically valid context 
and thus provided support for the real-life relevance of the findings. However, a 
possible limitation of this design was that the characteristics of existing groups may 
be naturally confounded. Study 3.2, using an experimental design, served to move 
beyond the possible confounds associated with naturally occurring groups. 
Specifically, independently manipulating hierarchy type, agentic behaviour and 
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interact to predict status, and allowed us to assess potential causal effects of 
behaviour on status in the different hierarchy types.  
Like in Study 2.1, participants rated their perception of the status of a person 
whose interactions with others in a group were described to them in a vignette rather 
than a person they personally interacted with. Therefore, participants’ needed to 
imagine what it would be like to be a member of the group in order to rate the 
person’s status. Ike in Study 2.1 I facilitated this process situating the vignette in a 
context (a student association) that was highly familiar to participants in the study 
(University students). 
Participants and Procedure 
Undergraduate students (N = 183; 141 females, 38 males, 4 unreported; Mage 
= 19.43, SD = 2.19) took part in a 2 (Hierarchy Type: dominance-based, prestige-
based) x 2 (Agentic Behaviour: low, high) x 2 (Communal Behaviour: low, high) 
between participant study.  
Participants read a description of a fictional student society “Vincentus”. In 
the dominance-based hierarchy condition, the society was described as one where 
“assertive personalities claim a leading role for themselves” and “people can achieve 
something by suppressing and dominating others”. In the prestige condition it was 
described as a society in which “credible personalities are given a leading role” and 
“people can achieve something if others respect and trust you”. (See Appendix 3.3 
for the complete Hierarchy Type manipulations) 
Participants then read one of four target descriptions of a Vincentus member, 
Kim (a gender-neutral Dutch name). Depending on condition, Kim’s description 
included behaviours that were either high or low in agency and either high or low in 
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the Social Behaviour Inventory (SBI: Moskowitz, 1994) and combined to form 
descriptions. For example, the high-agentic behaviour, high-communal behaviour 
condition described Kim as “someone who speaks with a firm, clear voice” as well as 
someone who “compliments or praises others”. (See Appendix 3.4 for the complete 
Behaviour Type manipulations) 
Measures 
To check whether the behaviour manipulations were successful, participants 
rated Kim’s behaviour from not at all (1) to very much (7) on four items, two 
assessing agentic (dominant and submissive [reversed-scored]) behaviour, M = 4.06, 
SD = 2.04, r(187) = .81, and two communal (friendly and unkind [reversed-scored]) 
behaviour, M = 4.91, SD = 1.56, r(187) = .85. 
Participants then rated the level of status they felt Kim had within Vincentus 
from not at all (1) to very much (7) on two items (M = 3.73, SD = 1.86, r(187) = .95): 
“Kim is someone who has a lot of status” and “Kim is someone who ranks highly”  
Finally, to check whether the hierarchy type manipulations were successful, 
participants rated Vincentus’ hierarchy type on the two-item measure used in Study 
3.1 (M = 4.49, SD = 1.95, r[187] = .74).  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. The hierarchy type manipulation was successful. A 3-
way Hierarchy Type x Agentic Behaviour x Communal Behaviour ANOVA on the 
hierarchy type measure revealed that participants in the prestige-based condition 
perceived Vincentus as more prestige-based (i.e., less dominance-based; M = 2.96, 
SD = 1.51) than participants in the dominance-based condition (M = 5.99, SD = .84), 
F(1,180) = 288.36, p < .001, η
2 = .62. No other effects were significant.  39 
 
A 3-way ANOVA on the behaviour measures revealed that participants rated 
Kim’s behaviour as more agentic in the high Agentic Behaviour condition (M = 5.80, 
SD = .97) than in the low Agentic Behaviour condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.11), 
F(1,180) = 731.88, p < .001, η
2 = .80, and as more communal in the high Communal 
Behaviour condition (M = 6.12, SD = .69) than in the low Communal Behaviour 
condition (M = 3.72, SD = 1.24), F(1,180) = 274.47, p < .001, η
2 = .60. Thus, the 
manipulation worked as intended. 
However, there was also a modest cross-over effect, such that participants 
rated Kim’s behaviour as less communal in the high Agentic Behaviour condition (M 
= 4.66, SD = 1.53) than in the low Agentic Behaviour condition (M = 5.17, SD = 
1.56), F(1,180) = 10.83, p = .001, η
2 = .06, and less agentic in the high Communal 
Behaviour condition (M = 3.47, SD = 1.85) than in the low Communal Behaviour 
condition (M = 4.46, SD = 2.06), F(1,180) = 74.91, p < .001, η
2 = .29. No other 
effects were significant.  
Status attainment. As predicted, a 3-way ANOVA on the status measure 
(Figure 3.2) yielded a main effect of Agentic Behaviour on ascribed status, F(1,179) 
= 208.18, p < .001, η
2 = .54, such that ascribed status was higher in the high Agentic 
Behaviour condition (M = 4.98, SD = 1,49) than in the low Agentic Behaviour 
condition (M = 2.47, SD = 1,24). A two-way interaction between Hierarchy Type and 
Agentic Behaviour also emerged, F(1,179) = 7.72, p = .006, η
2 = .04. Simple effects 
analysis revealed that Agentic Behaviour promoted ascribed status more strongly in 
the dominance-based condition, F(1,179) = 148.77, p < .001, η
2 = .45, than in the 
prestige-based condition, F(1,179) = 67.53, p < .001, η
2 = .27. However, as 
predicted, both effects were significant. 40 
 
Communal behaviour had no direct effect on ascribed status, F(1,179) = 2.00, 
p = .159, η
2 = .01, but, again as predicted, Hierarchy Type and Communal Behaviour 
interacted to predict ascribed status, F(1,179) = 43.54, p < .001, η
2 = .20. Simple 
effects analysis revealed that, in the dominance-based condition, ascribed status was 
higher in the low Communal Behaviour condition (M = 4.18, SD = 1,88) than in the 
high Communal Behaviour condition (M = 3.21, SD = 1,67), F(1,179) = 13.51, p < 
.001, η
2 = .07, whereas in the prestige-based condition, ascribed status was lower in 
the low Communal Behaviour condition (M = 3.08, SD = 1,72) than in the high 
Communal Behaviour condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1,83), F(1,179) = 31.95, p < .001, 
η
2 = .15. Thus, Hypothesis 3.2 was also supported.  
A three-way interaction on ascribed status also unexpectedly emerged, 
F(1,179) = 13.38, p < .001, η
2 = .07. Simple effects analysis revealed that agentic 
behaviour predicted ascribed status in both the dominance-based and the prestige-
based conditions, and at both high and low levels of communal behaviour (ps ≤ 
.001). However, in both hierarchy types, communal behaviour predicted status when 
agentic behaviour was high (ps < .001), but not when it was low (ps ≥ .134), possibly 
because agentic behaviour, because of its active nature, multiplies the impact of 
communal behaviour.  
Overall, agentic behaviour increased ascribed status in both hierarchy types, 
supporting Hypothesis 3.1. Moreover, hierarchy type moderated the effect of 
communal behaviour on ascribed status, supporting Hypothesis 3.2, for whereas in 
prestige-based hierarchies it augmented status, in dominance-based hierarchies it 
diminished status. Nonetheless, this moderation only emerged when agentic 
behaviour was high.  41 
 
General Discussion 
In this chapter I investigated what people need to do to attain status. Does 
exhibiting agentic (i.e., assured, dominant) behaviour or exhibiting communal (i.e., 
warm, agreeable) behaviour increase status? The answer is: it depends on the type of 
hierarchy present in a group. In Chapter 2 I found that group hierarchies vary from 
being more dominance-based—where status is grabbed by the few—to being more 
prestige-based—where status is granted by the many. I hypothesized that, although 
agentic behaviour should promote status in both types of hierarchies, communal 
behaviour should augment it in more prestige-based hierarchies but diminish it in 
dominance-based hierarchies. I confirmed the hypotheses in a field-study of naturally 
occurring groups (Study 3.1) and in an experiment where the hierarchy type of 
hypothetical groups was manipulated (Study 3.2).  
Each of these methods has its limitations as well as its strengths. For 
example, the ecologically valid context used in Study 3.1 limited the possibilities for 
independently manipulating each of the independent variables or testing causality, 
but also allowed me to demonstrate the importance of my findings in naturalistic 
settings. Similarly, the hypothetical groups used in Study 3.2 was limited to the 
extent that my dependent variable measured ascribed rather than actual status, but 
also allowed me to move beyond the natural confounds of Study 3.1. Moreover, the 
limitations associated with each of the studies were generally addressed by 
combining both designs, and thus achieving both external and internal validity. 
Study 3.2 also revealed that, in both hierarchy types, agentic behaviour 
promoted (ascribed) status at high as well as low levels of communal behaviour. In 
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agentic behaviour was high. Possibly, the active nature of agentic behaviour 
multiplies the impact of communal behaviour. Most people feel more appreciated 
when someone openly compliments them than when someone quietly values them; 
likewise, people might feel more spurned when someone openly faults them than 
when someone quietly criticizes them. Agentic behaviour, it seems then, not only 
affects status directly, it also increases both the benefits and the pitfalls of communal 
behaviour. Thus, while agentic behaviour goes some way in helping one to the top, 
getting all the way there requires it to be teamed with the right type of communal 
behaviour. 
I believe these findings advance theory in several ways. In particular, 
distinguishing the two hierarchy types may clarify why some research finds that 
high-status individuals engage in angry and quarrelsome behaviour (Fournier et al., 
2002; Tiedens, 2001), show little interpersonal sensitivity (Galinsky, Magee, Ines, & 
Gruenfeld, 2006) or compassion (Van Kleef, Oveis, Van Der Löwe, et al., 2008), 
whereas other research finds that high-status individuals are highly interested in other 
people (Overbeck & Park, 2001), engage in generous and friendly behaviour (Flynn 
et al., 2006), and show sensitivity to their emotions (Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 
2009).  In the former cases, the groups studied may have been characterized by more 
dominance-based hierarchies; in the latter cases they may have been characterized by 
more prestige-based hierarchies. 
The findings also have obvious implications for how the type of group 
hierarchy—dominance-based or prestige-based—determines how leaders can best 
pursue status. Such group hierarchies are not set in stone, but internal and external 
forces often render them highly resistant to change. For example, dominance-based 
hierarchies ruled by tyrants may be welcomed in times of crisis (Schlessinger, 1986). 43 
 
Here, the greater power wielded by dominant leaders may permit them to parry 
external threats or overcome logistical challenges more decisively, unencumbered by 
a need for consultation or compromise. Once established, however, such tyrants may 
be hard to dispose of. As the wave of Middle East uprisings in 2011 illustrates—
persistent domination ultimately sparks resistance from lower-ranking group 
members, prompting attempts to implement a more prestige-based hierarchy 
(Boehm, 1999; Van Vugt et al., 2004). However, those lower in rank may need to 
exert substantial efforts and take considerable personal risks to overthrow a hierarchy 
rooted in dominance and replace it with one rooted in prestige. When they do, the 
opportunity arises for status to be based on collectively recognized merit, rather than 
on brute force. 44 
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CHAPTER 4  
Self-Regard and Behavioural Strategies: Do Self-Esteem and Narcissism 
Relate to Alternative Ways of Getting Ahead?   
People who feel good about themselves strive for status more decidedly and 
more ambitiously than people who feel less good about themselves (Gilbert et al., 
1995). For example, they persist harder and longer on tasks (Di Paula & Campbell, 
2002; McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977, Study 
1), and are more likely to seek competence feedback following failure (Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2001, Study 1). Moreover, they are more likely to voice their opinions in 
groups (LePine and Van Dyne, 1998) and less likely to give in to persuasion by 
others (Brockner, 1983; Janis, 1954; McFarlin et al., 1984). In other words, people 
with positive self-views not only work harder to get ahead than people with less 
positive self-views; they are also more willing to speak up and stand their ground.  
As I have empirically demonstrated in the previous chapters, there are 
multiple strategies for getting ahead. Importantly, people may grab status – 
intimidate others with high agency/low communion behaviour – or convince others 
to grant them status – attract followers with high agency/high communion behaviour 
(for details of these strategies see Chapter 3). However, it remains unclear which 
people are likely to engage in each of these status-promoting strategies. While 
people’s level of status has been linked to their level of self-regard (Cheng et al., 
2010a; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001; Leary & Baumeister, 2000), research has not yet 
unambiguously established whether different self-appraisals are related to different 
status-promoting behaviours. In this chapter, I assess how the self-appraisals of 
people who grab status differ from those of people who persuade others to grant 
them status.  46 
 
Two Types of Self-Regard  
I use the term “self-regard” here to refer to an affectively laden appraisal of 
the self as a whole. In line with James’s (1890/1950) original conceptualization, I 
construe this appraisal as resulting from a judgment of the overall self against an 
evaluative standard. I will discuss the possible nature of this self-appraisal, and the 
standard used to make it, shortly. For now I simply contend that, if the self is 
appraised positively against an evaluative standard, a person will feel good about 
him- or herself and experience high self-regard. If the appraisal is neutral or even 
negative, a person will experience low self-regard.  
This general definition of self-regard closely resembles commonly used 
definitions of self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991; 
Kwan & Mandisotza, 2007). However, I contend that it can also encompass 
narcissism
1, or the “dark side” of self-esteem (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & 
Tracy, 2004). I am not the first to define self-esteem and narcissism as two 
alternative types of self-regard. Other researchers have made distinctions with a 
similar underlying theme (Paulhus et al., 2004) between self-appraisals that are 
realistic, adaptive, genuine, secure, or non-defensive versus unrealistic, maladaptive, 
fragile, or defensive (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Block & 
Thomas, 1955; Kernis, 2003; Paulhus et al., 2004; Salmivalli, Kaukiainen, 
Kaistaniemi, & Lagerspetz, 1999; Tracy & Robins, 2003).  
Although both self-esteem and narcissism are appraisals of the self, the type 
of self-judgment they represent differs on a number of dimensions. I will argue here 
that the main difference between self-esteem and narcissism revolves around the 
ambition of their self-judgments: whether they are judging success in terms of 
meeting a standard or in terms of exceeding one. To validate this claim, and further 47 
 
delineate the differences between self-esteem and narcissism, I will make use of a 
bottom-up approach: I will derive characteristic features of the two constructs from 
the scales commonly used to measure them (see Kwan & Mandisodza, 2007, for a 
similar approach).  
My analysis of scales used to measure self-esteem and narcissism is described 
below. However, before presenting this analysis, it is important to point out that this 
characterization of self-esteem and narcissism as distinct types of self-regard 
explicitly seeks to emphasize their differences. In reality, the distinction I make is a 
matter of degree rather than an absolute difference of kind. Thus, self-esteem is more 
a judgment of the self as meeting standards than a judgment of the self as exceeding 
standards, with the reverse being true for narcissism. This qualification is necessary, 
because the types of self-judgment characterizing self-esteem and narcissism are not 
fully independent: making judgments of the self as meeting standards (i.e., self-
esteem) logically entails making judgments of the self as exceeding standards (i.e., 
narcissism).
2 When people judge themselves to be better than a standard, it implies 
they judge themselves to be as good as that standard. Similarly, when people judge 
themselves as worse than a standard, it implies they also judge themselves not to be 
exceeding it. Thus, these two types of judgments partly overlap.  
Characterizing self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; 
Rosenberg, 1965) is the most commonly used measure of global self-esteem and is 
the standard against which new scales are compared (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991; 
Kwan & Mandisodza, 2007). For this reason, I use the RSES to characterize self-
esteem and distinguishing it from narcissism. The RSES was designed to measure 
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scale. Typical items ask participants to indicate to what extent they are “satisfied” 
with themselves, “respect” themselves, or feel that they are “a person of worth”.  
The items on the RSES emphasize meeting standards rather than exceeding 
them (see also Appendix 4.1). Five items assess to what extent people fail to meet a 
standard by asking to what extent they feel they are “no good”, “a failure”, “useless”, 
“do not have much to be proud of”, or wish they could “have more respect” for 
themselves. Four further items measure to what extent people meet a standard by 
assessing to what extent they are “satisfied” with themselves, take “a positive attitude 
toward” themselves, have “a number of good qualities, or can do things “as well as” 
other people. One item is more ambiguous as it asks people to rate to what extent 
they feel they are “a person of worth”, as well as “at least on an equal plane with 
others”, suggesting both elements of meeting a standard (being of worth) as 
exceeding one (by being at least on the same plane as others). In general, however, 
the RSES measures to what extent people live up to (as opposed to fall behind) 
standards, rather than to what extent they challenge and exceed them.  
Characterizing narcissism. The most commonly used measure of narcissism 
is the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-40; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Of 
the seven factors identified by Raskin and Terry (1988), Superiority, Authority, Self-
sufficiency, and Exploitativeness all imply that the self is in some way exceeds a 
comparison standard (see also Box 4.1). For example, being “an extraordinary 
person” (and thus more special than others), being “a leader” (and thus superior to 
those being led), being “more capable than other people”, or being able to “read 
people like a book” (and thus more smart and cunning than those people), al imply 
that a person is in some way exceeds other people. The factors Exhibitionism and 
Vanity do not directly reflect whether someone feels better than a standard, but they 49 
 
arguably imply a desire to be compared to such a standard, as well as the confidence 
that such comparison will be favourable for the self. For example, people might lead 
others to compare them to a standard by placing themselves at the “centre of 
attention” or lead themselves to make such a comparison as they look “in the 
mirror”. The last factor, Entitlement, with items like “I have a strong will to power” 
and “I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world”, implies a desire to 
exceed commonly accepted standards, as well as confidence in one’s ability to 
achieve this.  
States and traits. I will use the term self-regard to refer to a state as well as a 
trait. In line common views of self-esteem, I perceive state self-regard as fluctuating 
around a relatively stable trait base (e.g., Baumeister, 1998). Research generally 
supports this view. The stability of trait levels of self-esteem over the life-span is 
comparable to that of trait measures of personality (Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & 
Robins, 2003). Moreover, trait self-esteem shows resilience to decline in the face of 
life adversities like those associated with aging (Brandstadter & Greve, 1994). 
However, small and reversible state level fluctuations occur in different (relational) 
contexts (Denissen, Penke, Schmitt, & van Aken, 2008; Harter, Waters & Whitesell, 
1998; Wells, 1988), or as a result of changes in the environment like failure feedback 
(Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001) and exclusion from groups 
(Leary et al., 2003; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995).  
Trait narcissism is a well-studied construct, and the stability of trait 
narcissism has received support (e.g., α = .72 over an 8 week period: Raskin & Hall, 
1981, cited in Emmons, 1987). State narcissism is a relatively new area of research, 
but some first results support the existence of meaningful state fluctuations. For 
example, narcissism scores were higher after participants had visualized a time when 50 
 
they “impressed someone” or completed a word-nonword judgment task containing 
words relating to superiority (e.g. beautiful, smart) than when they visualized a time 
when they “felt accepted and/or included” or completed a word-nonword judgment 
task containing words relating to acceptance (e.g., accepted, wanted) (Sakellaropoulo 
& Baldwin, 2007). Moreover, given the correlation between narcissism and self-
esteem and the similarities between the constructs, and given that numerous studies 
provide support for a characterization of self-esteem as having these two dimensions, 
it seems at least likely that narcissism can be characterized in the same way. In this 
chapter, self-esteem and narcissism will be assessed at both the trait (Studies 4.1 and 
4.2) and the state level (Study 4.3).  
Self-Regard and Status-Promoting Behaviours 
Before formulating hypotheses about the relations between self-regard and 
status-promoting behaviours, I first want to point out the general affinities between 
self-regard and status. As outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, grabbing status in a 
dominance-based hierarchy involves an individual defeating others in an aggressive 
contest for status. Thus, to attain status in a dominance-based hierarchy one needs to 
exceed other people, and one needs to be willing to do so forcefully. As I just argued, 
narcissism can be characterized as a motivated appraisal of the self as exceeding 
norms (e.g. those set by other people). It reflects both a strong sense of being 
glorious and a strong desire for personal glory (cf. Sedikides & Gregg, 2001). This 
desire is so strong that narcissists may be willing to misuse others to get the 
recognition they crave (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, 
Elliot, & Gregg, 2002), and react aggressively when they are criticized (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). As such, narcissism may be 
associated with both a strong belief that one is suited for the highest place in a 51 
 
dominance-based hierarchy, and a strong motivation to claim such a position, even 
against the will of others.   
A similar observation can be made about self-esteem and prestige-based 
status. As I have argued in Chapter 3, in order to convince others to freely grant one 
status in a prestige-based hierarchy one needs to persuade others one is worthy of 
their support and one needs to treat them with respect. In other words, an individual 
needs to earn the appreciation and respect of others, but also to show some level of 
appreciation and respect for those same others. As I just argued, self-esteem can be 
characterized as an appraisal of the self as meeting standards, rather than challenging 
or exceeding them. Thus, where narcissist feel superior, people with high self-esteem 
simply feel good enough. Translating this to an interpersonal context, the sense of 
superiority associated with narcissism means narcissists combine a positive view of 
themselves with a derogatory view of others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1995). In contrast, 
the sense of worthiness associated with self-esteem implies people with high self-
esteem have a positive view of themselves that does not necessitate a negative 
appraisal of others. As such, self-esteem may be associated with both a belief that 
one is worthy of a high place in a prestige-based hierarchy, and a sense of 
appreciation and respect for others that could prohibit aggressively challenging these 
others or treating them disrespectfully.  
Given the general affinity between narcissism and dominance-based status 
(see also Cheng et al., 2010a), I first hypothesize there will be a positive correlation 
between narcissism and the behaviours that promote status in dominance-based 
hierarchies. In other words, narcissism should be positively related to agentic 
behaviours and negatively to communal behaviours (Hypothesis 4.1). Second, given 
the general affinity between self-esteem and prestige-based status (see also Cheng et 52 
 
al., 2010a), I hypothesize that self-esteem will be positively related to the behaviours 
that promote status in prestige-based hierarchies. In other words, self-esteem should 
be positively related to both agentic and communal behaviours (Hypothesis 4.2). 
Although these hypotheses have not been investigated directly, existing 
research provides some support. For example, people with high self-esteem tend to 
describe themselves both in relatively agentic terms (e.g., extraverted: Campbell, 
Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002, Study 1) and relatively communal ones (e.g., agreeable: 
Campbell et al., 2002, Study 1; low in aggression: Locke, 2008; Paulhus et al., 2004). 
After receiving negative feedback, people with high self-esteem, are perceived as 
more antagonistic and less likeable than people with low self-esteem (Heatherton & 
Vohs, 2000; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). However, when narcissism is controlled for 
to create a purer measure of self-esteem (Paulhus et al., 2004), self-esteem relates 
inversely to derogation and hostile feelings towards the evaluator, following negative 
feedback (Smalley & Stake, 1996). These latter results imply that controlling for 
narcissism may be essential for revealing the true relation between self-esteem and 
interpersonal behaviour (but see Heatherton & Vohs, 2000). I will address this issue 
in the studies.  
Conversely, narcissism is not only correlated with self-perceptions (extravert: 
Campbell et al., 2002, Study 1) and others-perceptions (self-assured and dominant:  
Back, Schmuckle, & Egloff, 2010) of being agentic, it also correlates with self-
reports and acts of aggression (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Locke, 2008; Paulhus 
et al, 2004; Smalley & Stake, 1996).  53 
 
Method 
I tested my hypotheses in three studies. The first two studies (Study 4.1 and 
4.2) aimed to provide strong support for the hypothesized relations. Both studies 
tested the hypotheses at the trait level. In accord with my aforementioned 
hypotheses, I assessed whether trait self-esteem was positively related to trait-level 
agentic and communal behaviour, and whether trait narcissism was positively related 
to trait agentic behaviour but negatively to trait communal behaviour. In order to 
provide strong support for these relations, I used different measures of the main 
variables across these studies. Moreover, to avoid any connection between the 
measures of self-regard and those of interpersonal behaviour, participants in Study 
4.2 completed these measures in two separate sessions that were considerably 
separated in time and that had unrelated ostensive purposes.  
The third study (Study 4.3) was included to provide further support for a 
unique relation between the different types of self-regard and the different status-
promoting behaviours. As such, it adds importantly to the first two. I investigated the 
uniqueness of the hypothesized relations in this study by assessing the hypothesized 
relations at the state level. My reasoning was that if I found that certain situations 
were associated with both a change in the level of a given type of self-regard, and of 
the behaviours that I hypothesized were associated with that type of self-regard, this 
would provide strong support for a unique and strong relation between the two. 
Plausible support for the uniqueness of the relations between self-regard and 
behaviour might also have been obtained by controlling for any covariates of self-
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creating an exhaustive list of such possible covariates would be difficult, whereas my 
chosen method has the advantage of being methodologically succinct.  
Study 4.1: Contrasting Self-Esteem and Narcissism as Predictors of 
Status-Relevant Interpersonal Behaviour 
Study 4.1 was run over the Internet and relied on standard measures of the 
main variables. It contained two samples. Participants in Sample A completed a 
measure of self-esteem, narcissism, and interpersonal behaviour. As measures of 
self-esteem differ in the level at which they correlate with narcissism and trait 
dominance (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004), I wanted to make sure that any findings 
generalized across different measures of self-esteem. Therefore, a second group of 
participants (Sample B) filled out an alternative measure of self-esteem together with 
the same measure of interpersonal behaviour.  
Participants and procedure. 288 participants took part over the Internet. An 
analysis of the IP addresses revealed one duplication suggesting that one of the 
participants had taken part in the study twice. The chronologically second set of data 
of this participant was removed. I assumed all other participants took part only once.
3   
Participants for Sample A were recruited university-wide at the University of 
Southampton and were entered into a prize draw for four prizes of 25 GBP.  This 
sample contained 159 (106 female, 53 male) participants ranging in age from 18 to 
54 (M = 23.06, SD = 6.18).  
Participants for Sample B were recruited among undergraduate students in 
psychology at the University of Southampton (26.6%) and via a number of well-
established online research websites (e.g., http://genpsylab-wexlist.unizh.ch, 
http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponent.html and 
http://www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk). University students took part in return for 55 
 
course credit whereas external participants took part voluntarily. This sample 
contained 128 (102 female, 25 male, 1 unreported) participants ranging in age from 
16 to 61 (M = 25.91, SD = 10.19).  
Measures. Participants completed the measures in a fixed order. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 4.3. 
Self-esteem. Participants in Sample A first completed the revised version of 
the Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale (SLCS-R; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). Eight 
items measuring self-liking (e.g., “I am secure in my sense of self-worth”) and eight 
items measuring self-competence (e.g., “I am highly effective at the things I do”) 
were rated from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Averages across the 
items were calculated to create composite scores of respectively self-liking, self-
competence, and overall self-esteem (all items).    
Participants in Sample B completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; 
Rosenberg, 1965). Ten items (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”) were 
rated from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), and averaged to create a 
composite score of self-esteem.  
Narcissism. Participants in Sample A then completed a short measure of 
narcissism (NPI-16; Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006). Participants read 16 pairs of 
self-descriptive statements and selected the statement from each pair that best 
described them. To create a narcissism composite score, I assigned one point for each 
narcissistic statement they selected (e.g., “I think I am a special person”), zero points 
for each non-narcissistic statement they selected (e.g., “I am no better or no worse 
than most people”), and computed the average of the points assigned across the 16 
items.  56 
 
Interpersonal behaviour. Finally, all participants completed a trait version of 
the Social Behaviour Inventory (SBI: Moskowitz, 1994). The SBI is based on an 
interpersonal circumplex model of behaviour (e.g., Wiggins, 1979). It consists of 
behavioural items that reflect the poles of two orthogonal dimensions: agency 
(dominant versus submissive behaviour), and communion (agreeable versus 
quarrelsome behaviour).  
The adapted version of the SBI used here, asks people to rate how 
characteristic (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) different behaviours are for them when 
interacting with peers in a group setting. The agentic (e.g., “I make suggestions”, “I 
wait for other people to act or talk first”, reversed-scored), and communal (e.g., “I 
compliment or praise other people”, “I discredit what others say”, reversed-scored) 
axes of the circumplex are each represented by 24 behaviours. As in the original 
measure, one type of behaviour (“I criticize others”) is classed as both high in agency 
and low in communion, and one type of behaviour (“I go along with the others”) is 
classed as both high in communion and low in agency, rendering the total number of 
behaviours in the scale to 46. 
Results and Discussion 
As predicted, both the measures of self-esteem
4 and the lone measure of 
narcissism correlated positively with agentic behaviour (see Table 4.4). In addition, 
as predicted, narcissism correlated negatively with communal behaviour. However, 
neither measure of self-esteem correlated with communal behaviour (see Table 4.4). 
Thus, while the results confirmed my predictions for agentic behaviour, this was only 
partially the case for communal behaviour. Moreover, the results were in line with 
my predictions for narcissism, but this was only partially the case for self-esteem.  57 
 
To control for contamination of the results due to the correlation between 
self-esteem and narcissism (Paulhus et al., 2004), I subsequently re-calculated the 
correlations for Sample A while mutually controlling for self-esteem and narcissism. 
Thus, I calculated partial correlations between self-esteem and the two types of 
behaviour, controlling for narcissism, as well as between narcissism and the two 
types of behaviour, controlling for self-esteem (see Table 4.4). 
In the agentic domain, mutual partialling reduced the strength of the relations, 
but this effect was only minor and the relations all remained significant. Thus, after 
partialling for narcissism, self-esteem was still positively correlated with agentic 
behaviour, and the same was true for narcissism after partialling for self-esteem. This 
suggests that, in the agentic domain, the correlation between self-esteem and reported 
behaviour, as well as that between narcissism and reported behaviour, were both 
largely independent of one another.  
In the communal domain, mutual partialling had a stronger impact on the 
results, albeit only on some of them. Whereas partialling for self-esteem did not 
affect the strength of the negative correlation between narcissism and communal 
behaviour, partialling for narcissism did affect the strength of that between self-
esteem and communal behaviour: after partialling for narcissism self-esteem became 
positively correlated with communal behaviour. These results suggest that, the 
correlation between genuine self-esteem (when measured with the SLCS-R) and 
communal behaviour was partially obscured by the correlation between narcissism 
and reported communal behaviour. Therefore, controlling for narcissism brought out 
the relation between self-esteem and communal behaviour, whereas the correlation 
between narcissism and communal behaviour held regardless of whether self-esteem 
was controlled for or not.  58 
 
A More Concrete Measure of Behavioural Strategies for Getting Ahead  
Study 4.1 provided initial support for the hypotheses. After mutually 
controlling for self-esteem and narcissism, I found that self-esteem was positively 
correlated with both self-reported agentic behaviour and self-reported communal 
behaviour, whereas narcissism was positively correlated with self-reported agentic 
behaviour and negatively correlated with self-reported communal behaviour. I sought 
to corroborate these findings in a second study using an alternative and more 
concrete measure of status-promoting behaviours. To do so, I developed six vignettes 
(see Appendix 4.1).  
Each vignette consisted of a short description of a realistic and vivid 
situation, involving a mild social conflict to which participants might react in 
different ways. The vignettes varied in terms of their setting (work/social), the type 
(demanding/quarrelsome) and level (clear/ambiguous) of abrasive behaviour 
displayed, and the target of that behaviour (self/others). They described situations 
that are relatively common to allow people to identify with them easily. For example, 
in one vignette two colleagues angrily discuss the behaviour of a third colleague who 
is not present, and in another, siblings disagree about what birthday gift to buy for 
their grandmother.  
I avoided descriptions that would make some of the possible reactions to the 
vignettes a priori more or less liable. For example, as behaviour is affected by social 
context, and may be especially sensitive to social role and hierarchical position 
(Fournier et al., 2002; Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994), the vignettes all 
described status-neutral interactions with peers.  59 
 
Each vignette was paired with four possible behavioural responses, each 
reflecting a different quadrant of the interpersonal circumplex. That is, the response 
options were designed to be respectively (a) high in both agency and communion, (b) 
high in agency and low in communion, (c) low in agency and high in communion, 
and (d) low in both agency and communion. In other words, rather than measuring 
agentic and communal behaviours separately, the vignette-based measure assessed 
behaviours in the agentic and communal domains simultaneously. There were several 
reasons for choosing this approach.  
First, since prestige-based status is attained by attracting followers, it should 
be positively related to behaviour that is simultaneously high in both agency and 
communion. Similarly, since dominance-based status is attained by intimidating 
subordinates, it should be associated with behaviour that is simultaneously high in 
agency and low in communion. Thus, the vignette-based measure allowed me to tests 
the exact combination of behaviours that I hypothesized.  
Second, in real-life settings, it is natural for people to judge targets along both 
the agentic and communal dimension (Fiske et al., 2007). Accordingly, I created a 
study featuring all four logical combinations. 
 Finally, this measure of behaviour differed markedly from that used in the 
first study. Thus, I felt that corroborating the hypotheses across these two studies 
would provide convincing support for the hypotheses.  
Study P4.1: Pilot Study 
To ensure that the vignettes accurately reflected the behaviours they were 
designed to assess, I conducted a pilot study.  60 
 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Fourteen participants (students and 
postgraduate researchers at the University of Southampton) took part in the pilot 
study. Postgraduate researchers took part voluntarily, whereas students were 
rewarded with research credits. Participants indicated that their level of familiarity 
with interpersonal circumplex models, rated on a scale from no expertise at all (1) to 
very high level of expertise (10), was very low (M = 1.43, SD = 1.16). 
The 14 participants rated the extent to which each of the response options 
accompanying each vignette was dominant (i.e., high in agency), submissive (i.e., 
low in agency), agreeable (i.e., high in communion), and quarrelsome (i.e., low in 
communion). To do so, they were given a list of adjectives to describe each of these 
poles of the main axes of the circumplex. Specifically, they were told:  
“Please read the list of adjectives provided below. They all refer to a dimension 
called XX.”  These instructions were followed by the list of adjectives. For example 
for the dominant pole of the circumplex they received the following list: “Assertive, 
Dominant, Forceful, Self-Assured, Domineering, Firm, Self-Confident, Persistent”. 
The lists of adjectives were obtained from the IAS-R (Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 
1988). The adjective list was followed by the following instructions “Now read each 
of the vignettes and indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much), to what 
extent each of the response options (the choices A to D) is similar to the XX 
dimension. You may refer back to the description of the XX dimension as often as you 
need to.” 
Participants rated all the response options on one pole of the circumplex 
before moving on to the next and continued until they had rated all response options 
in terms of dominance, submissiveness, agreeableness, and quarrelsomeness. The 61 
 
order of the circumplex poles was randomized across participants (For a similar 
procedure, see Moskowitz, 1994). 
Results and Discussion 
The vignettes were evaluated in two ways (see Appendix 4.1). First, I 
assessed inter-rater agreement. Following Moskowitz (1994), I calculated for each 
response option Cronbach’s coefficient alpha between raters and across the different 
poles of the interpersonal circumplex (i.e. dominant, submissive, agreeable, and 
quarrelsome behaviour) rather than – as is usual – between items of a scale and 
across different participants
5. This way I obtained a measure of the extent to which 
the raters agreed on the meaning of response options in terms of the interpersonal 
circumplex model.  
For 23 of the 24 response options the agreement between raters was very high 
ranging between 0.85 and 0.98 (mean alpha: 0.94). For the final response option 
(Vignette 1, response option B) the inter-rater alpha was 0.69, suggesting that the 
meaning of this response option in terms of the interpersonal circumplex model was 
more ambiguous.  
In addition to inter-rater agreement, I assessed dimensional accuracy for each 
response option: the extent to which raters thought that a given response option 
correctly reflected the poles of circumplex dimensions it was designed to represent. 
For example, if a response option was designed to be dominant/agreeable, I wanted 
to make sure it was rated high in both dominance and agreeableness.  
The four different response options belonging to any given vignette are 
alternative reactions to the same situation. My main concern was to establish that 
each response option better represented the behaviours it was intended to measure 
than the alternative response options. In addition, each response option 62 
 
simultaneously represents two types of behaviour (e.g., dominant behaviour and 
agreeable behaviour) and each of these behaviours is also represented by one of the 
other response options (i.e., dominant behaviour by the dominant/quarrelsome 
response option and agreeable behaviour by the submissive/agreeable response 
option). Therefore, I made separate assessments of dimensional accuracy for each 
type of behaviour, by requiring each response option to represent the behaviours it 
was designed to measure better than the two alternative responses that were not 
designed to measure either of those behaviours. So, for example, each 
dominant/agreeable response needed to be (a) rated as significantly more dominant 
than the submissive/agreeable and the submissive/quarrelsome alternatives, as well 
as (b) rated as significantly more agreeable than the dominant/quarrelsome and 
submissive/quarrelsome alternatives. 
To determine whether this was the case, I first calculated, for each vignette, 
cut-off values for the dimensional accuracy of each type of behaviour. The cut-off 
value was set at one standard deviation above the average rating on a given type of 
behaviour for the set of response options reflecting the opposite pole of the 
circumplex dimension. Thus, a response option featuring dominance as one 
dimension was considered to accurately reflect dominant behaviour if it was rated at 
least one standard deviation higher in dominance than the two alternative response 
options featuring submissiveness as one dimension. Only one response option 
(Vignette 1, Response Option C) did not meet this criterion. 
Thus, I decided to remove Vignette 1 from the analyses, retaining Vignettes 
2-6. But overall, the pre-test results show that the raters agreed that each of the 
response options of the remaining vignettes accurately reflected the poles of the 
circumplex it was intended to represent. 63 
 
Study 4.2: A Replication with a New Measure 
The main goal of Study 4.2 was to replicate the finding from Study 4.1 using 
a distinctly different measure of interpersonal behaviour, and thus to corroborate the 
earlier findings. To achieve this, participants completed the vignette-based measure 
of agentic versus communal behavioural tendencies (i.e., the 5 vignettes I retained 
after pre-testing), as well as trait measures of self-esteem and narcissism.  
The second goal of this study was to replicate the earlier findings whilst 
strictly avoiding that participants would suspect a connection between the different 
measures. To achieve this, participants completed the measures of self-esteem and 
narcissism in one session, and then completed the measure of interpersonal 
behaviour in a separate and seemingly unrelated session. Moreover, the second 
session took place approximately 4-5 months after the first session. Thus, the two 
sessions were not only seemingly unrelated, there was also a considerable time lag 
between the two. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. 63 undergraduate students (10 male, 53 
female) from the University of Southampton took part in this study in return for 
course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 (M = 18.89, SD = 1.25).  
Participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 
1965) and the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-40; Raskin & Terry, 
1988) as part of an online pre-test at the start of the academic year (for descriptive 
statistics see Table 4.5). They completed a second survey approximately 4-5 months 
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unrelated to this study. Participants were not aware of any connection between the 
two sessions.  
For each vignette, participants indicated how likely they were to exhibit each 
of the behavioural responses (in percentages rounded to the nearest 10, adding up to 
100% for each vignette) if they were faced with the situation described. They were 
given an unrelated example to clarify this procedure. In addition, a summation line 
was drawn under each set of response options as well as the words “100%” to remind 
them to distribute the correct total of percentages. Despite this reminder 14.8% of the 
participants failed to report percentages adding up to 100% for at least one of the 
vignettes. As removing these participants would substantially decrease the data 
available for analyses, I rescaled the relevant percentage scores so they added to 
100% instead
6. Following these adjustments, I calculated average percentage scores 
for each participant across the vignettes for each type of behaviour (see Table 4.5). 
Results and Discussion 
As predicted, self-esteem correlated positively with a self-reported preference 
for with high agency/high communion behavioural responses to a diverse set of 
situations, whereas narcissism correlated positively with a self-reported preference 
for high agency/low communion responses (see Table 4.6). Symmetrically, self-
esteem correlated negatively with a self-reported preference for with low agency/low 
communion behavioural responses to a diverse set of situations whereas narcissism 
correlated negatively with a self-reported preference for low agency/high 
communion responses.  
While not explicitly predicted, the negative relation between narcissism and 
low agency/high communion behaviour fits with the conception of narcissism 
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to higher status members may be careful not to challenge or upset their intimidators. 
Thus, they may avoid dominant and quarrelsome behaviour that might be construed 
as a challenge.  
In contrast, the negative relation between self-esteem and low agency/low 
communion behaviour fits with the conception of self-esteem reflecting prestige-
based status: before voluntarily granting status to those they deem worthy, low status 
group members may critically evaluate alternative group members (Price, 2000). 
Moreover, they may use unfriendly tactics to keep overly ambitious high status 
figures in check (Dentan, 1979; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Thus, while their 
behaviour may not be dominant, it need not necessarily be friendly.  
In addition, partialling for narcissism slightly reduced the correlation between 
self-esteem and high agency/high communion responses, whereas partialling for self-
esteem strengthened the positive correlation between narcissism and high agency/low 
communion behaviour. Thus, in contrast with Study 4.1, controlling for 
contamination effects did not increase the hypothesized relations between self-
esteem and behaviour, whereas it did somewhat increase those between narcissism 
and behaviour.  
One reason for these contrasting findings may be the measures of self-esteem 
used in Study 4.1 and Study 4.2. Different measures of self-esteem are associated 
with slightly different interpersonal content (Zeigler-Hill, 2010). Therefore, some 
may tap into narcissism to a greater extent than others. Possibly, compared to the 
SLCS-R, the RSES is a relatively “narcissism-free” measure of self-esteem: when 
partialling for narcissism the hypothesized relation between the RSES and high 
agency/high communion behaviour did not improve (and even decreased) in Study 66 
 
4.2, whereas partialling for narcissism had a substantial effect on the hypothesized 
correlation between the SLCS-R and communal behaviour in Study 4.1.  
Overall, Study 4.1 and 4.2 provide convergent support for the hypotheses at 
the trait level. They do so using different measures of self-esteem and narcissism, 
and markedly different operationalizations of interpersonal behaviour. Moreover, the 
results remain strong in Study 4.2 despite the substantial time-lag between the 
collection of the self-regard data and the collection of the behavioural strategies data, 
suggesting the results are not only strong but also stable.  
Study 4.3: Self-Regard and Recalled Behaviour 
Study 4.3 aimed to provide further converging support for the hypotheses. 
More importantly, it aimed to demonstrate that the hypothesized relations with 
interpersonal behaviour are unique to self-esteem and narcissism. Given that both 
self-esteem and narcissism covary with many traits (see e.g., Campbell et al., 2002), 
their relations with interpersonal behaviour may be the result of such covariates 
rather than of a unique relation with self-esteem or narcissism. However, if the same 
relations were found at the state level – in other words if state fluctuations in 
people’s interpersonal behaviour were to covary with their state levels of self-esteem 
and narcissism – this would arguably imply that these relations were unique to self-
esteem and narcissism. Moreover, such a method would offer methodological 
advantages over the alternative method of controlling for any covariates of self-
esteem and narcissism that theoretically might mediate these relations, as creating an 
exhaustive list of such possible covariates would be difficult. The chosen method, in 
contrast, has the advantage of being methodologically succinct.  67 
 
To assess whether people’s interpersonal behaviour covaries with their state 
levels of self-esteem and narcissism, I wanted to compare participants’ behaviour in 
situations in which they experienced high self-esteem with their behaviour in 
situations in which they experienced low levels of self-esteem, and to do the same for 
situations in which they experienced high versus low levels of narcissism. As, to my 
knowledge, no earlier work had attempted to manipulate self-esteem and narcissism 
in parallel, I was obliged to create a new manipulation. I decided to use a recall task 
to elicit each of the four conditions. There were several reasons for this choice.  
Firstly, as mentioned before, self-esteem and narcissism are related constructs 
that are moderately correlated. Thus, any manipulation of self-esteem is bound to 
have some effect on narcissism as well and vice versa. To minimize such crossover 
effects, I needed a task in which I could include enough specific instructions to 
carefully tease apart the two constructs.   
Secondly, narcissism is in itself a complex construct with many different 
factors (Emmons, 1984, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Therefore, I also needed a 
task in which I could include enough specific instructions to capture this complexity. 
Third, a review of the literature revealed many examples of self-esteem 
manipulations, but hardly any examples of narcissism manipulations. However, some 
earlier work that has successfully manipulated narcissism made use of a recall task 
(Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007). Given the relative novelty of manipulating 
narcissism, and the added complexity of manipulating self-esteem in parallel, I 
decided to build on this existing task, rather than attempt a completely new approach. 
Participants 
University students (n = 112) took part in a 2 (level of self-regard: high/low) 
x 2 (type of self-regard: self-esteem/narcissism) within-subject lab experiment in 68 
 
return for course credit or a monetary reward. A check on student IDs revealed that 
two participants had each taken part twice. Both students’ second set of data was 
removed, leaving 110 participants (23 male, 86 female, 1 unreported) ranging in age 
from 18 to 41 (M = 21.16, SD = 4.20).  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to report their interpersonal behaviour in four 
situations that were presented in a randomized order. They received a set of specific 
instructions for each of these situations. These instructions were designed to a) 
carefully distinguish between self-esteem and narcissism, and b) capture the 
complexity of the narcissism construct. Additionally, in order to reduce demand 
effects, overlap in the wording of the instruction and the manipulation checks of state 
self-esteem and narcissism was minimized (the complete manipulations are included 
in Appendix 4.2, the measures of state self-esteem and narcissism in Appendix 4.3 
and 4.4).  
For example, to carefully distinguish the high self-esteem condition from the 
high narcissism condition, participants in the high self-esteem condition were asked 
to describe a time when they “felt comfortable with themselves and secure in their 
self-worth” in order to elicit a memory of being worthy (i.e., meeting a standard). In 
contrast, participants in the high narcissism condition were asked to describe a time 
when they “stood out from the crowd and were admired by others” in order to elicit a 
memory of feeling glorious (i.e., exceeding a standard). Similarly, participants in the 
low narcissism condition were asked to describe a time when they “felt no better or 
worse than most people” (i.e., they did not exceed a standard), whereas participants 
in the low self-esteem condition were asked to describe a time when they “felt like a 
failure” (i.e., they did not meet a standard).  69 
 
To capture the complexity of the narcissism construct the instructions 
reflected different factors of the narcissism construct (see e.g. Raskin & Terry, 
1988). For example, in the high narcissism condition they were asked to describe 
how they “looked and felt” (vanity, exhibitionism), and how the event made them 
feel “successful” (authority, self-sufficiency), “entitled to the attention of others” 
(entitlement, exhibitionism), and “special” (superiority). To make sure that 
participants clearly recalled the situation and remembered it in all its complexity, 
they were urged to “take a couple of minutes to vividly recall the experience” and to 
“re-live the moment in your mind”, before describing the event and answering 
questions about it.  
Measures  
Following each recall task, participants reported their self-esteem, narcissism, 
and behaviour in the recalled situation on brief state-level measures (see Table 4.7 
for descriptive statistics). Up to 7 months prior to the lab session a subset of the 
participants (n = 58) also completed trait versions of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965) and the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
(NPI-40; Raskin & Terry, 1988) as part of a series of measures routinely completed 
by new students.   
Self-esteem. To create a short measure of state self-esteem, I selected items 
from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and reworded them to reflect states rather 
than traits (Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix 4.3). To maximize the relevance of the 
selected items for the self-esteem–status link under investigation, I selected only 
positively worded items as some research suggests such items reflect self-confidence 
whereas negative items reflect self-(dis)liking (see Gray-Little, Williams, & 
Hancock, 1997 for a review). Moreover, negatively worded items have been found to 70 
 
be more strongly confounded with measures of depression (Greenberger, Chen, 
Dimitrieva, & Farruggia, 2003). From the positive items I selected the two items that 
best reflect the underlying trait as indicated by their factor loadings and item 
discrimination scores (Gray-Little et al, 1997). Participants rated these items from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) and scores were averaged to create a 
composite score.  
Narcissism. Participants completed a state version of items selected from the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988; see Appendix 4.4). 
Two items were selected from each subscales identified by Raskin and Terry (1988) 
to limit the length of the narcissism measure, without compromising its breadth. I 
selected items that loaded most strongly on the different factors, except when such 
items were unsuitable to be worded in terms of a state (e.g., items reflecting “when 
… then…”statements). All selected items were among the three strongest loading 
items in the original subscale, and all had a minimum factor loading of .5. 
Interpersonal Behaviour. Interpersonal behaviour was assessed with the 
original state version of the SBI (Moskowitz, 1994). To increase brevity without 
compromising content, participants indicated whether they engaged in each of the 46 
behaviours on the scale in a simple yes (1) /no (0) format. The scores were reverse-
scored where appropriate and averaged to create composite scores for respectively 
agentic and communal behaviour.  
Results and Discussion 
Success of manipulations. To determine whether participants’ level of state 
self-esteem differed across conditions, I conducted a 2 (level of self-regard) x 2 (type 
of self-regard) ANOVA on self-esteem. There was a main effects of the type of self-
regard, F(1,105) = 352.34, p < .001, η
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F(1,105) = 704.34, p < .001, η
2 =. 87 on participants’ state self-esteem. Moreover, 
there was a significant interaction effect between the level and type of self-regard 
manipulated, F(1,105) = 360.50, p < .001, η
2 =. 77, suggesting that the self-esteem 
manipulation (i.e., high versus low self-esteem) and the narcissism manipulation 
(i.e., high versus low narcissism) each had a significantly different effect on state 
self-esteem. Simple effects analysis revealed that, as intended, self-esteem was 
higher in the high self-esteem condition than in the low self-esteem condition, 
F(1,105) = 967.83, p < .001, η
2 = .90. Self-esteem was also higher in the high 
narcissism condition than in the low narcissism condition, F(1,105) = 43.60, p < 
.001, η
2 = .29, which is not surprising given that self-esteem and narcissism are 
moderately correlated (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004). However, the latter effect was 
considerably smaller than the prior effect. Thus, state self-esteem was more strongly 
affected by the self-esteem manipulation than by the narcissism manipulation. 
Subjecting narcissism to the same level of self-regard x type of self-regard 
ANOVA revealed significant main effects of the type of self-regard, F(1,70) = 5.46, 
p = .022, η
2 = .07, and level of self-regard manipulated, F(1,70) = 113.12, p < .001, 
η
2 =. 62 on state narcissism, as well as a significant interaction effect between the 
level and type of self-regard manipulated, F(1,70) = 4.06, p = .048, η
2 = .06. Simple 
effects analysis revealed that, as intended, narcissism was higher in the high 
narcissism condition than in the low narcissism condition, F(1,70) = 82.30, p < .001, 
η
2 = .54. Again there was a smaller cross-over effect so that narcissism was also 
higher in the high self-esteem condition than in the low self-esteem condition, 
F(1,70) = 47.12, p < .001, η
2 = .40. Thus, the effect of the narcissism manipulation 
on state narcissism was stronger than that of the self-esteem manipulation. Thus, 72 
 
overall, each manipulation had a significantly greater impact on the variable it was 
meant to manipulate than on the variable it was not meant to manipulate.  
As a secondary check, I assessed the effectiveness of each of the recall tasks 
independently. To do so, I compared the levels of state self-esteem and narcissism 
reported by participants in different conditions with the trait levels of self-esteem and 
narcissism they reported up to seven months earlier. Given the time lag between the 
measurement of the trait-level and the state-level scores, these comparisons must be 
interpreted with caution. The trait scores of participants may have randomly changed 
in the interim, and as a result the effect of any condition may be underestimated or 
overestimated in this test. That said, t-tests revealed a significant effect in the 
intended direction in three of the four conditions. Thus, there is good evidence that 
most individual conditions had the intended effect. Relative to their trait level of self-
esteem, participants reported increased levels of state self-esteem in the high self-
esteem condition, t (56) = 6.05, p < .001, and reduced levels of self-esteem in the low 
self-esteem condition, t (55) = - 19.02, p < .001. Moreover, relative to their trait level 
of narcissism, participants reported reduced levels of narcissism in the low 
narcissism condition, t (43) = - 5.33, p < .001. However, in the high narcissism 
condition participants levels of situational narcissism did not differ from their trait 
level of narcissism, t (42) = 1.50, p = .142. Again, there were also some cross-over 
effects. Participants reported decreased narcissism in the low self-esteem condition, t 
(46) = 6.15, p < .001, and increased self-esteem in the high narcissism condition, t 
(56) = 6.13, p < .001. Other cross-over effects were not significant (ps ≥ .224).  
In summary, these checks confirmed that the manipulations generally worked 
as intended. Importantly, the primary checks confirmed that the manipulations 
worked relative to one another. Moreover, the secondary check produced results that 73 
 
were also generally consistent with the manipulations working. Therefore, I have 
reasonable confidence that the manipulations successfully manipulated participants’ 
state levels of self-esteem and narcissism.  
Agentic behaviour. A 2 (level of self-regard) x 2 (type of self-regard) 
ANOVA on the agentic behaviour composite score revealed a significant interaction 
between level and type of self-regard, F(1,89) = 4.52, p = .036, η
2 = .05, as well a 
main effect of level of self-regard, F(1,89) = 82.21, p < .001, η
2 =. 48. Importantly, 
simple effects analysis revealed that, as predicted, the level of agentic behaviour 
participants recalled was both higher in the high self-esteem condition than in the 
low self-esteem condition, F(1,89) = 65.26, p < .001, η
2 = .42, and higher in the high 
narcissism condition than in the low narcissism condition, F(1,89) = 27.78, p < .001, 
η
2 = .24.  
Communal behaviour. A 2 (level of self-regard) x 2 (type of self-regard) 
ANOVA on the communal behaviour composite scores revealed a significant 
interaction effect between level and type of self-regard, F(1,84) = 86.57, p < .001, η
2 
= .51, as well as main effects of type of self-regard, F(1,84) = 120.64, p < .001, η
2 = 
.59, and level of self-regard, F(1,84) = 61.81, p < .001, η
2 =. 42. Importantly, simple 
effects analysis revealed that, as predicted, the level of communal behaviour 
participants recalled was higher in the high self-esteem condition than in the low 
self-esteem condition, F(1,84) = 111.66, p < .001, η
2 = .57, and lower in the high 
narcissism condition than in the low narcissism condition, F(1,84) = -4.33, p = .041, 
η
2 = .05. 
Summary. Study 4.3 supported the hypotheses at the state level. Compared 
situations in which their state narcissism was low, participants recalled more agentic 
behaviour and less communal behaviour when their state narcissism was high. 74 
 
Moreover, compared situations in which their state self-esteem was low, participants 
recalled both more agentic behaviour and more communal behaviour when their state 
self-esteem was high.  
General Discussion 
How does the self-appraisal of people who behave in ways liable to assist 
them in grabbing status differ from the self-appraisal of people who behave in ways 
liable to convince others to grant them status? The research reported in this chapter 
provides a clear answer to this question. Across three studies, self-esteem was 
consistently associated with behaviours that were high in agency as well as 
communion, whereas narcissism was consistently associated with behaviours that 
were high in agency and low in communion, behaviours that have been found to be 
associated with status in, respectively, prestige-based hierarchies where status is 
grabbed, and dominance-based hierarchies where status is granted (see Chapter 3).  
The first two studies provided strong support for the hypotheses at the trait 
level across different measures of self-esteem and narcissism, and using markedly 
different operationalizations of interpersonal behaviour. The second study also found 
that these results were stable over time: the hypotheses were supported despite a 
substantial time lag between the collection of the self-regard data and the collection 
of the behavioural data. The third study, finally, supported the hypotheses at the state 
level. In other words, state fluctuations in people’s interpersonal behaviour were 
found to covary with their state levels of self-esteem and narcissism, arguably 
implying that the hypothesized relations were not only strong and stable, but also 
unique to self-esteem and narcissism.  75 
 
One possible limitation of these studies is that they relied on self-report to 
assess interpersonal behaviour. This renders them susceptible to a self-enhancement 
bias that may have led some participants to over-report socially desirable high 
agency and high communion behaviours. This is potentially problematic since people 
with higher levels of narcissism and self-esteem may be more inclined to exhibit 
such a bias (Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; John & Robins, 1994). By 
including more objective measures of interpersonal behaviour, future studies may 
build on and expand the current findings.  
All three studies assessed trait-level covariations between self-regard and 
status-promoting behaviours, either at the trait or at the state level. Consequently, it 
is not possible to determine the causal direction of the relations between self-regard 
and behaviour from the results. However, three possibilities are worth noting.  
The first possibility is that status-promoting behaviour makes people feel 
good about themselves because it promotes status. In other words, status-promoting 
behaviours lead to increased status (as Chapter 3 revealed, this need not always be 
the case), which in turn leads to positive self-regard. Thus, rather than there 
necessarily being a direct relation between self-regard and behaviour, this relation 
may be mediated by status. If this possibility is correct, both self-esteem and 
narcissism act as what Leary and colleagues (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & 
Downs, 1995) have referred to as a “sociometer”: they track the “social value” of an 
individual.  
A second possibility, and one that is consistent with the argumentation at the 
start of this chapter, is that people who feel good about themselves engage in status-
promoting behaviours because they feel confident that they can succeed in doing so 
(Gilbert et al, 1995). More specifically, high self-regard motivates people to behave 76 
 
in ways that promote status, whereas low self-regard motivates people to avoid (the 
risks associated with) such behaviours when they are unlikely to be successful. If this 
possibility is correct, and building on Leary and colleagues’ (Leary & Baumeister, 
2000; Leary & Downs, 1995) terminology, self-regard may be referred to as a 
“sociomotivator”: an internal device that regulates status-striving.  
Finally, combining these first two possibilities, gives a third possibility: that 
self-regard reacts to clues of social value and, when high, motivates people to behave 
in ways that promote status. In other words, status leads to self-regard which in turn 
leads to status-promoting behaviours. Stated differently, self-regard acts as both a 
sociometer and as a sociomotivator.   
Why discuss this causal sequence if the research presented does not assess it 
directly? There are several good reasons to do so. Firstly, this causal sequence speaks 
to a strand of research arguing that self-regard is an evolved psychological 
mechanism that helps people navigate their social world (Hill & Buss, 2006; 
Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Downs, 1995). 
More specifically, self-regard is asserted to help people maintain a certain level of 
social value. Quite similar to the way hunger alerts people to their need to acquire 
and ingest food, and motivates them to do so, low self-regard may alert people to the 
need to yield to superior competitors, and motivate them to do so. Together a 
sociometer and a sociomotivator may do just that.  
Secondly, although the research presented here does not critically test this 
causal sequence, the results are consistent with elements of it. In particular, the 
results provide support for a possible sociomotivator function of self-regard. As such, 
they complement the overwhelming support that has already been obtained for a 
sociometer function of self-regard (for a review see e.g., Leary & McDonald, 2003).  77 
 
A third and final reason to consider the causal nature of the relations between 
status, self-regard and interpersonal behaviour, is its importance for understanding 
the possible vices and virtues of narcissism. Narcissism and self-esteem are 
portrayed very differently in the literature. Self-esteem is generally perceived to be 
“healthy”, whereas narcissism is generally seen as “unhealthy” (Sedikides, Rudich, 
Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). However, the causal sequence discussed here 
implies that both may be “functional” in their own way: self-esteem impels people to 
convince other to grant them status, whereas narcissism motivates them to grab it. 
Aggressive leaders, who grab status, may be welcomed in times of crisis 
(Schlessinger, 1986), possibly because their ability to wield greater power is 
welcomed as a means to decisively deal with threats. Thus, in the right time and 
place, narcissism may prove highly effective. However, a confirmation of their 
ability to seize power may further boost the narcissism of such leaders, and 
contribute to the self-reinforcing cycle of status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). If we 
require people to assertively take control, we might need to accept that we will end 
up with narcissistic leaders.  78 
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CHAPTER 5 
Interpersonal Warmth towards High-Status Individuals in Dominance and 
Prestige Hierarchies 
Status is not equally distributed among members of a group (Berger et al., 
1985). In previous chapters I have empirically established that attaining high status is 
associated with certain behaviours, and that some people are more inclined to engage 
in such behaviours than others. However, there may be another reason that some 
people attain higher status in a group than others: like anything of value attaining 
status may entail some costs, and not everyone may be willing to pay the necessary 
price to attain status. Thus, the question arises what costs people may incur when 
attaining status. As status attainment is an inherently social process, I answer this 
question here by assessing the interpersonal consequences of status, focusing in 
particular on how status affect the level of interpersonal warmth people receive from 
others.  
Comparing unfavourably to another person can make people feel bad (Tesser, 
1988). Therefore, people who attain high status can evoke negative feelings in others 
who compare unfavourably to them. Those others may feel envious and even harbour 
malicious feelings towards the high-status person (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & 
Pieters, 2009) which would impede their seeking a kind and caring relationship with 
this person. Consequently, people may need to forego interpersonal warmth in order 
to gain status. This would qualify as an important interpersonal sacrifice, given 
people’s strong need to be part of on-going relationships marked by caring and 
concern (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  80 
 
Status and Interpersonal Warmth 
Prior research paints an inconsistent picture of the interpersonal warmth 
group members feel towards people with high status (cf. Lee & Tiedens, 2001). 
Relative to low-status people, higher-status people tend to be both prominent in 
interactions (Berkowitz, 1956; Leavitt, 1951; Shaw, 1964; but Cook, Emerson, 
Gilmore, & Yamagishi, 1983) and socially well-connected (Brass, 1984; Ibarra & 
Andrews, 1993; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). They also stand out (Chance, 1967; 
Ellyson, Dovidio, Corson, & Vinicur, 1980; Maner, DeWall, & Gaillot, 2008) and 
receive more attention (Berger et al., 1972; Ellyson et al., 1980). Thus, evidently, 
higher-status people are neither alone nor ignored. Accordingly, there is little support 
for the folk wisdom that “it’s lonely at the top”. But are higher-status people 
genuinely liked and included by other people? Or might they be highly regarded but 
yet unloved? Might it be false that “everybody loves a winner”? 
Given that kindness and liking tend to be reciprocated (Byrne & Rhamey, 
1965; Sadler & Woody, 2003), one clue may lie in how high-status people treat 
others. However, how they treat others is itself not clear. On the one hand, some 
research finds that high-status people are sensitive to others (Schmid Mast et al., 
2009), and are keen to seek additional information about them (Chen, Ybarra, & 
Kiefer, 2004). It also finds that they are better than low-status people at reading the 
emotions of interaction partners (Schmid Mast et al., 2009) and at remembering, 
recalling, and interpreting individuating information (Overbeck & Park, 2001). On 
the other hand, opposing research finds that high-status people are less likely to 
consider another person’s perspective (Galinsky et al., 2006), more likely to base 
their opinion of others on broader stereotypes (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 
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means to an end rather than as ends in themselves (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & 
Galinsky, 2008; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Kipnis, 1972).  
One reason for such mixed findings may be that status can be attained in 
contrasting ways. Whereas some may promote interpersonal warmth, others may 
impede it. Here, I propose that the extent to which people with high status are liked 
and included by other people depends importantly on the interpersonal processes 
underlying their group’s hierarchy.  
Dominance and Prestige Hierarchies 
I draw a distinction between dominance-based hierarchies—in which status 
is aggressively grabbed by few group members —and prestige-based hierarchies—
in which status is freely granted by many group-members (see Chapter 2 of this 
thesis).
1 This fundamental distinction has been noted by scholars across a range of 
disciplines (e.g., anthropology: Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; evolutionary 
psychology: Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010a; sociology: 
Kemper, 1994; social psychology: Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b). Real-life examples 
of the two hierarchy types are legion. Hierarchies based primarily on dominance-
processes include dictatorships, street gangs, and teams led by autocratic bosses. 
Hierarchies based primarily on prestige-processes include democracies, common 
interest groups, and teams who elect their own leader.  
My hypothesis is this: that the extent to which a group is, or is perceived to 
be, relatively dominance-based, as opposed to relatively prestige-based, will 
moderate how favourably people at or towards the top of a group hierarchy are 
regarded. In particular, status in relatively prestige-based hierarchies, being rooted 
in popularity, will elicit greater interpersonal warmth from others, whereas status in 
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interpersonal warmth from others. Thus, I postulate that is not so much status per se 
that determines attitudes towards high status individuals, but rather the manner in 
which that status has been achieved in the group. Consequently, the interpersonal 
costs or benefits associated with status attainment should differ diametrically 
depending on the interpersonal process underlying a status hierarchy.  
Why might interpersonal warmth towards people with high status differ in 
dominance and prestige hierarchies? As outlined in Chapter 3, status in prestige-
based hierarchies is attained with behaviour that is both high in agency and high in 
communion. Thus, people who attain status do so by behaving forcefully and kindly. 
In dominance-based hierarchies, on the other hand, status is attained with behaviour 
that is high in agency and low in communion. Thus, people who attain status do so 
by behaving forcefully and unkindly. As friendly behaviour evokes interpersonal 
warmth (Byrne & Rhamey, 1965; Sadler & Woody, 2003), I expected that would be 
the case for high-status members of prestige-based hierarchies, but not for high-
status members of dominance-based hierarchies. 
Overview of Studies 
I tested this hypothesis in two studies that used different methods with 
complementary strengths.  
In Study 5.1, I had participants read a vignette describing a student 
association that was either dominance-based or prestige-based and one describing a 
student-member who had either high or low status in the association. Participants 
then rated their perception of other members’ interpersonal warmth towards the 
student-member of the group. This allowed me to assess in a controlled experiment 
the independent effects of status and hierarchy type on perceived interpersonal 
warmth, as well as their interactions.  83 
 
It is important to note that participants rated their perception of the 
interpersonal warmth experienced towards a person described to them in a vignette, 
rather than their actual interpersonal warmth towards a person with whom they 
interacted directly. Like in earlier studies using vignettes (e.g. Study 2.1), this 
required participants to imagine what it would be like to be a member of the group in 
order to rate their interpersonal warmth. However, like in those earlier studies, to 
facilitate this process the context in which the vignette was situated (a student 
association) was chosen to be highly familiar to participants (University students).    
In Study 5.2, I investigated naturally occurring groups, using sociometric 
methods in which group members all rated one another. In this way, I assessed 
individual levels of status, individual levels of perceived interpersonal warmth, and 
overall type of group hierarchy (based on collective ratings). Importantly, members 
of these groups studied actually interacted with one another, actually possessed 
different statuses, actually experienced the consequences of this, and actually 
exhibited interpersonal warmth towards fellow group members. The design of Study 
5.2 thus allowed me to evaluate the real-world validity of the dominance-prestige 
distinction, and to explore the relevance of the distinction for predicting levels of 
interpersonal warmth. Furthermore, the design permitted me to study attitudes, not 
only of people at the top of a hierarchy (i.e., nominal leaders), but towards people 
towards the top of a hierarchy (i.e., prominent persons), affording the opportunity for 
a more fine-grained, general analysis. 84 
 
Study 5.1: Hierarchy Type, Perceived Status, and Interpersonal Warmth 
Participants and Procedure 
Undergraduate students (N = 75; 28 males, 46 females, 1 unreported) from 
Tilburg University participated in a 2 (Hierarchy Type: dominance-based processes, 
prestige-based) x 2 (Status Level: low, high) between-subject vignette study. The 
participants ranged in age from 18 to 36 (M = 21.20, SD = 2.75).  
Participants first read one of two vignettes describing a fictitious student 
association named “Mandante” (see Appendix 5.1). In the dominance-based 
hierarchy condition, Mandante was described as a place where “powerful members 
will exert pressure on others until they give in” whereas in the prestige-based 
hierarchy condition it was described as a place where “members will back the people 
that they sincerely appreciate and respect”.  
Participants then read a description of a student named “Kim” (a gender-
neutral name in Dutch), who was either described as having high status or low status 
within Mandante (see Appendix 5.2). In the low status condition Kim was described 
as “someone who is unnoticeably present” and “exerts little influence” within 
Mandante. In the high status condition Kim was described as “someone who is 
prominently present” and “exerts a lot of influence” within Mandante.   
After reading the vignette, participants completed the measures below.  
Measures 
Participants rated Kim’s status within Mandante (high status and little 
standing, reverse-scored) on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at All, 7 = Very Much).
1 The 
two items were averaged to form a composite score of status (M = 4.02, SD = 2.01, 
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The perceived hierarchy type of Mandante was measured with four items. Of 
these, two (M = 4.42, SD = 1.62, r(74) = .54) assessed how much status in Mandante 
was based on dominance (status is assertively taken by people who have the ability 
or means to do so and people with lower status go along with those with high status 
because they fear repercussions.). Another two (M = 3.82, SD = 1.67, r(74) = .49) 
assessed how much status in Mandante was based on prestige (status is willingly 
given to people by others who value them, and people with lower status go along 
with those with high status out of genuine respect). Again, participants rated each 
item on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at All, 7 = Very Much). 
Perceived interpersonal warmth was assessed with two items: “Within 
Mandante Kim is someone with whom others have a warm bond” and “Within 
Mandante Kim is someone who is not genuinely liked” (reversed-scored). The two 
items were averaged to create a composite index of interpersonal warmth (M = 3.91, 
SD = 1.11, r(74) = .42). 
Results 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (Hierarchy Type: dominance-based, prestige-
based) x 2 (Status Level: low, high) ANOVA on the two hierarchy type measures, 
suggested that the hierarchy type manipulation was successful. 
On the dominance-based hierarchy measure, the ANOVA yielded a main 
effect, F(1, 69) = 76.64, p < .001, η = .53, such that the hierarchy of Mandante was 
rated as more dominance-based in the dominance-based condition (M = 5.68, SD = 
.98) than in the prestige-based condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.24). No other effects 
were significant.  
Moreover, on the prestige-based hierarchy measure, the ANOVA yielded a 
main effect, F(1, 69) = 24.13, p < .001, η = .26, such that the hierarchy of Mandante 86 
 
was rated as more prestige-based in the prestige-based condition (M = 4.60, SD = 
1.24) than in the dominance-based condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.66). Again, no other 
effects were significant.  
A Hierarchy Type x Status ANOVA on the status measure revealed a main 
effect of status condition, F(1, 69) = 196.29, p < .001, η = .74, such that Kim’s status 
was rated higher in the High Status (M = 5.76, SD = .85) than in the Low Status (M = 
2.37, SD = 1.23) condition. Thus, the manipulation had the expected effect. There 
was also an unexpected, but smaller main effect of the hierarchy type manipulation, 
F(1, 69) = 4.12, p < .046, η = .06, such that status was higher in the prestige-based 
condition (M = 4.26, SD = 1.94) than in the dominance-based condition (M = 3.69, 
SD = 2.07). No other effects were significant. 
Interpersonal warmth. Running the same ANOVA with interpersonal 
warmth as the dependent variable yielded the expected interaction between hierarchy 
type and status, F(1, 69) = 13.31, p = .001, η = .16. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the 
nature of this interaction matched the predictions: status reduced interpersonal 
warmth in the dominance-based condition and increased it in the prestige-based 
condition, F(1,70) = 5.61, p = .021, η
2 = .07. Moreover, simple effects analyses 
revealed that these effects were significant in both the dominance-based condition, 
F(1,70) = 7.87, p = .007, η
2 = .10, and in the prestige-based condition, F(1,70) = 
5.61, p = .021, η
2 = .07.  
Simple effects analyses also revealed that interpersonal warmth differed 
across hierarchy type in the high status condition, F(1,70) = 19.93, p < .001, η
2 = .22, 
but not in the low status condition, F(1,70) = .42, p = .521, η
2 < .01. In other words, 
people with high status are liked more when they have this status in a prestige-
hierarchy (M = 4.66, SD = 1.20) than in a dominance-hierarchy (M = 3.24, SD = .94), 87 
 
but people with low status are equally liked in the two types of hierarchies 
(respectively M = 3.80, SD = .59 and M = 4.00, SD = 1.00).   
Discussion 
As predicted, Study 5.1 revealed that perceived status increased perceived 
interpersonal warmth when a group was described as a prestige-based hierarchy, but 
reduced it when the group was described as a dominance-based hierarchy. Thus, 
whether people with high status are perceived to be interpersonally warm depends on 
the type of process underlying their group’s hierarchy. In line with the hypothesis, I 
found that “everybody loves a winner” in prestige-based hierarchies, but that it is 
“lonely at the top” in dominance-based hierarchies.  
Study 5. 2: Hierarchy Type, Status Level, and Interpersonal Warmth in 
Naturally Occurring Groups 
In Study 5.2, I again tested whether group hierarchy type moderated the link 
between status and interpersonal warmth. This time, however, I did so in several pre-
existing classes of college students in the UK. In effect, Study 5.2 aimed to replicate 
the results of Study 5.1 in a real-life setting. However, Study 5.2 also went beyond 
Study 5.1 in several ways. 
First, I assessed both the perceived status of students in each class, and the 
interpersonal warmth shown towards them. Thus, I was able to measure, not only 
group-level variations in interpersonal warmth shown towards the highest status 
members, but also individual-level variations in interpersonal warmth shown towards 
members of varying different status within each group. 
Second, Study 5.2 employed a sociometric round-robin design such that, on 
the key dimensions of status and interpersonal warmth, each rater evaluated different 
targets, and each target was in turn evaluated by different raters, within each of the 88 
 
several classes. Accordingly, I could obtain highly reliable and objective measures of 
each target on these dimensions.
2 
Third, face-to-face status inherently reflects the perspective of group 
members, and hence is best measured through peer ratings (Anderson et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the same is true for interpersonal warmth, being defined as the extent to 
which other group members genuinely like and include a person.  
Finally, I am, to my knowledge, the first to test naturally occurring variances 
in the extent to which face-to-face human groups vary in terms of being dominance-
based or prestige-based. True, the relevant variation in college classes in Western 
culture is unlikely to be representative of that across human groups generally, and 
probably substantially underestimates it. If so, however, and if relevant variation in 
these rather homogeneous and civilized groups were still to predict how warmly 
high-status individuals are perceived, then that would argue for the validity and 
importance of the distinction between dominance-based or prestige-based processes 
in more heterogeneous and contentious groups. 
Participants and Procedure 
College students of psychology (N = 182, in 10 classes of 8-25 students) 
participated in a round-robin study with repeated measures (two sessions).
3 Seven 
participants were removed either because they (a) failed to complete more than one-
fifth of their measures, (b) were not rated by more than one-fifth of their fellow 
students, or (c) failed to complete more than one-tenth of their measures and were 
not rated by more than one-tenth of their fellow students. Five more participants 
were removed after an outlier analysis indicated that the test-retest reliability of the 
ratings departed significantly from normal expectation. The remaining 170 
participants included 13 students (7.6%) who were absent at the first session, and 27 89 
 
(15.9%) who were absent at the second session. Given the scores provided by 
participants present during only one session did not differ significantly from those 
provided by those present during both sessions, all scores were included in 
subsequent analyses to maximize power.
4 
Demographic data was gathered only during the first session. Students therein 
ranged in age from 16 to 28 (M = 16.95, SD = 1.26), were mostly female (75.2%), 
and white (89.2%). The teachers of the classes ranged in age from 27 to 42 (M = 
36.00, SD = 6.38); two were male, two female, and all white. 
After providing demographic data, participants rated all the students in their 
class on single-item measures of both status and interpersonal warmth in a round-
robin design. Next, they completed a class-level measure of hierarchy type. In order 
to assess their test-retest reliability, all these measures were repeated in the second 
session, which took place two weeks later.  
Measures 
Participants rated their own status level, and that of every other student in 
their class, from Not at All (1) to Very Much (7) on a single item (Thinking about 
each person in your class in turn, indicate how prominent [i.e. visible, attracts 
attention] and influential you feel they are in your class). 
Two bipolar items assessed the hierarchy type of the class. Each ran from a 
prestige pole to a dominance pole. (I did this as in Study 2.1 I found that dominance-
based and prestige-based processes were inversely correlated, lying at opposite ends 
of a continuum.) The first item ran from “status is willingly given to people by others 
who value them” to “status is assertively taken by people who have the ability or 
means to do so”. The second item ran from “people with lower status go along with 
those with high status out of genuine respect” to “people with lower status go along 90 
 
with those with high status because they fear repercussions”. Each item was rated on 
a 6-point scale, with higher scores indicating that the status hierarchy of the class was 
based more strongly on dominance than on prestige. 
Finally, interpersonal warmth was rated from Not at All (1) to Very Much (7) 
on a single item (Thinking about each person in your class in turn, indicate how 
liked and included you feel they are in your class). Again, each participant rated each 
student in their class, including themselves. 
Results 
The analysis of the data was designed to take into account both the 
sociometric nature of the round-robin data as well as the hierarchical nesting of the 
participants in classes. To do so, I first calculated composite peer ratings from the 
sociometric data using Kenny and La Voie’s (1984) social relations model and the 
associated SOREMO software (Kenny, 1994). To take into account the nesting of 
data within classes, I tested my hypothesis with the mixed models option in SPSS 
and included class as a random effect in the model. Given the complexity of these 
analyses, I maximized the data available to perform them by merging participant 
scores across the two data collection sessions, including all participants who had 
taken part in at least one of the two. 
Data preparation. Hierarchy type, status level, and interpersonal warmth, 
were each assessed twice. To assess the temporal stability of the hierarchy type 
measure, I first created a composite by averaging the two items (α = .58). I then 
calculated the correlation between the ratings of this composite during the first and 
the second session (r = .69). To assess the temporal stability of the two round-robin 
measures (status and interpersonal warmth) I took a slightly different approach. I first 
calculated, for each participant, the correlation between their ratings of the same 91 
 
targets across the first and second sessions. Next, I applied a Fisher r to z' 
transformation to normalize the resulting values, averaged those values across 
participants, and finally back-transformed that average. Both status (r = .79) and 
interpersonal warmth (r = .77) emerged as highly correlated across sessions.  
Having found adequate test-retest reliability, I merged the data across the two 
data collection sessions for status (M = 4.29, SD = .57), hierarchy type (M = 2.74, SD 
= .93), and interpersonal warmth (M = 5.18, SD = .67). I averaged scores across 
sessions for participants who had taken part in both sessions, and using either single 
score for participants who had taken part in either the first or second session. 
Between-class differences along the dominance prestige dimension. A 
one-way ANOVA revealed that hierarchy type varied significant across classes, F(9, 
160) = 2.43, p = .01). Thus, even the relatively homogeneous groups I studied 
differed in the extent to which their hierarchies were relatively prestige-based or 
relatively dominance-based. 
Given that the hierarchy type of the classes differed, I calculated a class-level 
score of hierarchy type by averaging the ratings per class. Inspection of these class 
means revealed that none of the classes in the sample reflected a dominance 
hierarchy in the absolute sense: all scores lay below the scale midpoint. This is 
unsurprising, given that prestige-based hierarchies are prevalent in human society in 
general (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008), and that 
psychology classes in contemporary liberal society are unlikely to contain either 
fiercely competitive students or autocratic teachers. 
SOREMO analysis. I computed composite peer ratings of status and 
interpersonal warmth in line with Kenny and La Voie’s (1984) social relations 
model, and using the associated software SOREMO to analyse it (Kenny, 1995). 92 
 
SOREMO separates target scores (i.e., how a student is typically perceived by other 
students in their class), perceiver scores (i.e., how each student typically view of 
others in their class), and relationship effect scores (how people in each dyadic 
relationship idiosyncratically perceive one other), making them suitable for analyses 
that assume independence. Before running the program, I filled in omitted ratings, as 
SOREMO requires a dataset without missing data. For missing data on round-robin 
measures, I inserted the average ratings provided by other students to a given 
participant. For missing data at class level, I inserted the class average. 
Before analysing the target scores calculated by SOREMO, I conducted two 
preliminary tests to assess their quality. First, I consulted the relative target variance 
calculated by SOREMO. Relative target variance reflects the extent to which the 
total variance in peer ratings reflects differences in ratings given to different targets 
relative to differences in ratings given by different raters, and as such is used as an 
index of consensus in peer ratings (cf. Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b). Significant 
relative target variances revealed above-chance agreement among group members on 
the relative status (relative variance = .36) and interpersonal warmth (relative 
variance = .23) of different members of their class. Second, to further ensure within-
class agreement on target scores, I checked whether they adequately corresponded to 
participants’ self-ratings. As expected, perceiver scores were highly correlated with 
self-ratings for both status (r = .61) and interpersonal warmth (r = .55).  
Predicting interpersonal warmth. As all classes possessed a relatively 
prestige-based hierarchy, I expected that status overall would generally be positively 
related to interpersonal warmth. Nonetheless, I still expected that hierarchy type 
would moderate that relation, such that it would be stronger in classes that were more 
prestige-based but weaker in classes that were relatively more dominance-based.  93 
 
To account for the nesting of the data in classes, I used the SPSS mixed 
models function to test these predictions in a hierarchical set of models, including 
class as a random effect in the last step (see Table 5.1). In Step 1, I included 
students’ status and the hierarchy type as predictors of their interpersonal warmth. As 
expected, I found that higher status predicted interpersonal warmth, F(1,170) = 
135.85, p < .001. The higher participants’ status, the more they were liked and 
included by other students in their class. In addition, I found that hierarchy type 
predicted interpersonal warmth, F(1,170) = 14.05, p < .001. Students in relatively 
prestige-based as opposed to dominance-based classes were generally better liked 
and included by others in their class.  
At Step 2, I included the interaction term between status and hierarchy type. 
Including the interaction effect significantly improved the model, χ
2
Change= -4.09, p 
<.05. The main effects of status, F(1,170) = 138.51, p < .001, and hierarchy type, 
F(1,170) = 10.09, p = .002, on interpersonal warmth remained significant. Moreover, 
in line with my hypothesis, this term additionally predicted warm affiliations, 
F(1,170) = 4.13, p = .044.  
At Step 3, I reran this analysis while including class as a random effect. 
Accounting for the nesting of data in classes significantly improved the model, 
χ
2
Change= -25.22, p <.01. Moreover, the main effects of status, F(1,164.35) = 120.45, 
p < .001, and hierarchy type, F(1,10.26) = 7.38, p = .021, on interpersonal warmth 
remained significant. However, their interaction no longer predicted interpersonal 
warmth (F< 1). 
 Gender differences. As social norms differ for males and females (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002), I examined whether gender qualified the findings in any way. 
However, mostly null findings emerged. First, females were no more likely than 94 
 
males to perceive their class as relatively prestige-based (correlation gender and 
hierarchy type rating: r(155) = -.04, p = .63), nor were classes more likely to be 
prestige-based when they contained more female (correlation between gender and 
class hierarchy type: r(155) = -.07, p = .39).  
Second, to assess whether the effect of gender on status depended on the 
hierarchy type of the class, I included both IVs, together with their interaction, on 
status in two steps in a mixed model including class as a random effect. In Step 1, I 
included standardized indices of gender as well as individual scores and group 
averages of and hierarchy type as fixed effects. Only a significant effect of gender 
emerged, F(1,153.14) = 5.13, p = .025, such that males had higher status than 
females. In Step 2, adding the interaction term between gender and hierarchy type 
neither improved the model, χ
2
Change= -.53, p >.05, nor exerted any effect of the 
interaction term, F(1,148.52) = .53, p = .467. In other words, males had higher status 
than females, but this was equally the case in relatively dominance-based and 
relatively prestige-based groups.  
Finally, I found no gender effects on interpersonal warmth. First, the 
correlation between gender and interpersonal warmth was not significant, r(155) = 
.09, p = .24. Second, rerunning the analysis predicting interpersonal warmth from 
status, hierarchy type and their interaction (Step 3), while including gender and its 
interactions with status and hierarchy type as independent variables (Step 4, Table 
5.1) did not significantly improve the earlier model, χ
2
Change= -25.22, p <.01, nor did 
any of the two-way and three-way interactions of gender with status and hierarchy 
type reveal significant results (all ps ≥ .337).  95 
 
Discussion 
Study 5.2 did not find the predicted interaction effect between status and 
hierarchy type on interpersonal warmth. Although the natural groups in the study 
varied meaningfully along the dominance-prestige dimension, this variance did not 
moderate the relation between the status of group members, and the interpersonal 
warmth shown towards them. In contrast, I did find support for this predicted 
interaction in Study 5.1.  
How might this discrepancy between the studies be explained? Possibly, 
some unknown confounding or interactive factor accounted for the failure of the 
finding in Study 5.1 to generalize. Equally possibly, the limited number of groups, 
well below the 20 recommended for cross-level interactions (Field, 2009), may have 
provided too little power for the predicted effect to emerge. Unfortunately, practical 
constraints limited the number of classes available for inclusion in this study: despite 
contacting multiple colleges in the region only one was eventually willing to 
participate. Finally, one might expect the impact of dominance-based versus 
prestige-based hierarchies to be more pronounced across more heterogeneous groups. 
Thus, the relatively homogenous nature of the groups in terms of hierarchy type may 
have further dampened any effects present in the data.  
General Discussion 
How do people of lower status feel towards people of higher status? I argued 
that this depends on the nature of a group’s hierarchy, as it manifests itself in face-to-
face interpersonal processes. I found support for this claim in one of the studies 
reported in this chapter. In Study 5.1, an experimental study, I found that the 
interpersonal warmth shown towards a hypothetical person of high status was greater 96 
 
when the hypothetical group the person belonged to was described as having a 
prestige-based hierarchy—where status is given by the many—than when it was 
described as having a dominance-based hierarchy—where status is taken by the few. 
Thus, in prestige-based groups, being liked and included are liable to go hand-in-
hand, whereas in dominance-based groups, there is liable to be a trade-off between 
them.  
In Study 5.2, a sociometric study, I found that the interpersonal warmth 
shown towards real people correlated positively with higher status in real groups, and 
I found this relation to be stronger in relatively prestige-based hierarchies than in 
relatively dominance-based hierarchy. However, when I controlled for the nesting of 
students in the sample in college classes, these findings were no longer significant. 
Given that Study 5.1 supported the hypotheses, the lack of support in Study 5.2 may 
be due to the natural limitations of the sample included in the study. In particular, the 
number of groups included in Study 5.2 (i.e., 10 classes) didn’t reach the minimum 
of 20 recommended for assessing cross-level interactions (Field, 2009) and the 
groups included in the study were relatively homogenous. Future work assessing 
larger and more diverse samples might be able to find support for the hypothesized 
interaction in a natural setting and thus provide ecologically valid support for the 
hypothesis.  
Moreover, other variables may further moderate the relation between status 
and interpersonal warmth. For example, Schmid Mast and colleagues (Schmid Mast 
et al., 2009) recently found that status is only related to more interpersonal sensitivity 
for people who adopt an empathic as opposed to egoistic leadership style. Similarly, 
when people use harsh rather than soft tactics to influence others, they develop a 
sense of superiority over team members and come to appreciate them less (Klocke, 97 
 
2009). Such moderators can readily be accommodated by the conceptual framework 
I have advanced. Alternatively, contrasting such individual differences in individual 
styles and tactics with the current distinction between hierarchy types might serve to 
improve the current theoretical framework.  
Given the null-finding in Study 5.2., I am cautious to draw implications from 
these results, even if the predictions were supported in Study 5.1. However, in 
combination with the findings in Chapter 3, they shed partial light on the currently 
mixed findings regarding how people with higher status act towards subordinates. 
Some research has found that people at or near the top of status hierarchies express 
higher levels of anger (Tiedens, 2001), and show little interpersonal sensitivity 
towards subordinates (Galinsky et al., 2006; Goodwin et al., 2000; Gruenfeld et al., 
2008), and are liable to engage in more quarrelsome behaviour (Fournier et al., 
2002). In contrast, other research has found they are highly interested in others (Chen 
et al., 2004; Overbeck & Park, 2001), sensitive to their emotions (Schmid Mast et al., 
2009), and liable to engage in generous and friendly behaviour (Flynn et al., 2006). I 
argue that such variations may reflect not only accidental dispositional differences 
between different high-status individuals, but also intelligible structural differences 
between the groups they lead. Moreover, the fact that these structural differences 
specify variations in hierarchy type rooted in evolutionary history offers a means of 
theoretically illuminating these and other findings.  
There is ample research showing that demonstrating one’s value to a group is 
a means of earning prestige, and thus is a viable route to status (Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009a). For example, competence and leadership are important predictors of status 
(Berger et al., 1972; Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986), as are being perceived as 
generous and helpful (Flynn et al., 2006, Study 3), committed to the task at hand 98 
 
(Anderson & Shirako, 2008), and willing to contribute to a group (Hardy & Van 
Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009). It is important to note that these findings need not imply 
that coercion may not be an equally successful route to status. Much existing 
research is run in White Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic (WEIRD: 
Henrich, Heine, & Norenyazan, 2010) societies. Thus dominance-based hierarchies 
may be more important in societies and cultures different from the ones that are 
generally used for social psychological research. Not only may influence be based on 
power and aggression as well as value and compassion (Mazur, 1985), but indeed 
that dominance-based hierarchies may have been the rule rather than the exception in 
recorded history (Somit & Peterson, 1997). Moreover, people frequently report using 
manipulative (Lund, Tamnes, Moestue, Buss, & Vollrath, 2007; Kyl-Heku & Buss, 
1996) and coercive (Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Chen et al., 2010) strategies to 
get ahead. In addition, even if prototypical dominance-based hierarchies (i.e., groups 
that are organized around violence or threat as may be the case for e.g. prison 
populations, street gangs or political dictatorships) represent a minority of human 
groups, the findings presented both in this chapter and in Chapter 3 suggest that 
distinguishing between relatively dominance-based and relatively prestige-based 
hierarchies can still help to meaningfully predict interpersonal differences in groups.  
Theoretical Connections 
  The current line of research, conceptually and empirically, bears a family 
resemblance to at least two other lines of research: one on procedural fairness (Lind 
& Tyler, 1988), the other on the warmth/competence distinction (Fiske et al., 2007). 
As these family resemblances help to situate the findings, and could serve as 
springboard for future integrative research, I close by briefly elaborating them below. 
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It has been argued that people construe both individuals and groups in terms 
of the two fundamental and largely independent dimensions: warmth and 
competence (Fiske et al., 2007). Higher status others are generally seen as more 
competent (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). I found they can be simultaneously 
seen as either warmer or colder too. It seems likely that they thereby become targets 
of either admiration or envy (e.g., religious people vs. rich people, at least according 
to US stereotypes). In particular, prestige-based hierarchies involve status being 
granted to others on the basis of respect. Accordingly, admiration is likely to be the 
cause of their status. However, status-based hierarchies involve status being taken by 
others on the basis of their power. Accordingly, fear is likely to be the result of their 
status. Thus, correspondence or opposition between warmth and competence may 
have meaningful consequences. 
Legitimacy 
Procedural fairness can be defined as the application of appropriate methods 
to determine how scarce resources are to be allocated among competing parties. (It 
contrasts with distributive fairness, which can be defined as the just final allocation 
of the scarce resources themselves.) Procedures are regarded as procedurally fair 
when several preconditions are met, but key among them is the opportunity to 
participate meaningfully in those procedures (Tyler, 2000). Research shows that, 
even when people are allocated fewer resources than they think they deserve, they 
are more accepting of the outcome if they have first been permitted to express their 
point of view (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Furthermore, they subsequently show 
greater respect for and deference to the authority that has allocated those scarce 
resources (Tyler, 1994). 100 
 
Status is a scarce resource that allows people to achieve a range of beneficial 
outcomes (Buss, 1999). Therefore, groups with prestige-based hierarchies and 
dominance-based hierarchies may differ in how procedurally fair the allocation of 
that resource to group members has been. (This would be the case even if status had 
been allocated to group members equally.) Specifically, because status is given by 
group members in prestige-based hierarchies, but is taken from group members in 
dominance-based hierarchies, lower-status members of the former will have 
participated more in the allocation of higher status to others (that allocation being 
distributively “unfair”, assuming status equity defines “fair”) than lower-status 
members of the latter. Thus, the distinction between prestige-based hierarchies and 
dominance-based hierarchies, together with its implications for how high-status 
individuals are regarded, has the potential to inform theories that seek to characterize 
how social groups develop hierarchies of varying legitimacy (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999) via theories that seek to characterize the nature of that legitimacy (Tyler, 
2000). 101 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Final Conclusions and Implications: Why It Is Important to Distinguish 
between Dominance and Prestige Hierarchies 
Status refers to a person’s position in a group hierarchy. In this thesis, I 
focused on status in face-to-face groups, investigating the social psychological nature 
of status. More specifically, I explored (a) the interpersonal behaviours that promote 
status, (b) the (intrapersonal) self-appraisals of people engaging in such behaviours, 
and (c) the interpersonal warmth others feel towards people with high status. In other 
words, I assessed what people need to do to attain status, what kind of people will 
most likely engage in such behaviours, and what they might need to sacrifice in order 
to attain status. As I highlighted in the individual chapters of this thesis, all these 
predictors and outcomes of status have been studied previously, and for each of them 
such studies have led to mixed results. The current research differs from earlier 
investigation by assessing the moderating effect of a little explored, but I believe 
highly important characteristic of groups: their hierarchy type.  
My starting point for defining group hierarchy types were observations by 
anthropologists (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Von Rueden et al., 2008; Von 
Rueden, Gurven & Kaplan, 2011) and evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Buttermore 
& Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010a; Gilbert et al, 1995) of two distinct routes 
to status: dominance (i.e., grabbing status through force or threats) and prestige (i.e., 
being granted status out of admiration or respect). A similar distinction also features 
in the debate in the sociological and social psychological literature. On the one hand, 
some argue that status results from conflict between people with differing interests 
and resources (Mills, 1956) and thus accruing to those able to realize their will (i.e., 102 
 
grab status) against the resistance of others (Kemper, 1994; Mazur, 1985). On the 
other hand, some argue that status result from the need to effectively divide roles in 
order to achieve common goals (Davis & Moore, 1945) and thus granted by group 
members to individuals who fulfil roles that they value (Berger et al., 1972). The 
prominence of this distinction across these diverse literatures argues for its 
fundamental importance. 
In this thesis, I first sought to understand the impact of dominance and 
prestige processes on status in face-to-face groups. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that 
assertively claiming status for oneself (i.e., via a dominance process) and willingly 
being granted status (i.e., via a prestige process) are both viable ways of achieving 
face-to-face status above and beyond formal status. I also found that these two types 
of status-achieving processes were mutually antagonistic: status was not further 
enhanced by engaging in both processes, and perceptions of the group hierarchy 
being based on each were undermined by mixing it with the other. In other words, 
rather than group hierarchies having two orthogonal dimensions, they fall along a 
hierarchy type continuum, ranging from highly dominance-based to highly prestige-
based. Depending on their place along this continuum status in groups is attained 
through dominance-striving, prestige-striving or a mix of the two. This conclusion 
received further support in Chapters 3 and 5 where I found that, in natural groups, 
perceived between-group differences along a dominance-prestige continuum were 
significantly larger than perceived within-group differences. Thus, the hierarchy 
types of natural groups were perceived to differ along the dominance-prestige 
continuum.   
Having gained an understanding of how hierarchies differ across groups, I 
turned to the three predictors and consequences of status that I outlined at the 103 
 
beginning of this chapter: the behaviours promoting status, the self-appraisals of 
people engaging in those behaviours, and the interpersonal warmth of people with 
different levels of status. I focused on these three predictors and consequences of 
status as each provided valuable insight into the social psychological nature of status. 
The behaviours that promote status provide valuable information about the nature of 
the status attainment process. Given that status is a highly desirable outcome of 
group interactions (Fiske, 2010), it is important to understand what behaviours 
promote that outcome. Moreover, some people may be more inclined to engage in 
such behaviours than others. Thus these behaviours may lie at the heart of individual 
status attainment. I focused in particular on self-appraisals as they differ widely 
across individuals, and such differences may be closely linked to individual 
differences in status (Cheng et al., 2010a; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001; Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). Having found what people need to do to attain status, and who 
might be likely to engage in such behaviours, I further  investigated what it takes to 
attain status by identifying potential sacrifices that need to be made in order to attain 
status.  Given people’s fundamental need for warm, supportive contact with others as 
part of ongoing relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), I focused on a key marker 
for such relationships: the interpersonal warmth they received from others.  
In the rest of this chapter I will outline my main findings concerning each of 
these predictors and consequences of status, and their implications for research and 
practice. I will also make suggestions for future research. 
Interpersonal Behaviours Promoting Status 
In both a naturalistic study and an experiment (Chapter 3), I found that 
agentic behaviour promoted status irrespective of the hierarchy type of a group, but 
communal behaviour augmented status in more prestige-based hierarchies and 104 
 
diminished it in more dominance-based hierarchies. Moreover, I found that, in both 
hierarchy types, agentic behaviour promoted status at high as well as low levels of 
communal behaviour. In contrast, in both hierarchy types, communal behaviour 
impacted status only when agentic behaviour was high. I concluded that, while 
agentic behaviour goes some way in helping people to the top, getting all the way 
there requires it to be teamed with the right amount of communal (i.e., agreeable) or 
non-communal (i.e., quarrelsome) behaviour.  
These findings make several important contributions to the literature. First, 
they synthesize two important views in the literature on the nature of status: the 
functional view (e.g., Berger et al., 1972; Davis & Moore, 1945) and the conflict 
view (e.g., Mills, 1956; Mazur, 1985). The validity of these views has been the topic 
of an on-going debate. Proponents of the functional view have argued that the vast 
majority of human status hierarchies are prestige-based (Anderson and Kilduff, 
2009a), a function of living in highly interdependent bands for the most formative 
period of evolutionary history (Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008). In contrast, 
proponents of the conflict view have argued that hierarchies based on dominance 
have been the rule rather than the exception throughout human history (Somit & 
Peterson, 1997). The current research moves beyond this debate and provides 
evidence that both the conflict view and the functional view are valid in certain 
situations. Sometimes, as in dominance-based hierarchies, status is grabbed: here 
force rather than popularity is the priority—consistent with the conflict view. 
However, at other times, as in prestige-based hierarchies, status is granted: here 
popularity rather than force is the priority—consistent with the functional view.  
Secondly, they help clarify why research findings pertaining to high status 
individuals’ interest in lower status individuals (e.g., highly interested: Overbeck & 105 
 
Park, 2001; sensitive to their emotions: Schmid Mast et al., 2009; unperceptive of 
their emotions: Galinsky et al., 2006; indifferent to their suffering: Van Kleef et al., 
2008) find such mixed results. As do research findings pertaining to high status 
individuals’ behaviour towards lower status individuals (e.g., generous and friendly: 
Flynn et al., 2006; angry: Tiedens, 2001; quarrelsome: Fournier et al., 2002). One 
reason may be that in some cases the high status of participants in such studies was 
based on dominance, whereas in other cases it was based on prestige. 
Finally, they provide guidance for individuals seeking status by clarifying the 
conditions under which engaging in agentic and communal behaviour may or may 
not promote status. An individual’s leadership style can shape the nature of group 
interactions (Lewin, Lippit, & White, 1939) and thus its hierarchy type. However, the 
survival challenges faced by a group also shape the type of hierarchy that emerges 
(Kracke, 1978; Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008) and thus the type of leader that 
emerges. In other words an individual’s ability to shape the hierarchy type of a group 
may be limited by the context in which that group needs to operate. For example, 
although group members generally tend to resist being subjected to dominant leaders 
(Boehm, 1999) and may even prefer to leave a group than be subjected to an 
autocratic leader (Van Vugt et al., 2003), they are more willing to tolerate such 
leaders when their group faces an external threat, possibly because a dominant leader 
can handle crisis situations more efficiently than leaders who need to rally support 
before taking action (Kracke, 1978; Schlessinger, 1986).  
My findings revealed that the hierarchy type of a group moderated the impact 
of communal behaviour, but not agentic behaviour, on status. Thus, agentic 
behaviour may allow individuals to enhance their status across different types of 
hierarchies. However, in relatively prestige-based hierarchies, people’s status should 106 
 
benefit from behaviour that is high in communion, whereas the reverse is true in 
dominance-based hierarchies. Moreover, these effects of communal behaviour are 
especially strong when people also engage in a high level of agentic behaviour.  
Although the studies demonstrated the effect of agentic and communal 
behaviours on status in dominance and prestige hierarchies, more work is necessary 
to determine why these effects occur. For example, I found that both agentic and 
communal behaviours are interpreted in multiple ways (pre-test reported in Chapter 
3). However, it is unclear how these multiple interpretations mediate the effect of 
those behaviours on status in the different hierarchy types. Possibly, the presence of a 
certain hierarchy type makes some interpretations more salient than others. For 
example, if people saw someone behaving kindly in a dominance-based hierarchy 
they might more readily associate this behaviour with weakness than with 
respectfulness, whereas the reverse might be true in a prestige-based hierarchy. 
Alternatively, some interpretations are simply more relevant than others for status in 
the different hierarchy types. Thus, multiple interpretations may be salient, but only 
one of the two drives an individual’s status attainment. For example, if people saw 
someone behaving kindly in a dominance-based hierarchy they might associate this 
behaviour with both weakness and respectfulness, but only their association of this 
behaviour with weakness would be relevant for the level of status they would 
attribute to that person. 
I also found that the effects of communal behaviour on status were amplified 
by agentic behaviour. Possibly, the active nature of agentic behaviour multiplies the 
impact of communal behaviour by making such behaviour more visible (see 
Anderson & Shirako, 2008, for a similar amplification effect resulting from social 107 
 
connectedness). Future research may clarify the nature of these and other processes 
underlying the results presented in this chapter.  
Status-Striving and Self-Regard 
Having established in Chapter 3 what behaviours it takes to attain status, 
Chapter 4 investigated what sorts of people might be likely to engage in such 
behaviours, thus moving the research into the intrapersonal domain. In particular, 
Chapter 4 investigated whether engagement in status-promoting behaviours was 
related to individual differences in self-appraisals, as the latter not only vary widely 
across individuals, but also may be closely linked to individual differences in status 
(Cheng et al., 2010a; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Across 
three studies, self-esteem was consistently associated with behaviours that were high 
in agency as well as communion, whereas narcissism was consistently associated 
with behaviours that were high in agency and low in communion. In other words, 
narcissism was correlated with behaviours that were found (in Chapter 3) to 
accompany status in dominance-based hierarchies, whereas self-esteem was 
correlated with behaviours that were found to accompany prestige-based status. 
These findings have implications for research in a number of areas.  
First, they inform theories that view self-esteem as an evolved psychological 
mechanism that helps people navigate their social world (e.g., Barkow, 1980; 
Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Downs, 1995). 
According to such theories, self-esteem helps people maintain a certain level of 
social value. Similar to the way hunger alerts people to their need to acquire and 
ingest food and motivates them to do so, self-esteem may act as a “sociometer” 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Downs, 1995), alerting people to the need to 
engage in social acts, and a “sociomotivator” (term introduced in Chapter 4), 108 
 
motivating them to engage in such acts. By demonstrating a relation between self-
regard and behaviours that promote social value, the studies provide support for a 
potential sociomotivator function of self-regard. Moreover, they do so both for self-
esteem and for narcissism, and thus imply that both may be evolutionary evolved 
mechanisms that help people maintain their social value, albeit in different ways. 
This offers an interesting avenue for exploring existing theories. Moreover, revealing 
a potentially functional side to narcissism may help to balance the view of (non-
clinical) narcissism that is often described as an “unhealthy” trait (cf. Sedikides et al., 
2004).  
Second, they inform the literature on narcissistic leadership. This literature 
features numerous studies that focus on the benefits and disadvantages of narcissistic 
leaders (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006; see Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & 
Marchisio, 2011 for a recent review). For example, Maccoby (2004) argues that, on 
the upside, narcissistic leaders’ overconfidence helps them to come up with 
ambitious visions that non-narcissists might not dare venture into, and their energy 
and confidence help to inspire followers. However, weaknesses of narcissistic 
leaders may include sensitivity to criticism, poor listening and a lack of empathy 
(Maccoby, 2004). In this thesis I take a more balanced approach. Rather than 
proclaiming narcissists to be “good” or “bad” leaders, the studies in this thesis 
suggest they may be better suited to attain leadership roles in some groups (i.e., those 
with a dominance-based hierarchy) than in others (i.e., those with a prestige-based 
hierarchy). Even though I am not the first to argue that narcissists’ suitability for 
leadership roles may depend on context (e.g. Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006 argue that 
narcissists may do well in sales and science; Campbell et al, 2011 argue they do well 
in newly emerging leadership positions in unstable situations, but not so well in long-109 
 
held leadership positions in stable situations), I think my research helps to explain 
how they might attain these positions, by illuminating behavioural processes (i.e., 
behaviours that are characterized by a combination of high agency and low 
communion) that may promote narcissists’ rise to influence. Thus, this research not 
only clarifies which people attain status, but also how they are able to do so.  
While this is beyond the scope of this thesis, future research may also address 
whether narcissists are also more effective as leaders in dominance-based groups than 
in prestige-based ones. If so, research might need to focus more on finding ways to 
ensure that narcissists end up in places where they are the right person for the job, 
and move on when this is no longer the case, rather than attempting to control and 
repair the failings of narcissistic leaders (see e.g., Kets de Vries & Miller, 1985; 
Maccoby, 2004). 
Moreover, the narcissistic leadership literature fails to clearly distinguish 
between self-esteem and narcissism (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). However, the 
studies presented here reveal that they are associated with fundamentally different 
behavioural strategies. Thus, another way that the current research may inform the 
narcissistic leadership literature is by demonstrating the importance of clearly 
distinguishing between self-esteem and narcissism. Future research might seek to 
understand which strengths and weaknesses currently ascribed to narcissistic leaders 
actually result from their level of self-esteem and which from their level of 
narcissism.  
Status and Interpersonal Warmth 
Finally, after having determined what people need to do to attain status and 
who might be likely to engage in such behaviours, I also focused on potential costs 
of status in groups. Such costs of status may entail sacrifices that need to be made in 110 
 
order to attain status and thus provide important insight into what it takes to attain 
status, the main theme of this thesis. Moreover, identifying such sacrifices further 
clarifies who is more likely to attain status, as some people may be more willing to 
make such sacrifices than others.  
As status attainment is an inherently social process, I investigated the effect 
of people’s level of status on the interpersonal warmth they receive from others. 
Foregoing interpersonal warmth in order to gain status qualifies as an important 
interpersonal sacrifice, given people’s strong need to be part of on-going 
relationships marked by caring and concern (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Moreover, 
the effect of status on interpersonal warmth remains poorly understood (Fiske et al., 
2007; Lee & Tiedens, 2001). I found in an experimental study that the interpersonal 
warmth towards individuals increased with status in relatively prestige-based 
hierarchies and decreased with status in relatively dominance-based hierarchies. In 
other words, in prestige-based groups, being liked and included are liable to go hand-
in-hand, whereas in dominance-based groups, there is liable to be a trade-off between 
them. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with some caution as I failed to 
replicate it in a subsequent naturalistic study. This failure to replicate may be the 
result of limitations of the naturalistic study in terms of the number and range of 
participants included. While at this stage it seems prudent to err on the side of 
caution rather than downplaying the null-finding on these grounds, a reasonable 
interpretation of the effect of status on interpersonal warmth may be derived from the 
experimental results in combination with the results in Chapter 3 for status 
attainment and behaviour. In the light of this full set of findings, I propose the results 
may have some implications for research as well as for individuals striving for status.  111 
 
Firstly, the studies presented here inform work on status and interpersonal 
warmth. As outlined in Chapter 5, research suggests that high status individuals are 
well-connected (Brass, 1984; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Lincoln & Miller, 1979) and 
receive a lot of attention from others (Berger et al., 1972; Chance, 1967; Ellyson et 
al., 1980; Maner et al., 2008). However, the interpersonal warmth felt towards them 
(i.e., how liked and included they really are by others) remains unclear. Moreover, 
research of the interpersonal warmth of high status individuals towards others is 
mixed (e.g., high-status individuals were found to be highly interested in others: 
Chen et al., 2004; and sensitive to others thoughts and feelings: Schmid Mast et al., 
2009; versus prone to stereotyping: Goodwin et al, 2000; and inconsiderate towards 
others: Gruenfeld et al., 2008) and may be moderated by individuals’ leadership style 
(empathic versus egoistic: Schmid Mast et al., 2009) or influence tactics (harsh 
versus soft: Klocke, 2009). Given that warm feelings and behaviours tend to be 
reciprocated (Byrne & Rhamey, 1965; Sadler & Woody, 2003), these mixed results 
suggest that the interpersonal warmth of others towards people with high status is 
also not unequivocal. By presenting hierarchy type as a moderator of the effect of 
status on interpersonal warmth, the studies presented in Chapter 3 and 5 provide a 
coherent and much needed explanation for these previous mixed findings.  
This result is also potentially important for individuals striving for status and 
influence. Hierarchy types differ across groups, and may at least partially result of 
the external conditions in which a group operates (cf., e.g. Kracke, 1978; 
Schlessinger, 1986), making it difficult for individuals to alter them. Thus, although 
individuals choose whether to strive to get ahead, to some extent their environment 
may dictate the behaviours they need to engage in to do so (Chapter 3) as well as the 
interpersonal consequences this has (Chapter 5). Depending on hierarchy type, 112 
 
individuals may need to give up heart-felt popularity to gain status and influence. 
Realizing this, may help potential leaders decide which paths they want to pursue 
and which they prefer to forsake. 
Debates and Future Directions  
In the studies reported in this thesis I interchangeably used two ways of 
measuring status. When referring to status directly was deemed undesirable (e.g., to 
avoid the risk of confounding measures of status and hierarchy type via common 
method biases in the naturalistic studies in Chapters 3 and 5) I asked participants to 
rate both someone’s prominence and their influence in a group. In other cases, I 
simply asked participants to rate someone’s status in a group (e.g. in the 
experimental studies in Chapter 3 and 5). Although both clearly reflective of the 
underlying construct, both operationalizations relied on only a limited number of 
items. This limitation did not prevent the hypothesized relations from emerging. 
Nonetheless, future research may benefit from the development of a more extensive 
and reliable measure of status in groups. A similar argument may be made about the 
hierarchy type measure used in the studies reported here. This measure was derived 
from anthropological descriptions of prestige-based and dominance-based 
hierarchies. Future work may expand the current measure to cover characteristics 
that are central to the different hierarchy types. 
My conceptualization of status in terms of prominence and influence, rather 
than in terms of prestige, diverges from a recent trend in social psychological 
research that considers prestige as the key feature of status in face-to-face groups 
(e.g., Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, as outlined at the start of this 
chapter, my conceptualization reflects a broad research tradition in which status has 
been described as emerging not just via prestige processes, but also via dominance 113 
 
(e.g., Buttermore & Kirkpatrick, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010a; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Gilbert et al, 1995; Kemper, 1994; Von Rueden et al., 2008; Von Rueden, 
Gurven & Kaplan, 2011). Moreover, it also reflects lay perceptions of status: as 
shown in Chapter 2people perceive status as a result of dominance-processes, 
prestige-processes, or both. Thus, there are sound theoretical and empirical reasons 
to use the broader definition of status advocated in this thesis. Nonetheless, the 
question still arises as to how the results would have differed had my 
conceptualization and measurement of status included an element of respect/prestige. 
To address this question I will discuss two ways in which such a conceptualization 
might have affected the outcomes discussed in this thesis.  
First, as noted in Chapter 1, status differences in more prestige-based 
hierarchies generally result from prestige processes whereas status differences in 
more dominance-based hierarchies generally result from dominance processes. 
Therefore, it is likely that the type of prestige-neutral status investigated in this thesis 
(i.e., status measured solely in terms of status or in terms of both prominence and 
influence) would be more strongly associated with prestige-positive status (i.e., status 
including an element of prestige) in more prestige-based groups than in more 
dominance-based groups. Likewise, the behaviours, types of self-regard, and 
interpersonal consequences associated with prestige-neutral status in more prestige-
based groups should be more strongly related to prestige-positive status than the 
behaviours, types of self-regard, and interpersonal consequences associated with 
prestige-neutral status in more dominance-based groups. In other words, one effect of 
conceptualizing status as prestige-positive rather than prestige-neutral would likely 
be to strengthen (and thus highlight) the results I found for prestige-based hierarchies 114 
 
and weaken (and thus downplay) the results I found for dominance-based 
hierarchies. 
Second, as I have argued in the first chapter, dominance and prestige 
processes often partly co-occur in groups (cf. Anderson et al., 2001). Moreover, in 
Chapter 2 I found that people perceive hierarchy types to form a continuum ranging 
from relatively prestige-based to relatively dominance-based. The groups in the 
middle of this continuum, then, are the ones in which dominance and prestige 
processes will predominantly co-occur. It is in these groups that behaviour that is 
both high in agency and low in communion would be most likely to lead to prestige-
positive status and that persons high in narcissism would be most likely to attain 
prestige-positive status. In other words, a second effect of conceptualizing status as 
prestige-positive rather than prestige neutral might be to weaken (and thus downplay) 
the importance of low-communion behaviour and of narcissism for attaining status in 
dominance-based hierarchies and strengthen (and thus highlight) their importance for 
attaining status in mixed (i.e., halfway between dominance-based and prestige-based) 
hierarchies. Although such speculations are merely idle they suggest interesting 
predictions. For one thing, given that prestige-positive status relates positively to 
interpersonal warmth, groups in the middle of the hierarchy type continuum may 
offer a safe haven for individuals inclined to aggressively claim status by limiting 
blows to their popularity.  
The studies in this thesis were all conducted in WEIRD (Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich and Democratic; Henrich et al., 2010) societies. In such societies 
I found that group hierarchy types differed in terms of the extent to which they were 
more dominance-based or more prestige-based. However, the groups in my sample 
were all relatively prestige-based (i.e., on a scale ranging from dominance-based to 115 
 
prestige-based all groups fell on the prestige-end of the continuum). An interesting 
path for future research would be to investigate the prevalence of dominance versus 
prestige hierarchies in natural groups. Moreover, it would be interesting to see 
whether such prevalence differs across cultures. 
Such an investigation might reveal higher numbers of relatively prestige-
based hierarchies, and lower numbers of relatively dominance-based hierarchies, in 
collectivistic cultures relative to individualistic cultures. This would be in line with 
findings that levels of narcissism tend to be higher in individualistic cultures than in 
collectivistic cultures (Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003). In general, 
individualistic cultures harbour more people who are likely to behave in ways that 
promote status in dominance hierarchies. On the other hand, a closer look at the 
relation between narcissism and culture suggests that the more benign subscales are 
the ones that differ most between individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Foster et 
al, 2003), which are those most likely to correlate highly with self-esteem (Rosenthal 
& Hooley, 2010). Clearly more research is needed to resolve this issue. 
Conclusion 
Hierarchy is a defining feature of groups (Berger et al., 1972; Fiske, 2010; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The research conducted as part of this thesis demonstrates 
it is also a diversifying feature of status in groups: depending on the type of 
hierarchy, status is associated with diametrically different interpersonal behaviours, 
intrapersonal self-evaluations, and interpersonal outcomes. These individual findings 
are interesting in themselves. But, in combination they powerfully illustrate the 
importance of distinguishing between dominance-based and prestige-based groups.  116 
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FOOTNOTES 
Chapter 1 
1 Relative levels of dominance and prestige form a continuous range. 
Therefore, it would be more accurate to refer to hierarchy types as continuous 
“traits” rather than distinctive “types”. However, given the unfamiliarity of the term 
“trait” for describing a group-level characteristic I use the term “type” instead.  
Chapter 2 
1 The elaboration likelihood model posits a trade-off between being persuaded 
by the propositional content available in a message and being persuaded by 
peripheral clues as to its value or validity. While these types of information are not in 
themselves mutually exclusive, they are when considered in light of some external 
factor, in this case the level of scrutiny to which they are subjected (scrutiny lowers 
the persuasiveness of peripheral cues and heightens that of factual information). 
Similarly, claiming status and being granted status need not in themselves be 
mutually exclusive, but they may be in light of some external factor (e.g., the level of 
threat in the environment, cf. Kracke, 1978; Schlessinger, 1986).  
2 As recommended by cross-cultural psychologists (e.g., Geisinger, 1994), the 
translations of these vignettes, as well as other manipulations administered in Dutch 
as part of the research in this thesis, were all verified by a small panel of experts 
rather than by back-translation. In all cases, the panel consisted of the author and a 
research assistant, who are both fluent in Dutch as well as English. Due to the small 
size of the committee, both completed independent translations of the manipulations 
before discussing and resolving discrepancies. 137 
 
Chapter 3 
1 Hierarchies are termed dominance-based or prestige-based to indicate they 
are based on respectively dominance or prestige processes. However, for readability 
I sometimes refer to them more briefly as dominance hierarchies and prestige 
hierarchies.  
2 In deciding the cut-off criterion I aimed to strike a balance between the loss 
of data resulting from excluding participants and the number of blanks that would 
need to be filled in when retaining participants. An iterative process revealed that 
increasing this percentage greatly decreased the number of participants retained, 
whereas a decrease drastically increased the number of data missing in the dataset.  
Chapter 4 
1 The terms “non-clinical narcissism” and “normal narcissism” are used to 
distinguish narcissism as a normally distributed personality trait from the related 
pathological condition (Foster & Campbell, 2007). All the research cited in this 
paper is related to this non-clinical form of narcissism. For the sake of brevity I will 
use the term “narcissism”. 
2 For example, in this chapter I found moderate correlations between trait 
self-esteem and narcissism in both Study 4.1, r(149) = .31, p < .001, and Study 4.2,  
r(59) = .19, p = .014.Moreover, in Study 4.3 I also found small but significant 
correlations at the state level in four experimental conditions, r(98) = .21, p =.042 
(low narcissism condition, lowest), and a marginal correlation in the fourth  that were 
, r(95) = .18, p =.076 (high narcissism condition).  
3Although this is not a conclusive test of the uniqueness of each participant 
(the same person might use different computers or different people may take part on 138 
 
the same computer) it is a reasonable test and a commonly accepted method to check 
for duplicate participants (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). 
4Principal axis factoring of the self-esteem items failed to identify a separate 
self-liking and self-competence subscale. Rather, inspection of the screeplot revealed 
the presence of just one component.  All the items of the scale loaded onto this 
component, with loadings ranging from .33 to .76. The discussion is therefore limited 
to overall self-esteem. 
5 To stay in line with earlier work, I followed Moskowitz’ (1994) example of 
using Cronbach Alpha for evaluating inter-rater agreement. However, in order to do 
so I needed to assume that the poles of the interpersonal circumplex are independent. 
While the raters scored each pole independently, dominance is not independent from 
submissiveness, nor is agreeableness independent from quarrelsomeness. As a result, 
this method inflates the obtained alpha values. To compensate for the inflated alpha 
levels, I observed strict limits for the level of alpha at which I assumed that inter-
rater agreement exists. Moreover, I augmented the assessment of inter-rater 
agreement with a more definitive test of dimensional accuracy.  
6 Including or excluding these participants did not change the general pattern 
of the findings. 
Chapter 5 
1 Following an extensive review of the status literature, Anderson and 
colleagues (2001) concluded that definitions of face-to-face status generally pertain 
to any of three highly correlated types of standing that individuals can attain within 
in a group, namely, prominence, influence, and respect. I focus on the first two types 
only, as the last applies only to status based on prestige. 139 
 
2 Means for round-robin measures were obtained by calculating the average 
score given by each rater, and then averaging across raters. The need to rely on peer 
ratings for both measures raises the possibility of common method bias (see 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003, for a review). However, although 
status and interpersonal warmth were both measured using peer-ratings, no 
predictions were made about the direct (i.e., unmoderated) relation between the two. 
Moreover, to further reduce the risk of common method bias, participants rated the 
status of each of their peers at the individual level, and on a 7-point scale, but rated 
hierarchy type at the class level, on a 6-point scale.  
3 Part of this data was reported in Study 3.1.  
4 I ran t-tests comparing scores of participants absent at one of the sessions 
with those of participants present at both. These subsets did not differ significantly in 
how they rated themselves, their peers, or their class on any of the measures (all ps < 
.05). Moreover, participants absent from the second session did not differ 
demographically from those present at both sessions. 140 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 2.1 
Study  2.1:  Perceptions  of  Hierarchy  Type  as  a  Function  of  the  Experimental 
Manipulation of whether the Group Hierarchy was Dominance-Based or Prestige-
Based 
 
 
  Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
Perception of 
Hierarchy Type 
Low Dominance 
 & High Prestige 
High Dominance 
& High Prestige 
High Dominance 
& Low Prestige 
       
N  41  44  40 
       
Based on 
Dominance 
4.09 
(1.36) 
5.16 
(1.14) 
5.77 
(.85) 
       
Based on 
Prestige 
5.34 
(.85) 
4.83 
(1.20) 
2.67 
(.98) 
 
 
Note. Figures without brackets represent means. Figures in brackets represent 
standard deviations. Scale values range from 1 to 7. The Low Dominance & Low 
Prestige condition of the full 2 x 2 design is omitted. 141 
 
Table 3.1  
Study 3.1: Fixed Effects Estimates (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates 
(Bottom) for Models Predicting Group Members’ Status 
Parameter  Model 1A  Model 1B  Model 2A  Model 2B 
  Fixed effects 
Intercept  4.29 (.05)  4.31 (.07)  4.28 (.05)  4.29 (.06) 
Agentic Behaviour    .52 (.05)    .52 (.05)    .53 (.05)  .53 (.05) 
Communal Behaviour   -.04 (.05)   -.04 (.05)   -.05 (.05)  -.04 (.05) 
Hierarchy Type (individual 
rating) 
 -.01 (.05)   -.01 (.05)   -.02 (.05)  -.02 (.05) 
Hierarchy Type (group average)   -.10 (.05)   -.13 (.07)   -.08 (.05)  -.10 (.06) 
Communal Behaviour X 
Hierarchy  
         Type (group average) 
     -.09 (.04)  -.08 (.04) 
  Random parameters 
Intercept  .39 (.04)    .37 (.04)    .38 (.04)    .37 (.04) 
Class      .02 (.02)      .01 (.02) 
-2*log likelihood  322.28  320.23  316.73  315.96 
 
Note. N = 170. Standard errors are in parentheses. 142 
 
Figure 3.1 
Study 3.1: Target status as a function of Behaviour exhibited by the target, plotted 
for hierarchy types of college classes calculated one standard deviation below and 
above the mean 
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Figure 3.2 
Study 3.2: Mean differences in target status as a function of the hierarchy type of 
student group (either Dominance-based or Prestige-based) and of the type of 
behaviour exhibited by one of its members (either high or low in Agency, and high or 
low in Communion) 
 
 
Note. Bars represent standard errors. 
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Table 4.1 
Study 4.1: Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach Alpha values 
  Sample A (N = 159)    Sample B (N = 128) 
Variable  M  SD  Alpha    M  SD  Αlpha 
Self-liking  4.25  1.22  .91    -  -  - 
Self-competence  4.38  .84  .79    -  -  - 
Self-esteem (SLSC-R)  4.33  .92  .90    -  -  - 
Self-esteem (RSES)  -  -  -    5.31  1.07  .90 
Narcissism  .23  .17  .78    -  -  - 
Agentic behaviour  4.47  .70  .88    4.47  .84  .92 
Communal behaviour  4.99  .58  .83    4.97  .56  .79 
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Table 4.2   
Study 4.1: Correlation (Significance) Values 
      Agentic  Communal 
Self-esteem (RSES)
a  Bivariate  .57 (< .001)  .13 ( = .167) 
Self-esteem (SLCS-R)
b  Bivariate  .41 (< .001)  .11 ( = .188) 
   Partial  .39 (< .001)  .25 ( = .004) 
Narcissism (NPI-40)
b  Bivariate  .29 (< .001)  -.33 (< .001) 
   Partial  .22 ( = .010)  -.33 (< .001) 
Note. Correlations in Study 4.1 of self-esteem (bivariate and partialled for 
narcissism) and narcissism (bivariate and partialled for self-esteem) with agentic 
behaviour. RSES = the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). SLSC-R = 
revised self-liking/self-competence scale (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). NPI-16 = 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Ames et al., 2006). 
a N = 159. 
b N = 128. 
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Table 4.3  
Study 4.2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach Alpha values 
Variable  M  SD  Alpha 
Self-esteem  5.19  .99  .87 
Narcissism  .29  .17  .86 
Behaviour choice:       
   Low Agency/High Communion  25.8%  12.5%  .57 
   High Agency/High Communion  34.2%  13.7%  .59 
   Low Agency/Low Communion  20.7%  9.3%  .39 
   High Agency/Low Communion  19.3%  15.4%  .72 
Note. N = 63. 147 
 
Table 4.4  
Study 4.2: Correlation (Significance) values 
    LA/LC  HA/LC  LA/HC  HA/HC 
Self-esteem   Bivariate  -.269 
(.036) 
-.004 
( .979) 
-.122 
(.350) 
.298 
(.020) 
   Partial  -.173 
(< .201) 
-.212 
( .117) 
.014 
(.966) 
.311 
(.020) 
Narcissism   Bivariate  -.148 
(.271) 
.563 
(< .001) 
-.450 
(< .001) 
-.136 
(.312) 
   Partial  -.084 
(.541) 
.589 
(< .001) 
-.432 
(< .001) 
-.239 
(.076) 
Note. Correlations between self-esteem (bivariate and partialled for narcissism) and 
different behavioural strategies. N = 63. LA/LC = Low Agency/Low Communion 
behaviour; HA/LC = High Agency/Low Communion behaviour; LA/HC = Low 
Agency/High Communion behaviour; HA/HC = High Agency/High Communion 
behaviour. 
* p < .050. ** p < .005. 148 
 
Table 4.5  
Study 4.3: Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach Alpha values 
    Trait level
a  Condition 
      HN
b  LN
b  HSE
b  LSE
b 
Self-esteem  M  5.70  6.26  5.47  6.21  2.20 
  SD  .99  .86  1.14  .94  1.08 
  r  .56  .86  .82  .88  .70 
Narcissism  M  .41  .45  .23  .38  .22 
  SD  .21  .21  .14  .19  .16 
  α  .96  .69  .44  .65  .62 
Agentic 
Behaviour 
M    .62  .49  .62  .42 
SD    .16  .17  .13  .19 
α    .75  .73  .60  .78 
Communal 
Behaviour 
M    .78  .81  .76  .51 
SD    .13  .13  .13  .19 
α    .62  .67  .57  .76 
Note. HN = high narcissism; LN = low narcissism; HSE = high self-esteem; LSE = 
low self-esteem. 
a N = 58. 
b N = 110. 149 
 
Figure 5.1 
Study 5.1: Interpersonal warmth shown towards a group member as a function of the 
experimental manipulation of hierarchy type (dominance-based or prestige-based) 
and status (high or low) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Error bars represent standard errors of the cell means.  150 
 
Table 5.1  
Study 5.1: Fixed Effects Estimates (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates 
(Bottom) for Models Predicting Group Members’ Interpersonal Warmth 
Parameter  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  Fixed effects 
Intercept  5.19 (.03)  5.18 (.03)  5.23 (.09)  5.24 (.09) 
Status    .38 (.03)    .38 (.03)    .33 (.03)  .33 (.03) 
Hierarchy Type  
         (individual rating) 
 < -.01 (.03)   < -.01 (.05)   -.01 (.03)  -.01 (.03) 
Hierarchy Type (group  
         average) 
 -.13 (.03)   -.11 (.03)   -.22 (.08)  -.23 (.08) 
Status X Hierarchy Type  
         (group average) 
  -.06 (.03)   -.02 (.03)  .02 (.03) 
Gender        -.01 (.03) 
Gender X Status        .03 (.04) 
Gender X Hierarchy Type  
         (group average) 
      .01 (.04) 
Gender X Status X Hierarchy  
         Type (group average) 
      <-.01 (.04) 
    Random parameters 
Intercept  .18 (.02)    .17 (.02)    .13 (.02)  .14 (.02) 
Class        .07 (.04)  .07 (.04) 
-2*log likelihood  188.50  184.41  159.19  152.29 
 
Note. N = 170. Standard errors are in parentheses. 151 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1.1: Example of a dominance-based status conflict in the Yąnomamö tribe 
Chagnon (1968/1992, pp. 134-135) describes how the position of the headman of the 
violent Amazonian Yąnomamö tribe, Koąbawä, is challenged by an ambitious group 
member called Hontonawä, and Kąobawä defends his position through threat of force. In the 
described event, Hontonawä and his followers attempt to murder visitors to the village, who 
Kąobawä earlier had pledged to defend and was now guarding:  
“Hontonawä and his men appeared in their black paint and took up strategic positions 
around the village. He himself held an axe. He strutted arrogantly and with determination up 
to the visitors holding his axe over his head as if he were ready to strike. The village became 
very quiet, and most of the women and children fled nervously. Neither Kąobawä nor the 
Patanowä-teri visitors batted an eyelash as Hontonawä stood there, menacing the visitors, 
although the others were visibly anxious and sat up abruptly in their hammocks. It was a 
showdown. But instead of striking the visitors with his axe as he seemed to be preparing to 
do, he brought the axe down to his side and aggressively invited one of the visitors out to 
chant with him. Within seconds all three the visitors had paired off with members of 
Hontonawä’s group and were chanting passionately with them … The crisis had been 
averted because of Kąobawä’s implied threat that he would defend the visitors with force.” 153 
 
Appendix 1.2: Example of how attempts to control others are averted in the Semai 
tribe 
Age is an important source of respect among the Semai. However, the system of 
calculating who is an “elder” is highly flexible, giving individuals considerable leeway in 
deciding whom to respect. Dentan (1979, pp. 66-67) describes how Semai may deal with 
other group members’ attempts to exert their will: 
“A Semai takes heed of what his elders say. In the Semai phrase, he “hears” them. He does 
not interrupt when they are speaking … On the other hand, after listening respectfully to 
them, he may reject their advice. If they press the point, he may say, “I don’t hear you.” 
Although a senior may have great influence over some of his juniors, he cannot order them 
to do anything they do not want to do.” 154 
 
Appendix 2.1: Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
Low Dominance & Low Prestige 
 
English Translation 
 
Tom† is a second year student and has been actively involved in his student 
association since the beginning of his studies. Tom has a tendency to occupy positions of 
high status without being held in high regard by his peers and without taking the positions by 
force. He is not commanding or particularly notable in either formal or informal social 
circumstances. Every movement he makes and every word he says lacks authority and 
distinction. Tom prefers cooperating or convincing over direct competition. When his plans 
are thwarted in some way, he will usually give in and let others have their way.  
This year, Tom requested and was granted a nomination to become the president of 
his student association. When asked to speak with regard to the nomination, he sat for 
periods of time and sometimes got up to ensure that everyone could hear him and see him. 
Tom spoke without much emotion or confidence. He simply reminded all the members that 
he would be a third year student next year, always punctually attended meetings, participated 
in important decisions, and in important activities.  
Tom suspected that he had a competitor, but was unwilling to dominate or put 
pressure on the situation. Furthermore he was unwilling to act dominating or presumptuous 
toward a competitor or his peers. Tom briefly spoke of his many positive attributes, 
successes and accomplishments across many areas of his life. While he spoke, some of his 
peers remained attentive and others appeared uninterested.  
Tom was pleased when his fellow members elected him president and promised to 
continue to actively contribute to the student association. Consistent with many other of his 
other experiences, Tom found that he could be successful without being pushy or even being 
admired. 
 
† In the female condition “Tom” was replaced with “Lisa”. 155 
 
Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
Low Dominance & Low Prestige 
 
Original Dutch Version 
 
Tom is een tweedejaars student en is vanaf het begin van zijn studie actief betrokken 
geweest bij zijn studentenvereniging. Tom heeft de neiging om posities met hoge status te 
vervullen zonder dat hij in hoge aanzien staat bij medestudenten en zonder de posities met 
dwang te bemachtigen. Hij is niet gebiedend of bijzonder opvallend in zowel formele als 
informele sociale situaties. In elke beweging die hij maakt en elk woord dat hij zegt 
ontbreekt het aan authoriteit en aanzien. Tom geeft de voorkeur aan samenwerking of 
overtuigen boven directe competitie. Als hij op enige wijze gedwarsboomd wordt, zal Tom 
meestal inbinden en anderen hun zin geven. 
Dit jaar heeft Tom een verzoek ingediend en toegewezen gekregen om voorzitter 
van zijn vereniging te worden. Toen hem gevraagd werd om het woord te nemen met 
betrekking tot de voordracht, bleef hij een deel van de tijd zitten en stond hij soms op om te 
zorgen dat iedereen hem kon zien en horen. Tom sprak zonder veel emortie of 
zelfvertrouwen. Hij herinnerde de leden van de studentenvereniging er simpelweg aan dat hij 
volgend jaar derdejaars zou worden, stipt aanwezig was bij vergaderingen, en deelnam aan 
belangrijke beslissingen en aan belangrijke activiteiten.  
Tom vermoedde dat hij een concurrent had maar was niet bereid om de situatie te 
domineren of onder druk te zetten. Bovendien was hij niet bereid om zich overheersend of 
aanmatigend te gedragen tegenover een concurrent of zijn verenigingsgenoten. Tom sprak 
kort over zijn vele positive eigenschappen, successen en verdiensten in veel verschillende 
domeinen van zijn leven. Tewijl hij sprak, bleven sommige verenigingsleden aandachtig 
luisteren en maakten anderen een ongeinteresseerde indruk.  
Tom voelde zich voldaan toen zijn verenigingsgenoten hem tot voorzitter verkozen 
en beloofde bereid te blijven om actief bij te dragen aan de vereniging. In lijn met veel van 
zijn andere ervaringen, was het Tom duidelijk dat hij succesvol kon zijn zonder dwingend te 
zijn of zelfs maar bewonderd te worden. 
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
High Dominance & Low Prestige  
 
English Translation 
 
Tom is a second-year student and has been actively involved in his student 
association since the beginning of his studies. Tom, with his commanding and powerful 
presence, has a tendency to control and take the lead in every situation. He is direct and 
presumptuous in both formal and informal social circumstances. Every movement he makes 
communicates dominance and authority. He is very competitive, refusing to yield to any 
opponent or challenger who questions his leadership. When his plans are thwarted, Tom will 
coerce any competitor with a show of oppressive determination, which usually results in the 
competitor giving in.   
This year Tom was determined to become the president of his student association 
and was willing to take anyone on who stood in his way. When the time came that he 
nominated himself, Tom rose and paced while he spoke and was emotional at times when 
expressing why he should be elected president.  
He suspected there were rivals for the position and expressed a subtle threat to any 
possible competitors. He reminded the members of the student association that he had 
frequently led meetings, taken important decisions, and taken a leading role in important 
activities. Tom went on to remind them of his many positive qualities, successes and 
accomplishments across many areas of his life. When Tom spoke forcefully, his peers 
avoided eye contact and slouched in their seats.  
When Tom’s peers called for further nominations, it was clear that they didn’t regard 
him highly and were not ready to hand over the leadership to him. Tom resolved to defeat his 
competition and pressure his peers until he was sure he would be elected. Despite the overall 
low regard of his peers for him, Tom was elected president of his student association as a 
result of his characteristic dominance and pressure he subjected his peers to. Consistent with 
many other of Tom’s experiences, it was clear to him that he could get his way by 
oppressing and dominating challengers to his desire to have the lead. 
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
High Dominance & Low Prestige  
 
Original Dutch Version 
 
Tom is een tweedejaars student en is vanaf het begin van zijn studie actief betrokken 
geweest bij zijn studentenvereniging. Tom, met zijn gebiedende en krachtige aanwezigheid, 
heeft de neiging om het voortouw te nemen en de leiding naar zich toe te trekken in elke 
situatie. Hij is direct en aanmatigend in zowel formele als informele sociale situaties. Uit 
elke beweging die hij maakt spreekt dominantie en autoriteit. Hij is zeer competitief, niet 
bereid om toe te geven aan enig opponent of tegenstander die zijn leiderschap in twijfel trekt. 
Als hij gedwarsboomd wordt, zal Tom zijn tegenstander overbluffen door blijkt te geven van 
een dwingende vastberadenheid, wat er meestal toe leidt dat zijn opponent toegeeft.  
Dit jaar is Tom vastbesloten om voorzitter van zijn vereniging te worden, en hij is 
bereid om het tegen iedereen op te nemen die hem in de weg staat. Toen het moment daar 
was dat hij zich beschikbaar stelde, stond Tom op, liep hij heen en weer terwijl hij sprak, en 
was hij bij tijden emotioneel toen hij verwoorde waarom hij vond dat hij tot voorzitter 
gekozen zou moeten worden.  
Hij vermoedde dat er mededingers waren voor de positie en hij uitte een subtiele 
dreiging aan het adres van mogelijke concurrenten. Hij herinnerde de leden van de 
studentenvereniging eraan dat hij vaak vergaderingen had geleid, belangrijke beslissingen 
had genomen, en belangrijke activiteiten had aangestuurd. Tom vervolgde door ze te 
herinneren aan zijn vele positieve eigenschappen, successen en verdiensten in veel 
verschillende domeinen van zijn leven. Op het moment dat Tom op dwingende wijze sprak, 
vermeden zijn verenigingsgenoten het om oogcontact met hem te maken en zakten ze weg in 
hun stoelen.  
Het was duidelijk dat Tom’s verenigingsgenoten hem niet hoog achtten en er niet 
klaar voor waren om het leiderschap aan hem over te dragen toen ze een oproep deden aan 
andere kandidaten. Tom besloot om de concurrentie te verslaan en zijn verenigingsleden 
onder druk te zetten tot hij er zeker van was dat hij verkozen zou worden. Ondanks de 
algemene lage waardering van zijn verenigingsgenoten voor hem, werd Tom verkozen tot 
voorzitter van zijn vereniging, door de voor hem kenmerkende dominantie en dwang die hij 
uitoefende over leden van zijn vereniging. In lijn met veel andere ervaringen van Tom, was 
het duidelijk dat hij zijn zin kon krijgen door tegenstanders van zijn verlangen om de leiding 
te hebben te onderdrukken en te overheersen. 158 
 
Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
Low Dominance & High Prestige 
English Translation 
Tom is a second year student and has been actively involved in his student 
association since the beginning of his studies. Tom, with his striking and distinctive 
presence, has a tendency to be place himself in a prominent position in every situation. He is 
direct and thorough in both formal and informal social circumstances. Every movement he 
makes and every word he says communicates dignity, credibility, and honour. Tom prefers 
cooperating or convincing over direct competition. When his plans are thwarted, Tom will 
usually give in and allow others to have their way – especially when someone resists his 
attempts to convince them.  
Tom was happy and willing to accept a nomination to become the president of his 
student association this year. It came as no surprise, because his peers had often asked him to 
organize meetings, take important decisions, and take a leading role in important activities. 
When asked to speak with regard to the nomination, he remained seated and began to speak 
in a relaxed and confident manner.  
Tom suspected that he had a competitor, but was unwilling to attempt to dominate or 
put pressure on the situation. Furthermore he was unwilling to act dominating or 
presumptuous toward a competitor or his peers. Tom briefly spoke of his many positive 
qualities, successes and accomplishments across many areas of his life. While he spoke, his 
peers sat upright, made good eye-contact and listened intently until he finished speaking.  
Tom was pleased when his fellow members told him that they had already 
unanimously decided among themselves to elect him president. Furthermore, they 
emphasized that this decision was based on Tom’s consistent successes and frequent 
accomplishments. Consistent with many other of Tom’s experiences, it was clear to him that 
his peers admired him and held him in high regard. 
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
Low Dominance & High Prestige 
Original Dutch Version 
Tom is een tweedejaars student en is vanaf het begin van zijn studie actief betrokken 
geweest bij zijn studentenvereniging. Tom, met zijn opvallende en kenmerkende  
aanwezigheid, heeft de neiging om een vooraanstaande plek in te nemen in elke situatie. Hij 
is direct en gedegen in zowel formele als informele sociale situaties. Uit elke beweging die 
hij maakt en elk woord dat hij zegt spreekt waardigheid, geloofwaardigheid en eer. Tom 
geeft de voorkeur aan samenwerking of overtuigen boven directe competitie. Als hij op 
enige wijze gedwarsboomd wordt, zal Tom meestal inbinden en anderen hun zin geven – 
vooral als iemand weerstand biedt aan zijn pogingen tot overtuigen.  
Tom was blij en dienstwillig om voorgedragen te worden om dit jaar voorzitter van 
zijn vereniging te worden. Het kwam niet als een verassing want zijn verenigingsgenoten 
hadden hem vaak gevraagd hadden om vergaderingen te organiseren, belangrijke 
beslissingen te leiden, en belangrijke activiteiten aan te sturen. Toen hem gevraagd werd om 
het woord te nemen met betrekking tot de voordracht, bleef hij zitten en begon hij op 
ontspannen en vol zelfvertrouwen te spreken.  
Tom vermoedde dat hij een concurrent had maar was niet bereid om de situatie te 
domineren of onder druk te zetten. Bovendien was hij niet bereid om zich overheersend of 
aanmatigend te gedragen tegenover een concurrent of zijn verenigingsgenoten. Tom sprak 
kort over zijn vele positive eigenschappen, successen en verdiensten in veel verschillende 
domeinen van zijn leven. Tewijl hij sprak zaten zijn verenigingsgenoten rechtop, maakten ze 
goed oogcontact en luisterden ze intens tot hij klaar was met spreken.  
Tom voelde zich voldaan toen zijn verenigingsgenoten hem vertelden dat ze 
onderling al unaniem besloten hadden om hem tot voorzitter te kiezen. Ze onderstreepten 
verder nog dat dit besluit gebaseerd was op Tom’s niet aflatende successen en frequente 
prestaties. In lijn met veel andere ervaringen van Tom, was het hem duidelijk dat zijn 
verenigingsgenoten hem bewonderden en in hoge aanzien hielden. 
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
High Dominance & High Prestige 
English Translation 
Tom is a second year student and has been actively involved in his student 
association since the beginning of his studies. Tom, with his striking and powerful presence, 
has a tendency to control and take the lead in every situation. He is direct and thorough in 
both formal and informal social circumstances. Every movement he makes communicates 
dignity, dominance, reputability, and authority. When his plans are thwarted, Tom will 
coerce any competitor with a show of oppressive determination, which usually results in the 
competitor giving in.  
This year, Tom was determined to become the president of his student association 
and was willing to take anyone on who stood in his way. When the time came that he 
nominated himself, Tom rose and paced while he spoke and was emotional at times when 
expressing why he should be elected president. He reminded the members of the student 
association that they had frequently asked him to organize meetings, take important 
decisions, and take a leading role in important activities. Tom went on to remind them of his 
many positive qualities, successes and accomplishments across many areas of his life.  
When Tom spoke forcefully, his peers avoided eye contact and slouched in their 
seats. However, Tom began to suspect that he was not going to encounter any opposition, so 
he sat and began to speak in a relaxed and confident manner. At this time, Tom’s peers sat 
upright, made good eye contact and listened intently until he finished speaking.  
Tom was pleased when his fellow members told him that they had already 
unanimously decided among themselves to elect him president. Furthermore, they 
emphasized that this decision was based on Tom’s consistent successes and frequent 
accomplishments. Consistent with many other of Tom’s experiences, it was clear to him that 
his peers admired him, held him in high regard, and were unwilling to challenge his desire to 
lead them. 
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 2.1 
High Dominance & High Prestige 
Original Dutch Version 
Tom is een tweedejaars student en is vanaf het begin van zijn studie actief betrokken 
geweest bij zijn studentenvereniging. Tom, met zijn opvallende en krachtige aanwezigheid, 
heeft de neiging om het voortouw te nemen en de leiding naar zich toe te trekken in elke 
situatie. Hij is direct en gedegen in zowel formele als informele sociale situaties. Uit elke 
beweging die hij maakt spreekt waardigheid, dominantie, gerenommeerdheid, en autoriteit. 
Als hij gedwarsboomd wordt, zal Tom zijn tegenstander overbluffen door blijkt te geven van 
een dwingende vastberadenheid, wat er meestal toe leidt dat zijn opponent toegeeft.  
Dit jaar was Tom vastbesloten om voorzitter van zijn vereniging te worden, en hij 
was bereid om het tegen iedereen op te nemen die hem in de weg stond. Toen het moment 
daar was dat hij zich beschikbaar stelde, stond Tom op, liep hij heen en weer terwijl hij sprak 
en was hij bij tijden emotioneel toen hij verwoorde waarom hij vond dat hij tot voorzitter 
gekozen zou moeten worden. Hij herinnerde de leden van de studentenvereniging eraan dat 
ze hem vaak gevraagd hadden om vergaderingen te organiseren, belangrijke beslissingen te 
nemen, en belangrijke activiteiten aan te sturen. Tom vervolgde door ze te herinneren aan 
zijn vele positieve eigenschappen, successen en verdiensten in veel verschillende domeinen 
van zijn leven.  
Op het moment dat Tom op dwingende wijze sprak, vermeden zijn 
verenigingsgenoten het om oogcontact met hem te maken en zakten ze weg in hun stoelen. 
Maar Tom begon te vermoeden dat hij geen tegenstand zou ondervinden, dus ging hij zitten 
en begon op meer ontspannen en zelfverzekerde wijze te spreken. Nu gingen de 
verenigingsgenoten van Tom rechtop zitten, maakten ze oogcontact en luisterden ze intens 
tot hij klaar was met spreken.  
Tom voelde zich voldaan toen zijn verenigingsgenoten hem vertelden dat ze 
onderling al unaniem besloten hadden om hem tot voorzitter te kiezen. Ze onderstreepten 
verder nog dat dit besluit gebaseerd was op Tom’s niet aflatende successen en frequente 
prestaties. In lijn met veel andere ervaringen van Tom, was het hem duidelijk dat zijn 
verenigingsgenoten hem bewonderden en in hoge aanzien hielden, en dat ze niet bereid 
waren om zijn wens om de leiding over ze te nemen aan te vechten. 162 
 
Appendix 3.1: Pre-test A3.1 Perceptions of Agentic Behaviour 
Thirty-three participants (16 females, 17 males; Mage = 21.94, SD = 4.48) were 
recruited on Campus at Tilburg University and assigned to one of two Behaviour Type 
conditions (Agentic Behaviour: low, high) of a paper-and-pencil pre-test.  
Participants read a description of a person named “Kim” (a Dutch gender-neutral 
name). Depending on condition the description consisted of eight high agency behaviours or 
eight low agency behaviours obtained from the associated scales of the Social Behaviour 
Inventory (SBI: Moskowitz, 1994; full list is included in Table A3.1). After reading the 
description, participants rated their perception of Kim on two items (persuasive and 
intimidating) on scales running from not at all (-3) to very much (3).  
T-tests confirmed that targets described in terms of High Agency behaviour were 
seen as more persuasive (M = 1.69) than targets described in terms of Low Agency 
behaviour (M = -2.06), t(31) = 7.82, p < .001, and as more intimidating (M = 1.25) than those 
described in terms of Low Agency behaviour (M = -2.29), F(31) = 9.42, p < .001. 163 
 
Table A3.1: Behaviour Type Manipulation Materials for Pre-test A3.1 
Low Agentic Behaviour 
 English Translation 
  Kim waits until others say or do something first.  
  Kim easily gives in to others.  
  Kim speaks softly.  
  Kim only speaks when others ask something.  
  Kim prefers to keep an own opinion to themselves.  
  Kim is someone who doesn’t always voice a disagreement with something.  
  Kim prefers to let others make plans or take decisions.  
  Kim doesn’t state own wishes directly.  
 
Original Dutch Version 
  Kim wacht af tot anderen eerst iets zeggen of doen.  
  Kim geeft gemakkelijk toe aan anderen.  
  Kim spreekt zachtjes. 
  Kim praat alleen als anderen iets vragen. 
  Kim houdt een eigen mening liever voor zich. 
  Kim is iemand die niet altijd zegt het ergens niet mee eens te zijn.  
  Kim laat het liever aan anderen over laat om plannen te maken of beslissingen te 
nemen. 
  Kim zegt niet rechtstreek iets te willen. 
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Table A3.1 (Continued): Behaviour Type Manipulation Materials for Pre-test 
A3.1 
High Agentic Behaviour 
English Translation 
  Kim sets goals for themselves and others.  
  Kim takes the lead in planning and organizing projects or activities.  
  Kim speaks with a clear and resolute voice.  
  Kim provides information.  
  Kim isn’t afraid to give an opinion.  
  Kim asks for volunteers.  
  Kim immediately gets to the point.  
  Kim asks others to do things. 
 
Original Dutch Version 
  Kim stelt doelen voor zichzelf en anderen  
  Kim neemt de leiding in het plannen en organiseren van projecten of activiteiten  
  Kim spreekt met een heldere ferme stem  
  Kim geeft informatie 
  Kim is niet bang is om een mening te geven  
  Kim vraagt om vrijwilligers 
  Kim komt onmiddellijk ter zake  
  Kim vraagt anderen om dingen te doen.  165 
 
Appendix 3.2: Pre-test A3.2 Perceptions of Communal Behaviour 
Thirty-two more participants (16 females, 16 males; Mage = 22.87, SD = 5.07) were 
recruited on Campus at Tilburg University and assigned to one of two Behaviour Type 
conditions (Communal Behaviour: low, high) of a paper-and-pencil pre-test.  
Depending on condition, participants read a description of a person named Kim 
consisting of eight High Communal behaviours or eight Low Communal behaviours 
obtained from the associated scales of the SBI (Moskowitz, 1994; full list included in Table 
A3.2). After reading the description, participants rated their perception of Kim on two items 
(respectful and accommodating) on scales running from not at all (-3) to very much (3).  
T-tests confirmed that targets described in terms of High Communal behaviour were 
seen as more respectful (M = 2.50) than targets described in terms of Low Communal 
behaviour (M = -1.31), t(30) = 8.96, p < .001, and as more accommodating (M = 1.69) than 
those described in terms of Low Communal behaviour (M = -1.19), t(30) = 6.18, p < .001. 
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Table A3.2: Behaviour Type Manipulation Materials for Pre-test A3.2 
Low Communal Behaviour 
English Translation 
  Kim doesn’t always react to questions and comments of others.  
  Kim sometimes makes sarcastic remarks.  
  Kim sometimes provides false information. 
  Kim discredits what others say. 
  Kim sometimes speaks with a strongly raised voice. 
  Kim contradicts what others say.  
  Kim confronts others when they disagree about something. 
  Kim demands that others do what Kim wants.  
 
Original Dutch Version 
  Kim reageert niet altijd op de vragen en opmerkingen van anderen. 
  Kim maakt soms sarcastische opmerkingen.  
  Kim geeft weleens onjuiste informatie.  
  Kim brengt wat anderen zeggen in diskrediet. 
  Kim verheft soms luidkeels de stem. 
  Kim weerspreekt wat anderen zeggen.  
  Kim gaat de confrontatie aan met anderen als ze het ergens niet over eens zijn.  
  Kim eist van anderen dat ze doen wat Kim wil. 
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Table A3.2 (Continued): Behaviour Type Manipulation Materials for Pre-test A3.2 
High Communal Behaviour 
English Translation 
  Kim listens attentively to others. 
  Kim shows sympathy.  
  Kim compliments or praises others. 
  Kim says positive things about other people who are not present.  
  Kim is prepared to compromise about decisions. 
  Kim points out to others where there is agreement.  
  Kim laughs and smiles with others. 
  Kim exchanges pleasantries. 
 
Original Dutch Version 
  Kim luistert aandachtig naar anderen 
  Kim toont sympathie  
  Kim complimenteert of prijst anderen 
  Kim zegt positieve dingen over mensen die er niet bij zijn  
  Kim is bereid om compromissen te sluiten over beslissingen  
  Kim wijst anderen erop waar er overeenstemming is  
  Kim lacht en glimlacht vaak met anderen  
  Kim wisselt beleefheden uit 
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Appendix 3.3: Group Hierarchy Type Manipulation Materials for Study 3.2 
Dominance-based 
English Translation 
Assertiveness reigns at Vincentus 
Research by bureau Youth and Well-Being in Utrecht has shown that competitive 
students are highly successful within student associations and social societies at Dutch 
Universities. The individualistic atmosphere seems to benefit assertive careerists. Our 
reporter discussed this with members of social society “Vincentus” in Enschede. “In our 
society dominant personalities claim a leading role for themselves. Their forceful behaviour 
withholds fellow students from challenging them.”  
“Vincentus has set the stage for a power struggle between dominant personalities in 
which the most coercive students call the shots. Students who are not prepared to 
predominate or put pressure on others are disregarded. The most powerful students simply 
apply coercion and exert pressure on them until they give in. Consequently interactions are 
characterized by harsh competition. Aggressive determination is imperative in order to 
exercise influence. Therefore, members soon learn that you need to stand up for yourself, 
and that you can achieve something by suppressing and dominating others.” # 
 
Original Dutch Version 
Op Vincentus heerst assertiviteit 
Uit onderzoek van het bureau Jeugd en Welzijn in Utrecht is gebleken dat 
competitief ingestelde studenten veel aanzien hebben binnen studentenverenigingen en 
disputen van Nederlandse universiteiten. De individualistische sfeer zou assertieve strebers 
in de kaart spelen. Onze verslaggever sprak hierover met leden van het dispuut “Vincentus” 
in Enschede. “In ons dispuut eisen krachtige persoonlijkheden een leidende rol op. Hun 
dwingende gedrag weerhoudt medestudenten ervan om tegen hen in te gaan.” 
“Vincentus heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een toneel voor een machtstrijd tussen 
krachtige persoonlijkheden waarin degene die de meeste dwang uitoefent het voor het 
zeggen heeft. Studenten die niet bereid zijn om de boventoon te voeren of anderen onder 
druk te zetten hebben het nakijken. De machtigste studenten overbluffen ze simpelweg en 
oefenen druk op ze uit tot ze inbinden. Het gevolg is dat de omgangsvormen gekenmerkt 
worden door keiharde competitie. Agressieve vastberadenheid is van belang om invloed uit 
te kunnen oefenen. Leden leren daarom al gauw dat je voor jezelf op moet komen en dat je 
iets bereikt door anderen te onderdrukken en overheersen.” # 169 
 
Appendix 3.3 (Continued): Group Hierarchy Type Manipulation for Study 3.2 
Prestige-based 
English Translation 
Appreciation reigns at Vincentus 
Research by bureau Youth and Well-Being in Utrecht has shown that cooperative 
students are highly successful within student associations and social societies at Dutch 
Universities. The democratic atmosphere seems to benefit trustworthy mediators. Our 
reporter discussed this with members of social society “Vincentus” in Enschede. “In our 
society reliable and credible personalities are given a leading role. Sincere appreciation 
withholds fellow students from challenging them.”  
“Vincentus has set the stage for a democratic process in which those who enjoy the 
trust of fellow students call the shots. Students who try to dominate the situation or suppress 
others are disregarded. Fellow students simply give their support and trust only to students 
they genuinely appreciate and respect. Consequently interactions are characterized by mutual 
respect. Convincing others is essential to exercise influence. Therefore, members soon learn 
to be considerate towards others, and that you can achieve something if others respect and 
trust you.” # 
 
Original Dutch Version 
Op Vincentus heerst waardering 
Uit onderzoek van het bureau Jeugd en Welzijn in Utrecht is gebleken dat 
coöperatief ingestelde studenten veel aanzien hebben binnen studentenverenigingen en 
disputen van Nederlandse universiteiten. De democratische sfeer zou betrouwbare 
bruggenbouwers in de kaart spelen. Onze verslaggever sprak hierover met leden van het 
dispuut “Vincentus” in Enschede. “In ons dispuut wordt aan gedegen en geloofwaardige 
persoonlijkheden een leidende rol toebedeeld. Oprechte waardering weerhoudt 
medestudenten ervan om tegen hun in te gaan.” 
“Vincentus heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een toneel voor een democratisch proces 
waarin degene die het vertrouwen geniet van medestudenten het voor het zeggen heeft. 
Studenten die proberen om de situatie te domineren of onder druk te zetten hebben het 
nakijken. Medestudenten geven hun steun en vertrouwen simpelweg alleen aan die studenten 
die ze oprecht waarderen en respecteren. Het gevolg is dat de omgangsvormen gekenmerkt 
worden door onderling respect. Het meekrijgen van anderen is van belang om invloed uit te 
kunnen oefenen. Leden leren daarom al gauw om rekening te houden met anderen en dat je 
iets bereikt als anderen je waarderen en vertrouwen.” #170 
 
Appendix 3.4: Behaviour Type Manipulation Materials for Study 3.2 
Low Agentic and Low Communal 
 English Translation 
Kim is someone who prefers to keep an own opinion to themselves and doesn’t always 
voice a disagreement with something. Kim prefers to let others make plans or take decisions 
and doesn’t state directly to want something. Kim also doesn’t always react to questions and 
remarks of others and sometimes makes sarcastic comments. Kim sometimes provides 
incorrect information and discredits what others say. 
 
Original Dutch Version 
Kim is iemand die een eigen mening liever voor zich houdt en het niet altijd zegt het 
ergens niet mee eens te zijn. Kim laat het liever aan anderen over laat om plannen te maken 
of beslissingen te nemen en zegt niet rechtstreek iets te willen. Ook reageert Kim niet altijd 
op de vragen en opmerkingen van anderen en maakt Kim soms sarcastische opmerkingen. 
Kim geeft weleens onjuiste informatie en brengt wat anderen zeggen in diskrediet. 
 
Low Agentic and High Communal 
English Translation 
Kim is someone who waits until others say or do something first and who easily gives in 
to others. Kim speaks softly and only when others ask something. Kim is also prepared to 
compromise about decisions and points out to others where there is agreement. Kim often 
laughs and smiles with others and exchanges pleasantries. 
 
Original Dutch Version 
Kim is iemand die afwacht tot anderen eerst iets zeggen of doen en die gemakkelijk 
toegeeft aan anderen. Kim spreekt zachtjes en praat alleen als anderen iets vragen. Ook is 
Kim bereid om compromissen te sluiten over beslissingen en wijst Kim anderen erop waar er 
overeenstemming is. Kim lacht en glimlacht vaak met anderen en wisselt beleefheden uit. 
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Appendix 3.4 (Continued): Behaviour Type Manipulation Materials for Study 3.2  
High Agentic and High Communal 
English Translation 
Kim is someone who sets goals for themselves and others and often takes the lead in 
planning and organizing projects or activities. Kim speaks with a clear firm voice and 
provides information. Kim also listens attentively to others and shows sympathy. Kim 
compliments or praises others and says positive things about people who are not present.  
 
Original Dutch Version 
  Kim is iemand die doelen stelt voor zichzelf en anderen en vaak de leiding neemt in 
het plannen en organiseren van projecten of activiteiten. Kim spreekt met een heldere ferme 
stem en geeft informatie. Ook luistert Kim aandachtig naar anderen en toont sympathie. Kim 
complimenteert of prijst anderen en zegt positieve dingen over mensen die er niet bij zijn.  
 
High Agentic and Low Communal 
English Translation 
Kim is someone who isn’t afraid to give an opinion or ask for volunteers. Kim usually 
gets to the point immediately and asks others to do things. Kim sometimes speaks with a 
loudly raised voice and contradicts what others say. Kim confronts others when they 
disagree about something and demands that they do what Kim wants.  
 
Original Dutch Version 
Kim is iemand die niet bang is om een mening te geven of om vrijwilligers te vragen. 
Kim komt meestal onmiddellijk ter zake en vraagt anderen om dingen te doen. Kim verheft 
soms luidkeels de stem en weerspreekt wat anderen zeggen Kim gaat de confrontatie aan met 
anderen als ze het ergens niet over eens zijn en eist van anderen dat ze doen wat Kim wil. 
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Appendix 4.1: Pre-test A4.1 Meeting or Exceeding Standards 
My theoretical analysis of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES, Rosenberg, 
1965), the scale most commonly used to measure self-esteem, and the 40-item Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (NPI-40, Raskin & Terry, 1988), the scale most commonly used to 
measure narcissism, suggested that the former primarily measures the extent to which people 
perceive themselves as meeting standards whereas the latter primarily measures the extent to 
which people perceive themselves as exceeding standards. I subjected this theoretical 
conclusion to empirical testing in a short pre-test.  
Participants. 
Participants (M = 32; 12 males, 20 females) were recruited via M-Turk for an online 
study.  They ranged in age from 18 to 58 (M = 33.88, SD = 12.14) and predominantly had 
the American nationality (78.2%). All participants classed their English speaking ability as at 
least “good”, while the vast majority even classed it as “perfect” (90.6%).  
Procedure. 
I provided detailed instructions of the task. To explain the difference between 
meeting and exceeding standards they were told that “to meet a standard, you do just enough 
to reach a desired target” and “to exceed a standard, you do enough to reach a desired target, 
but also do more in addition”. They then read an example that further illustrated this 
distinction.  
Following the instructions they were given a complete list of the items from the 
RSES (see Table A4.1), the narcissistic items from the NPI-40 (see Table A4.2) and the non-
narcisstic items (see Table A4.3) from the NPI-40.  They rated each of these items on a scale 
ranging from All about meeting standards (1) to All about exceeding standards (5). 
Results. 
I first computed average scores across 1) the self-esteem items from the RSES (α = 
.55), 2) the narcissistic items from the NPI-40 (α = .94), and 3) the non-narcissistic items 
from the NPI-40 (α = .90) (see Tables A4.1, A4.2, and A4.3 for descriptive statistics). 
Subjecting these average scores to pairwise independent sample t-tests supported the 
hypothesis. First, participants perceived the narcissistic items from the NPI-40 to reflect 
exceeding standards as opposed to meeting standards more (or meeting standards as opposed 
to exceeding standards less) than the items from the RSES, t (28) = 3.96, p < .001. Secondly, 
the narcissistic items from the NPI-40 were also perceived to reflect exceeding standards as 
opposed to than exceeding standards more than the non-narcissistic items from the NPI-40, t 
(27) = 2.50, p = .019. In contrast, the items from the RSES were not perceived to reflect 173 
 
exceeding standards rather than exceeding standards more or less than the non-narcissistic 
items from the NPI-40, t (27) = -1.23, p = .228. 174 
 
Table A4.1 
Pre-test A4.1: Mean (standard deviation) ratings of items on the RSES  
   Item  M  SD 
RSES     
   I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others  2.72  1.65 
   I feel that I have a number of good qualities  3.25  1.32 
   All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure  2.56  1.01 
   I am able to do things as well as most other people  2.59  1.56 
   I feel I do not have much to be proud of  2.37  1.04 
   I take a positive attitude toward myself  3.50  1.24 
   On the whole, I am satisfied with myself  3.00  1.44 
   I wish I could have more respect for myself  2.47  1.30 
   I certainly feel useless at times  2.22  1.07 
   At times I think I am no good at all  2.38  1.13 
Average across items  2.71    .57 
Note.  N  =  32.  Scale  values  ranged  from  All  about  meeting  standards  (1)  to  All  about 
exceeding standards (5).  175 
 
Table A4.2 
Pre-test A4.1: Mean (standard deviation) ratings of narcissistic items on the NPI-40  
Item  M  SD 
I have a natural talent for influencing people.  3.48  1.30 
Modesty doesn’t become me.  3.00  1.10 
I would do almost anything on a dare.  2.90  1.26 
I know that I am a good person because everyone keeps telling me so.  3.21  1.26 
If I ruled the world it would be a better place.  4.17  1.00 
I can usually talk my way out of anything.  3.69  1.17 
I like to be the centre of attention.  3.31  1.29 
I will be a success.  3.97  1.24 
I think that I am a special person.  3.93  1.10 
I see myself as a good leader.  3.69  1.34 
I am assertive.  3.14  1.36 
I like having the authority over other people.  3.29  1.24 
I find it easy to manipulate people.  3.26  1.13 
I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me.  3.07  1.33 
I like to show off my body.  3.03  1.32 
I can read people like a book.  3.55    .99 
I like to take responsibility for making decisions.  3.00  1.28 
I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world.  3.66  1.45 
I like to look at my body.  2.93  1.16 
I will usually show off if I get a chance.  3.41  1.43 
I always know what I am doing.  3.31  1.31 
I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.  3.28  1.22 
Everybody likes to hear my stories.  3.31  1.07 
I expect a great deal from other people.  3.59  1.35 
I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.  3.34  1.59 
I like to be complimented.  3.14  1.38 
I have a strong will to power.  3.69  1.26 
I like to start new fads and fashions.  3.48  1.21 
I like to look at myself in the mirror.  3.21  1.24 
I really like to be the centre of attention.  3.24  1.38 
I can live my life anyway I want to.  3.24  1.19 176 
 
People always seem to recognize my authority.  3.24  1.22 
 
Table A4.2 (Continued) 
Pre-test A4.1: Mean (standard deviation) ratings of narcissistic items on the NPI-40  
I would prefer to be a leader.  3.28  1.39 
I am going to be a great person.  3.52  1.41 
I can make anybody believe anything I want them to.  3.24  1.30 
I am a born leader.  3.45  1.33 
I wish someone would someday write my biography.  3.28  1.56 
I get upset when people don’t notice how I look when I go out in public.  2.59  1.30 
I am more capable than other people.  3.90  1.26 
I am an extraordinary person.  4.21  1.08 
Average across narcissistic items of the NPI-40  3.38    .72 
Note. N = 32. Scale values ranged from All about meeting standards (1) to All about 
exceeding standards (5).  
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Table A4.3 
Pre-test A4.1: Mean (standard deviation) ratings of non-narcissistic items on the NPI-40  
Item  M  SD 
I am not good at influencing people.  2.61  1.13 
I am essentially a modest person.  2.89  1.29 
I tend to be a fairly cautious person.  3.00  1.36 
When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.  2.64    .87 
The thought of ruling the world frightens the hell out of me.  3.14  1.30 
I try to accept the consequences of my behaviour.  3.07  1.36 
I prefer to blend in with the crowd.  2.36  1.28 
I am not too concerned about success.  2.14  1.04 
I am no better or no worse than most people.  2.36  1.34 
I am not sure if I would make a good leader.  2.50  1.07 
I wish I were more assertive.  2.93  1.09 
I don't mind following orders.  2.29  1.05 
I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people.  2.64  1.16 
I usually get the respect that I deserve.  2.79  1.37 
I don't particularly like to show off my body.  3.04  1.00 
People are sometimes hard to understand.  2.79    .96 
If I feel competent I am willing to take responsibility for making decisions.  2.96  1.45 
I just want to be reasonably happy.  2.82  1.66 
My body is nothing special.  2.61  1.10 
I try not to be a show-off.  2.79  1.20 
Sometimes I am not sure what I am doing.  2.36  1.03 
I sometimes depend on people to get things done.  2.89  1.20 
Sometimes I tell good stories.  3.00  1.12 
I like to do things for other people.  3.25  1.08 
I take my satisfactions as they come.  2.93  1.33 
Compliments embarrass me.  2.75    .75 
Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.  3.25  1.18 
I don't very much care about new fads and fashions.  2.86  1.04 
I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.  3.04  1.11 
It makes me uncomfortable to be the centre of attention.  3.00  1.02 
People can't always live their lives in terms of what they want.  3.32  1.28 178 
 
Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.  2.89  1.23 
 
Table A4.3 (Continued) 
Pre-test A4.1: Mean (standard deviation) ratings of non-narcissistic items on the NPI-40 
I makes little different to me whether I am a leader or not.  2.61  1.34 
I hope I am going to be successful.  3.32  1.44 
People sometimes believe what I tell them.  3.29    .90 
Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.  3.50  1.11 
I don't like people to pry into my life for any reason.  3.04  1.04 
I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public.  3.04  1.20 
There is a lot that I can learn from other people.  3.14  1.33 
I am much like everyone else.  2.54  1.40 
Average across non-narcissistic items of the NPI-40  2.86    .54 
Note. N = 32. Scale values ranged from All about meeting standards (1) to All about 
exceeding standards (5).  179 
 
Appendix 4.2: Vignettes and Response Options with Inter-Rater Alphas and 
Means obtained in Study P4.1 
Vignette/Response option  Α 
Mean scores 
DOM  SUB  AGR  QUAR 
1. You have been working on a task with two other people for several weeks. You believe that 
everyone has contributed equally to the task. However, your co-workers claim that you have 
done less than your fair share. Hence, they ask you to do more in future. What do you do? 
A.  Try to understand their point of view and 
reluctantly agree to do more in future. 
.94  3.07  7.43  7.14  2.21 
B.  Try to understand their point of view but calmly 
refuse to do more in future. 
.69  6.00  4.00  5.29  3.86 
C.  Resent them for being unfair to you and bitterly 
agree to do more in future. 
.89  4.21  6.50  2.93  4.93 
D.  Resent them for being unfair to you and resolutely 
refuse to do more in future. 
.96  7.50  2.07  2.36  7.50 
Cut-off value    5.94  5.34  4.57  4.95 
2. As you are talking at the coffee machine two colleagues angrily discuss the behaviour of a 
third colleague who is not there. You sometimes find this colleague difficult to get on with. 
What do you do? 
A.  Refrain from expressing your views openly but 
think of incidents showing the colleague in a 
positive light. 
.94  3.29  7.50  7.36  2.21 
B.  Actively join the discussion and point out 
incidents showing the colleague in a positive 
light. 
.95  6.36  3.14  8.07  2.07 
C.  Refrain from expressing your views openly but 
think of incidents where the colleague behaved 
offensively. 
.90  3.64  6.50  3.36  5.14 
D.  Actively join the discussion and point out 
incidents where the colleague behaved 
offensively. 
.93  7.43  3.29  2.43  7.00 
Cut-off value  5.72  5.36  4.70  3.90 
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Appendix 4.2 (Continued): Vignettes and Response Options with Inter-Rater Alphas 
and Means Scores obtained in Study P4.1 
Vignette/Response option  α 
Mean scores 
DOM  SUB  AGR  QUAR 
3. During a meeting with a group of colleagues, one of them makes an insensitive remark 
about you. What do you do? 
A.  Make allowances for your colleague and say 
nothing about their remark. 
.97  3.00  8.36  7.43  1.71 
B.  Make allowances for your colleague and gently 
point out their remark was inappropriate. 
.92  6.36  4.64  7.07  2.71 
C.  Resent your colleague but say nothing about their 
remark. 
.94  2.71  7.64  3.57  5.14 
D.  Resent your colleague and coldly point out their 
remark was inappropriate. 
.97  7.86  2.57  2.07  7.71 
Cut-off value  4.78  5.79  4.61  3.90 
4. You and your siblings have decided to buy a present for your grandmother's 85th birthday 
together. One sibling forcefully makes a suggestion for a gift you doubt your grandmother will 
be happy with. What do you do? 
A.  Appreciate your sibling for making a suggestion 
and hope there will be better ideas. 
.98  2.71  7.93  8.71  1.79 
B.  Appreciate your sibling for making a suggestion 
but decisively ask for alternative ideas. 
.88  6.79  4.00  7.07  3.57 
C.  Feel contempt for your sibling for being forceful 
and hope there will be better ideas. 
.90  2.93  7.14  4.00  5.29 
D.  Feel contempt for your sibling for being forceful 
and decisively ask for alternative ideas. 
.95  8.21  2.50  2.71  7.00 
Cut-off value  4.73  5.65  5.40  4.72 
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Appendix 4.2 (Continued): Vignettes and Response Options with Inter-Rater Alphas 
and Means Scores obtained in Study P4.1     
Vignette/Response option  α 
Mean scores 
DOM  SUB  AGR  QUAR 
5. At a school reunion you end up sharing a table with a group of old classmates, whom you 
didn't particularly like at the time. Their recollections of "the old days" paint an unflattering 
picture of you. What do you do? 
A.  Understand that memories can be innocently 
biased and quietly wait for them to move on to 
another topic. 
.98  2.50  8.07  8.71  1.86 
B.  Understand that memories can be innocently 
biased and calmly change the topic. 
.95  6.00  5.36  8.21  2.21 
C.  Assume they are deliberately being nasty and 
angrily wait for them to move on to another topic. 
.85  3.57  6.36  3.00  5.57 
D.  Assume they are deliberately being nasty and 
bitterly change the topic.  
.98  7.79  2.14  1.93  7.86 
Cut-off value    5.13  6.13  4.09  3.35 
6. You have invited two friends to your birthday party who have only recently split-up. As you 
go to the kitchen for a couple of cold beers you realize they are engaged in a loud and bitter 
argument. What do you do? 
A.  Sympathize with their plight but cautiously refrain 
from interfering. 
.98  2.50  7.79  7.86  1.64 
B.  Sympathize with their plight, but walk over and 
calmly suggest they talk things over in private. 
.95  6.64  4.57  7.79  2.93 
C.  Feel annoyed about their behaviour but cautiously 
refrain from interfering. 
.89  2.64  6.57  3.64  5.29 
D.  Feel annoyed about their behaviour, walk over 
and sharply suggest they talk things over in 
private. 
.98  8.36  2.57  2.00  8.00 
Cut-off value  4.05  5.58  4.54  3.72 
Note. N = 14. DOM = Dominant behaviour; SUB = Submissive behaviour; AGR = 
Agreeable behaviour; QUAR = Quarrelsome behaviour.  Cronbach alpha was computed for 
each response options across the four behavioural types and between raters. Cut-off values 
are 1 standard deviation above the mean rating on a given behaviour of the two response 
options representing the theoretically opposite behaviours on the same vignette. 182 
 
Appendix 4.3: Manipulations of Self-Esteem and Narcissism Used in Study 4.3 
High Narcissism 
1.  Please think of a moment in your life when you felt that you stood out from the crowd 
and were admired by others. Take a couple of minutes to vividly recall the experience 
and re-live the moment in your mind. Now, write about this experience in the space 
below. Describe how you looked and felt, what you thought about and what you said and 
did. 
2.  Describe how this event made you feel successful and entitled to the attention of others. 
3.  Now, describe how this event made you feel special. 
 
Low Narcissism 
1.  Please think of a moment in your life when you felt you were no better or worse than 
most people and comfortable to blend in with the crowd. Take a couple of minutes to 
vividly recall the experience and re-live the moment in your mind. Now, write about this 
experience in the space below. Describe how you looked and felt, what you thought 
about and what you said and did. 
2.  Describe how this event made you feel unconcerned about your personal success and 
happy to do things for other people. 
3.  Now, describe how this event made you feel humble. 
 183 
 
Appendix 4.3 (Continued): Manipulations of Self-Esteem and Narcissism 
Used in Study 4.3 
High Self-esteem 
1.  Please think of a moment in your life when you felt comfortable with yourself and secure 
in your sense of self-worth. Take a couple of minutes to vividly recall the experience and 
re-live the moment in your mind. Now, write about this experience in the space below. 
Describe how you felt, what you thought about and what you said and did. 
2.  Describe how this event made you feel able to deal with challenges. 
3.  Now, describe how this event made you feel satisfied with who you are. 
 
Low Self-esteem 
1.  Please think of a moment in your life when you felt like a failure and could not respect 
yourself. Take a couple of minutes to vividly recall the experience and re-live the 
moment in your mind. Now, write about this experience in the space below. Describe 
how you felt, what you thought about and what you said and did. 
2.  Describe how this event made you feel unable to deal with challenges.  
3.  Now, describe how this event made you feel unhappy with who you are. 
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Appendix 4.4: State Measure of Self-Esteem Used in Study 4.3 
In the situation I just described… 
1.  I felt that I had a number of good qualities. 
2.  I had a positive attitude toward myself. 185 
 
Appendix 4.5: State Measure of Narcissism Used in Study 4.3 
In the situation I just described… 
1   A  I would have preferred to be a leader. (N) 
  B It made little difference to me whether I was a leader or not. 
2  A  I was not sure if I would make a good leader. 
  B I saw myself as a good leader. (N) 
3  A  I thought I depended on other people to get things done. 
  B I thought I was unlikely to depend on anyone else to get things done. (N) 
4  A  I felt more capable than other people. (N) 
  B I felt there was a lot I could learn from other people.     
5  A  I thought I was much like everybody else. 
  B I thought I was an extraordinary person. (N)     
6  A  Compliments embarrassed me. 
  B I liked to be complimented. (N)     
7  A  I tried not to be a show off. 
  B I would show off if I got a chance. (N)     
8  A  I felt modesty didn’t become me. (N) 
  B I felt I was essentially a modest person.     
9  A  I could read people like a book. (N) 
  B I felt people were sometimes hard to understand.     
10  A  People might have believed what I told them. 
  B I could make anybody believe anything I wanted them to. (N)     
11  A  I thought my body was nothing special. 
  B I liked to look at my body. (N)     
12  A  I liked to look at myself in the mirror. (N) 
  B I was not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.   
13  A  I felt I would never be satisfied until I got all that I deserved. (N) 
  B I took my satisfactions as they came.     
14  A  I expected a great deal from other people. (N) 
  B I liked to do things for other people. 
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Appendix 5.1: Vignettes Used in Study 5.1 as Hierarchy Type Manipulation  
Dominance-Based Hierarchy 
English Translation 
From “Welcome to Mandante (September 2009)” : 
... The possibilities to play a prominent role within Mandante are limited and 
not everyone is suitable for them. Assertive determination is essential in order to 
exert influence within Mandante. Winning the support of others is not important as it 
is not the case that members give their support to the people they sincerely 
appreciate and respect. Rather, powerful members exert pressure on others until 
they give in. New members quickly learn that they need to stand their ground and 
apply coercion to others if they want to play an important role within Mandante, and 
that they do not need to earn respect and trust from others to do so...  
 
Original Dutch Version 
Uit “Welkom bij Mandante (September 2009)” : 
... Er zijn beperkte mogelijkheden om een prominente rol te vervullen 
binnen Mandante en dit is dus niet voor iedereen weggelegd. Om invloed uit te 
oefenen binnen Mandante is assertieve vastberadenheid van essentieel belang. Het 
meekrijgen van anderen is dat niet. Het is namelijk niet zo dat leden hun steun geven 
aan degenen die ze oprecht waarderen en respecteren. In tegendeel machtige leden 
oefenen druk uit op anderen totdat deze toegeven. Nieuwe leden leren al snel dat 
ze op hun strepen moeten staan en anderen moeten overbluffen als ze een 
belangrijke rol willen spelen binnen Mandante, en dat ze daarvoor niet het respect en 
vertrouwen van anderen hoeven te winnen...  187 
 
Appendix 5.1 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 5.1 as Hierarchy 
Type Manipulation  
Prestige-Based Hierarchy 
English Translation 
From “Welcome to Mandante (September 2009)” : 
... The possibilities to play a prominent role within Mandante are limited and 
not everyone is suitable for them. Winning the support of others is essential in order 
to exert influence within Mandante. Assertive determination is not important, as it is 
not the case the powerful members exert pressure on others until they give in. 
Rather, members give their support to the people that they sincerely appreciate 
and respect. New members quickly learn that they need to earn respect and trust 
from others if they want to play an important role within Mandante, and that they do 
not need to stand their ground and apply coercion to others to do so...  
 
Original Dutch Version 
Uit “Welkom bij Mandante (September 2009)” : 
... Er zijn beperkte mogelijkheden om een prominente rol te vervullen 
binnen Mandante en dit is dus niet voor iedereen weggelegd. Om invloed uit te 
oefenen binnen Mandante is het meekrijgen van anderen van essentieel belang. 
Assertieve vastberadenheid is dat niet. Het is namelijk niet zo dat machtige leden 
oefenen druk uit op anderen totdat deze toegeven. In tegendeel leden geven hun 
steun aan degenen die ze oprecht waarderen en respecteren. Nieuwe leden leren 
al snel dat, als ze een belangrijke rol willen spelen binnen Mandante, ze het respect 
en vertrouwen van anderen moeten winnen, en ze daarvoor niet op hun strepen 
hoeven staan en anderen hoeven te overbluffen... 188 
 
Appendix 5.2: Vignettes Used in Study 5.1 as Status Manipulation  
Low Status 
English Translation 
 
 
 
Kim 
Kim is someone who has little influence within Mandante. Kim does not occupy much of a 
prominent position within Mandante and is not very noticeably present. When decisions are 
taken Kim’s opinion does not carry a lot of weight. 
 
 
Original Dutch Version 
 
 
 
Kim 
Kim is iemand die weinig invloed heeft binnen Mandante. Kim neemt een weinig 
opvalllende plek in binnen Mandante en is niet heel merkbaar aanwezig. Als er besluiten 
worden genomen legt de mening van Kim weinig gewicht in de schaal. 
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Appendix 5.2 (Continued): Vignettes Used in Study 5.1 as Status 
Manipulation  
High Status 
English Translation 
 
 
 
Kim 
Kim is someone who has a lot of influence within Mandante. Kim occupies a prominent 
position within Mandante and is noticeably present. When decisions are taken Kim’s opinion 
carries a lot of weight. 
 
 
Original Dutch Version 
 
 
 
 
Kim 
Kim is iemand die veel invloed heeft binnen Mandante. Kim neemt een prominente plek in 
binnen Mandante en is merkbaar aanwezig. Als er besluiten worden genomen legt de mening 
van Kim veel gewicht in de schaal. 
 